Veracrypt for build under GCC6 required using compatibility flag `-std=c++98` against change default C++ frontend in GCC6.
The C++ frontend now defaults to C++14 standard instead of C++98 it has
been defaulting to previously, for compiling older C++ code that might
require either explicitly compiling with selected older C++ standards,
or might require some code adjustment, see
http://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-6/porting_to.html for details. The experimental
C++17 support has been enhanced in this release.
from: https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-announce/2016/msg00000.html
Adhere to XDG Desktop Specification and use the environment variable
XDG_CONFIG_HOME to determine location of configuration files on *all*
platforms. If it is unset or empty resort to platform-specific defaults.
On Windows and OS X, `wxStandardPaths` provides correct defaults (equal
to the previous hard-coded paths) but on Linux and other Unices
`~/.config/appinfo` would be better than `~/.appinfo`. This means we
treat those platforms as a special case. It also means that we may need
to fall back to the legacy location if it exists but the new location
doesn't.
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm (Rijndael, designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, published in 1998) that may be used by US federal departments and agencies to cryptographically protect sensitive
information [3]. VeraCrypt uses AES with 14 rounds and a 256-bit key (i.e., AES-256, published in 2001) operating in
In June 2003, after the NSA (US National Security Agency) conducted a review and analysis of AES, the U.S. CNSS (Committee on National Security Systems) announced in [1] that the design and strength of AES-256 (and AES-192) are sufficient to protect classified
information up to the Top Secret level. This is applicable to all U.S. Government Departments or Agencies that are considering the acquisition or use of products incorporating the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to satisfy Information Assurance requirements
associated with the protection of national security systems and/or national security information [1].</div>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<p>We would like to thank the following people:</p>
<p>The TrueCrypt Developers team who have done an amazing job over the course of 10 years. Without their hard work, VeraCrypt would not exist today.</p>
<p>Paul Le Roux for making his E4M source code available. TrueCrypt 1.0 was derived from E4M and some parts of the E4M source code are still incorporated in the latest version of the TrueCrypt source code.</p>
<p>Brian Gladman, who wrote the excellent AES, Twofish, and SHA-512 routines.</p>
<p>Peter Gutmann for his paper on random numbers, and for creating his cryptlib, which was the source of parts of the random number generator source code.</p>
<p>Wei Dai, who wrote the Serpent and RIPEMD-160 and Whirlpool routines.</p>
<p>Tom St Denis, the author of LibTomCrypt which includes compact SHA-256 routines.</p>
<p>Mark Adler and Jean-loup Gailly, who wrote the zlib library.</p>
<p>The designers of the encryption algorithms, hash algorithms, and the mode of operation:</p>
<p>Horst Feistel, Don Coppersmith, Walt Tuchmann, Lars Knudsen, Ross Anderson, Eli Biham, Bruce Schneier, David Wagner, John Kelsey, Niels Ferguson, Doug Whiting, Chris Hall, Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, Carlisle Adams, Stafford Tavares, Phillip Rogaway, Hans
Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, Bart Preneel, Paulo S. L. M. Barreto.</p>
<p>Andreas Becker for designing VeraCrypt logo and icons.</p>
<p>Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet who proposed a speed optimization for PBKDF2 that reduced mount/boot time by half.</p>
<p>kerukuro for cppcrypto library (http://cppcrypto.sourceforge.net/) from which Kuznyechik cipher implementation was taken.</p>
<p><br>
Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner who wrote the libzip library.</p>
<p><br>
Jack Lloyd who wrote the SIMD optimized Serpent implementation.</p>
<p>All the others who have made this project possible, all who have morally supported us, and all who sent us bug reports or suggestions for improvements.</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Additional%20Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html">Additional Security Requirements and Precautions</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<div>
<h1>Additional Security Requirements and Precautions</h1>
<p>In addition to the requirements and precautions described in this chapter (<ahref="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html"><em>Security Requirements and Precautions</em></a>), you must follow and keep in
mind the security requirements, precautions, and limitations listed in the following chapters and sections:</p>
<ul>
<li><ahref="How%20to%20Back%20Up%20Securely.html"><em><strong>How to Back Up Securely</strong></em></a>
</li><li><ahref="Security%20Requirements%20for%20Hidden%20Volumes.html"><em><strong>Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</strong></em></a>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Authenticity%20and%20Integrity.html">Authenticity and Integrity</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<div>
<h1>Authenticity and Integrity</h1>
<p>VeraCrypt uses encryption to preserve the <em>confidentiality</em> of data it encrypts. VeraCrypt neither preserves nor verifies the integrity or authenticity of data it encrypts or decrypts. Hence, if you allow an adversary to modify data encrypted by VeraCrypt,
he can set the value of any 16-byte block of the data to a random value or to a previous value, which he was able to obtain in the past. Note that the adversary cannot choose the value that you will obtain when VeraCrypt decrypts the modified block —
the value will be random — unless the attacker restores an older version of the encrypted block, which he was able to obtain in the past. It is your responsibility to verify the integrity and authenticity of data encrypted or decrypted by VeraCrypt (for
example, by using appropriate third-party software).<br>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
https://fr.linkedin.com/in/idrassi</a>) is the creator and main developer of VeraCrypt. He managed all development and deployment aspects on all supported platforms (Windows,Linux and OSX).</p>
<p>Alex Kolotnikov (<ahref="https://ru.linkedin.com/in/alex-kolotnikov-6625568b"target="_blank">https://ru.linkedin.com/in/alex-kolotnikov-6625568b</a>) is the author of VeraCrypt EFI bootloader. He manages all aspects of EFI support and his strong expertise
helps bring new exciting features to VeraCrypt Windows system encryption.</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<h2>How to Create and Use a VeraCrypt Container</h2>
<p>This chapter contains step-by-step instructions on how to create, mount, and use a VeraCrypt volume. We strongly recommend that you also read the other sections of this manual, as they contain important information.</p>
<h4>STEP 1:</h4>
<p>If you have not done so, download and install VeraCrypt. Then launch VeraCrypt by double-clicking the file VeraCrypt.exe or by clicking the VeraCrypt shortcut in your Windows Start menu.</p>
The VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard window should appear.<br>
<br>
In this step you need to choose where you wish the VeraCrypt volume to be created. A VeraCrypt volume can reside in a file, which is also called container, in a partition or drive. In this tutorial, we will choose the first option and create a VeraCrypt volume
within a file.<br>
<br>
As the option is selected by default, you can just click <strong>Next</strong>.</p>
<p>Note: In the following steps, the screenshots will show only the right-hand part of the Wizard window.</p>
In this step you need to choose whether to create a standard or hidden VeraCrypt volume. In this tutorial, we will choose the former option and create a standard VeraCrypt volume.<br>
<br>
As the option is selected by default, you can just click <strong>Next</strong>.</p>
In this step you have to specify where you wish the VeraCrypt volume (file container) to be created. Note that a VeraCrypt container is just like any normal file. It can be, for example, moved or deleted as any normal file. It also needs a filename, which you
will choose in the next step.<br>
<br>
Click <strong>Select File</strong>.<br>
<br>
The standard Windows file selector should appear (while the window of the VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard remains open in the background).</p>
In this tutorial, we will create our VeraCrypt volume in the folder F<em>:\Data\ </em>
and the filename of the volume (container) will be <em>My Volume </em>(as can be seen in the screenshot above). You may, of course, choose any other filename and location you like (for example, on a USB memory stick). Note that the file
<em>My Volume </em>does not exist yet – VeraCrypt will create it.</p>
<p>IMPORTANT: Note that VeraCrypt will <em>not </em>encrypt any existing files (when creating a VeraCrypt file container). If you select an existing file in this step, it will be overwritten and replaced by the newly created volume (so the overwritten file
will be <em>lost</em>, <em>not </em>encrypted). You will be able to encrypt existing files (later on) by moving them to the VeraCrypt volume that we are creating now.*</p>
<p>Select the desired path (where you wish the container to be created) in the file selector. Type the desired container file name in the
<strong>Filename </strong>box.<br>
<br>
Click <strong>Save</strong>.<br>
<br>
The file selector window should disappear.<br>
<br>
In the following steps, we will return to the VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard.</p>
<p>* Note that after you copy existing unencrypted files to a VeraCrypt volume, you should securely erase (wipe) the original unencrypted files. There are software tools that can be used for the purpose of secure erasure (many of them are free).</p>
Here you can choose an encryption algorithm and a hash algorithm for the volume. If you are not sure what to select here, you can use the default settings and click
<strong>Next </strong>(for more information, see chapters <ahref="Encryption Algorithms.html">
<em>Encryption Algorithms</em></a> and <ahref="Hash%20Algorithms.html">
Here we specify that we wish the size of our VeraCrypt container to be 250 megabyte. You may, of course, specify a different size. After you type the desired size in the input field (marked with a red rectangle), click
This is one of the most important steps. Here you have to choose a good volume password. Read carefully the information displayed in the Wizard window about what is considered a good password.<br>
<br>
After you choose a good password, type it in the first input field. Then re-type it in the input field below the first one and click
<strong>Next</strong>.</p>
<p>Note: The button <strong>Next </strong>will be disabled until passwords in both input fields are the same.</p>
Move your mouse as randomly as possible within the Volume Creation Wizard window at least until the randomness indicator becomes green. The longer you move the mouse, the better (moving the mouse for at least 30 seconds is recommended). This significantly increases
the cryptographic strength of the encryption keys (which increases security).<br>
<br>
Click <strong>Format</strong>.<br>
<br>
Volume creation should begin. VeraCrypt will now create a file called <em>My Volume
</em>in the folder F<em>:\Data\ </em>(as we specified in Step 6). This file will be a VeraCrypt container (it will contain the encrypted VeraCrypt volume). Depending on the size of the volume, the volume creation may take a long time. After it finishes, the
We have just successfully created a VeraCrypt volume (file container). In the VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard window, click
<strong>Exit</strong>.<br>
<br>
The Wizard window should disappear.<br>
<br>
In the remaining steps, we will mount the volume we just created. We will return to the main VeraCrypt window (which should still be open, but if it is not, repeat Step 1 to launch VeraCrypt and then continue from Step 13.)</p>
Select the PRF algorithm that was used during the creation of the volume (SHA-512 is the default PRF used by VeraCrypt). If you don’t remember which PRF was used, just leave it set to “autodetection” but the mounting process will take more
time. Click <strong>OK</strong> after entering the password.<br>
<br>
VeraCrypt will now attempt to mount the volume. If the password is incorrect (for example, if you typed it incorrectly), VeraCrypt will notify you and you will need to repeat the previous step (type the password again and click
<strong>OK</strong>). If the password is correct, the volume will be mounted.</p>
We have just successfully mounted the container as a virtual disk M:<br>
<br>
The virtual disk is entirely encrypted (including file names, allocation tables, free space, etc.) and behaves like a real disk. You can save (or copy, move, etc.) files to this virtual disk and they will be encrypted on the fly as they are being written.<br>
<br>
If you open a file stored on a VeraCrypt volume, for example, in media player, the file will be automatically decrypted to RAM (memory) on the fly while it is being read.</p>
<p>Important: Note that when you open a file stored on a VeraCrypt volume (or when you write/copy a file to/from the VeraCrypt volume) you will not be asked to enter the password again. You need to enter the correct password only when mounting the volume.</p>
<p>You can open the mounted volume, for example, by selecting it on the list as shown in the screenshot above (blue selection) and then double-clicking on the selected item.</p>
<p>You can also browse to the mounted volume the way you normally browse to any other types of volumes. For example, by opening the ‘<em>Computer</em>’ (or ‘<em>My Computer</em>’) list and double clicking the corresponding drive letter
You can copy files (or folders) to and from the VeraCrypt volume just as you would copy them to any normal disk (for example, by simple drag-and-drop operations). Files that are being read or copied from the encrypted VeraCrypt volume are automatically decrypted
on the fly in RAM (memory). Similarly, files that are being written or copied to the VeraCrypt volume are automatically encrypted on the fly in RAM (right before they are written to the disk).<br>
<br>
Note that VeraCrypt never saves any decrypted data to a disk – it only stores them temporarily in RAM (memory). Even when the volume is mounted, data stored in the volume is still encrypted. When you restart Windows or turn off your computer, the volume
will be dismounted and all files stored on it will be inaccessible (and encrypted). Even when power supply is suddenly interrupted (without proper system shut down), all files stored on the volume will be inaccessible (and encrypted). To make them accessible
again, you have to mount the volume. To do so, repeat Steps 13-18.</p>
<p>If you want to close the volume and make files stored on it inaccessible, either restart your operating system or dismount the volume. To do so, follow these steps:<br>
Select the volume from the list of mounted volumes in the main VeraCrypt window (marked with a red rectangle in the screenshot above) and then click
<strong>Dismount </strong>(also marked with a red rectangle in the screenshot above). To make files stored on the volume accessible again, you will have to mount the volume. To do so, repeat Steps 13-18.</p>
<h2>How to Create and Use a VeraCrypt-Encrypted Partition/Device</h2>
<p>Instead of creating file containers, you can also encrypt physical partitions or drives (i.e., create VeraCrypt device-hosted volumes). To do so, repeat the steps 1-3 but in the step 3 select the second or third option. Then follow the remaining instructions
in the wizard. When you create a device-hosted VeraCrypt volume within a <em>non-system
</em>partition/drive, you can mount it by clicking <em>Auto-Mount Devices </em>in the main VeraCrypt window. For information pertaining to encrypted
<em>system </em>partition/drives, see the chapter <ahref="System%20Encryption.html">
<em>System Encryption</em></a>.</p>
<p>Important: <em>We strongly recommend that you also read the other chapters of this manual, as they contain important information that has been omitted in this tutorial for simplicity.</em></p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
Jointly developed by Mitsubishi Electric and NTT of Japan, Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher that was first published on 2000. It has been approved for use by the ISO/IEC, the European Union's NESSIE project and the Japanese CRYPTREC project.</div>
VeraCrypt uses Camellia with 24 rounds and a 256-bit key operating in <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html"style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
XTS mode</a> (see the section <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html"style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<p>Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html">
<em>Modes of Operation</em></a>). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that
header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see
<ahref="Header Key Derivation.html"><em>Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count</em></a>). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.</p>
<h2>AES-Twofish-Serpent</h2>
<p>Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html">
<em>Modes of Operation</em></a>). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode, and finally with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption
keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section
<ahref="Header Key Derivation.html"><em>Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count</em></a>). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.</p>
<h2>Serpent-AES</h2>
<p>Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html">
<em>Modes of Operation</em></a>). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that
header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section
<ahref="Header Key Derivation.html"><em>Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count</em></a>). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.</p>
<h2>Serpent-Twofish-AES</h2>
<p>Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html">
<em>Modes of Operation</em></a>). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256- bit key) in XTS mode, and finally with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All
encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section
<ahref="Header Key Derivation.html"><em>Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count</em></a>). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.</p>
<h2>Twofish-Serpent</h2>
<p>Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section <ahref="Modes%20of%20Operation.html">
<em>Modes of Operation</em></a>). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note
that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section
<ahref="Header Key Derivation.html"><em>Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count</em></a>). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Changing%20Passwords%20and%20Keyfiles.html">Changing Passwords and Keyfiles</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<h1>Changing Passwords and Keyfiles</h1>
<p>Note that the volume header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile) contains the master key (not to be confused with the password) with which the volume is encrypted. If an adversary is allowed to make a copy of your volume
before you change the volume password and/or keyfile(s), he may be able to use his copy or fragment (the old header) of the VeraCrypt volume to mount your volume using a compromised password and/or compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume
before you changed the volume password and/or keyfile(s).<br>
<br>
If you are not sure whether an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and whether he has a copy of your volume when you need to change its password and/or keyfiles, it is strongly recommended that you create a new VeraCrypt volume and move files
from the old volume to the new volume (the new volume will have a different master key).<br>
<br>
Also note that if an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and has access to your volume, he may be able to retrieve and keep its master key. If he does, he may be able to decrypt your volume even after you change its password and/or keyfile(s)
(because the master key does not change when you change the volume password and/or keyfiles). In such a case, create a new VeraCrypt volume and move all files from the old volume to this new one.<br>
<br>
The following sections of this chapter contain additional information pertaining to possible security issues connected with changing passwords and/or keyfiles:</p>
<ul>
<li><ahref="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html"><em>Security Requirements and Precautions</em></a>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Choosing%20Passwords%20and%20Keyfiles.html">Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<div>
<h1>Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles</h1>
<p>It is very important that you choose a good password. You must avoid choosing one that contains only a single word that can be found in a dictionary (or a combination of such words). It must not contain any names, dates of birth, account numbers, or any
other items that could be easy to guess. A good password is a random combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters, such as @ ^ = $ * + etc. We strongly recommend choosing a password consisting of more than 20 characters (the
longer, the better). Short passwords are easy to crack using brute-force techniques.<br>
<br>
To make brute-force attacks on a keyfile infeasible, the size of the keyfile must be at least 30 bytes. If a volume uses multiple keyfiles, then at least one of the keyfiles must be 30 bytes in size or larger. Note that the 30-byte limit assumes a large amount
of entropy in the keyfile. If the first 1024 kilobytes of a file contain only a small amount of entropy, it must not be used as a keyfile (regardless of the file size). If you are not sure what entropy means, we recommend that you let VeraCrypt generate a
file with random content and that you use it as a keyfile (select <em>Tools -> Keyfile Generator</em>).</p>
<p>When creating a volume, encrypting a system partition/drive, or changing passwords/keyfiles, you must not allow any third party to choose or modify the password/keyfile(s) before/while the volume is created or the password/keyfiles(s) changed. For example,
you must not use any password generators (whether website applications or locally run programs) where you are not sure that they are high-quality and uncontrolled by an attacker, and keyfiles must not be files that you download from the internet or that are
accessible to other users of the computer (whether they are administrators or not).</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Command%20Line%20Usage.html">Command Line Usage</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<div>
<h1>Command Line Usage</h1>
<p>Note that this section applies to the Windows version of VeraCrypt. For information on command line usage applying to the
<strong>Linux and Mac OS X versions</strong>, please run: veracrypt –h</p>
<tableborder="1"cellspacing="0"cellpadding="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>/help</em> or <em>/?</em></td>
<td>Display command line help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/truecrypt or /tc</em></td>
<td>Activate TrueCrypt compatibility mode which enables mounting volumes created with TrueCrypt 6.x and 7.x series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/hash</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a parameter indicating the PRF hash algorithm to use when mounting the volume. Possible values for /hash parameter are: sha256, sha-256, sha512, sha-512, whirlpool, ripemd160 and ripemd-160. When /hash is omitted, VeraCrypt will try
all possible PRF algorithms thus lengthening the mount operation time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<tdid="volume"><em>/volume</em> or <em>/v</em></td>
<td>
<p>It must be followed by a parameter indicating the file and path name of a VeraCrypt volume to mount (do not use when dismounting) or the Volume ID of the disk/partition to mount.<br>
The syntax of the volume ID is <strong>ID:XXXXXX...XX</strong> where the XX part is a 64 hexadecimal characters string that represent the 32-Bytes ID of the desired volume to mount.<br>
<br>
To mount a partition/device-hosted volume, use, for example, /v \Device\Harddisk1\Partition3 (to determine the path to a partition/device, run VeraCrypt and click
<em>Select Device</em>). You can also mount a partition or dynamic volume using its volume name (for example, /v \\?\Volume{5cceb196-48bf-46ab-ad00-70965512253a}\). To determine the volume name use e.g. mountvol.exe. Also note that device paths are case-sensitive.<br>
<br>
You can also specify the Volume ID of the partition/device-hosted volume to mount, for example: /v ID:53B9A8D59CC84264004DA8728FC8F3E2EE6C130145ABD3835695C29FD601EDCA. The Volume ID value can be retrieved using the volume properties dialog.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/letter</em> or <em>/l</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a parameter indicating the driver letter to mount the volume as. When /l is omitted and when /a is used, the first free drive letter is used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/explore</em> or <em>/e</em></td>
<td>Open an Explorer window after a volume has been mounted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/beep</em> or <em>/b</em></td>
<td>Beep after a volume has been successfully mounted or dismounted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/auto</em> or <em>/a</em></td>
<td>If no parameter is specified, automatically mount the volume. If devices is specified as the parameter (e.g., /a devices), auto-mount all currently accessible device/partition-hosted VeraCrypt volumes. If favorites is specified as the parameter, auto-mount
favorite volumes. Note that /auto is implicit if /quit and /volume are specified. If you need to prevent the application window from appearing, use /quit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/dismount</em> or <em>/d</em></td>
<td>Dismount volume specified by drive letter (e.g., /d x). When no drive letter is specified, dismounts all currently mounted VeraCrypt volumes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/force</em> or <em>/f</em></td>
<td>Forces dismount (if the volume to be dismounted contains files being used by the system or an application) and forces mounting in shared mode (i.e., without exclusive access).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/keyfile</em> or <em>/k</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a parameter specifying a keyfile or a keyfile search path. For multiple keyfiles, specify e.g.: /k c:\keyfile1.dat /k d:\KeyfileFolder /k c:\kf2 To specify a keyfile stored on a security token or smart card, use the following syntax:
token://slot/SLOT_NUMBER/file/FILE_NAME</td>
</tr>
<trid="tryemptypass">
<td><em>/tryemptypass </em></td>
<td>ONLY when default keyfile configured or when a keyfile is specified in the command line.<br>
If it is followed by <strong>y</strong> or <strong>yes</strong> or if no parameter is specified: try to mount using an empty password and the keyfile before displaying password prompt.<br>
if it is followed by <strong>n </strong>or<strong> no</strong>: don't try to mount using an empty password and the keyfile, and display password prompt right away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/nowaitdlg</em></td>
<td>If it is followed by <strong>y</strong> or <strong>yes</strong> or if no parameter is specified: don’t display the waiting dialog while performing operations like mounting volumes.<br>
If it is followed by <strong>n</strong> or <strong>no</strong>: force the display waiting dialog is displayed while performing operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/secureDesktop</em></td>
<td>If it is followed by <strong>y</strong> or <strong>yes</strong> or if no parameter is specified: display password dialog in a dedicated secure desktop to protect against certain types of attacks.<br>
If it is followed by <strong>n</strong> or <strong>no</strong>: the password dialog is displayed in the normal desktop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/tokenlib</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a parameter indicating the PKCS #11 library to use for security tokens and smart cards. (e.g.: /tokenlib c:\pkcs11lib.dll)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/tokenpin</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a parameter indicating the PIN to use in order to authenticate to the security token or smart card (e.g.: /tokenpin 0000). Warning: This method of entering a smart card PIN may be insecure, for example, when an unencrypted command
prompt history log is being saved to unencrypted disk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/cache</em> or <em>/c</em></td>
<td>If it is followed by <strong>y</strong> or <strong>yes</strong> or if no parameter is specified: enable password cache;
<br>
If it is followed by <strong>n </strong>or<strong> no</strong>: disable password cache (e.g., /c n).<br>
If it is followed by <strong>f </strong>or<strong> favorites</strong>: temporary cache password when mounting multiple favorites (e.g., /c f).<br>
Note that turning the password cache off will not clear it (use /w to clear the password cache).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/history</em> or <em>/h</em></td>
<td>If it is followed by <strong>y</strong> or no parameter: enables saving history of mounted volumes; if it is followed by
<strong>n</strong>: disables saving history of mounted volumes (e.g., /h n).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/wipecache</em> or <em>/w</em></td>
<td>Wipes any passwords cached in the driver memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/password</em> or <em>/p</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a parameter indicating the volume password. If the password contains spaces, it must be enclosed in quotation marks (e.g., /p ”My Password”). Use /p ”” to specify an empty password.
<em>Warning: This method of entering a volume password may be insecure, for example, when an unencrypted command prompt history log is being saved to unencrypted disk.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/pim</em></td>
<td>It must be followed by a positive integer indicating the PIM (Personal Iterations Multiplier) to use for the volume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/quit</em> or <em>/q</em></td>
<td>Automatically perform requested actions and exit (main VeraCrypt window will not be displayed). If preferences is specified as the parameter (e.g., /q preferences), then program settings are loaded/saved and they override settings specified on the command
line. /q background launches the VeraCrypt Background Task (tray icon) unless it is disabled in the Preferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/silent</em> or <em>/s</em></td>
<td>If /q is specified, suppresses interaction with the user (prompts, error messages, warnings, etc.). If /q is not specified, this option has no effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/mountoption</em> or <em>/m</em></td>
<td>
<p>It must be followed by a parameter which can have one of the values indicated below.</p>
<p><strong>ro</strong> or<strong> readonly</strong>: Mount volume as read-only.</p>
<p><strong>rm</strong> or <strong>removable</strong>: Mount volume as removable medium (see section
<ahref="Removable%20Medium%20Volume.html">
<em>Volume Mounted as Removable Medium</em></a>).</p>
<p><strong>ts</strong> or <strong>timestamp</strong>: Do not preserve container modification timestamp.</p>
<p><strong>sm</strong> or <strong>system</strong>: Without pre-boot authentication, mount a partition that is within the key scope of system encryption (for example, a partition located on the encrypted system drive of another operating system that is not running).
Useful e.g. for backup or repair operations. Note: If you supply a password as a parameter of /p, make sure that the password has been typed using the standard US keyboard layout (in contrast, the GUI ensures this automatically). This is required due to the
fact that the password needs to be typed in the pre-boot environment (before Windows starts) where non-US Windows keyboard layouts are not available.</p>
<p><strong>bk</strong> or <strong>headerbak</strong>: Mount volume using embedded backup header. Note: All volumes created by VeraCrypt contain an embedded backup header (located at the end of the volume).</p>
<p><strong>recovery</strong>: Do not verify any checksums stored in the volume header. This option should be used only when the volume header is damaged and the volume cannot be mounted even with the mount option headerbak. Example: /m ro</p>
<p><strong>label=LabelValue</strong>: Use the given string value <strong>LabelValue</strong> as a label of the mounted volume in Windows Explorer. The maximum length for
<strong>LabelValue </strong> is 32 characters for NTFS volumes and 11 characters for FAT volumes. For example,
<em>/m label=MyDrive</em> will set the label of the drive in Explorer to <em>MyDrive</em>.<br>
<br>
Please note that this switch may be present several times in the command line in order to specify multiple mount options (e.g.: /m rm /m ts)</p>
<td>Create a container based volume in command line mode. It must be followed by the file name of the container to be created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/size</td>
<td>
<p>(Only with /create)<br>
It must be followed by a parameter indicating the size of the container file that will be created. This parameter is a number indicating the size in Bytes. It can have a suffixe 'K', 'M', 'G' or 'T' to indicate that the value is in Kilobytes, Megabytes, Gigabytes
or Terabytes respectively. For example:</p>
<ul>
<li>/size 5000000: the container size will be 5000000 bytes </li><li>/size 25K: the container size will be 25 KiloBytes. </li><li>/size 100M: the container size will be 100 MegaBytes. </li><li>/size 2G: the container size will be 2 GigaBytes. </li><li>/size 1T: the container size will be 1 TeraBytes. </li></ul>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> /password</td>
<td> (Only with /create)<br>
It must be followed by a parameter indicating the password of the container that will be created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> <em>/hash</em></td>
<td>(Only with /create)<br>
It must be followed by a parameter indicating the PRF hash algorithm to use when creating the volume. It has the same syntax as VeraCrypt.exe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/encryption</td>
<td>(Only with /create)<br>
It must be followed by a parameter indicating the encryption algorithm to use. The default is AES if this switch is not specified. The parameter can have the following values (case insensitive):
It must be followed by a parameter indicating the file system to use for the volume. The parameter can have the following values:
<ul>
<li>None: don't use any filesystem </li><li>FAT: format using FAT/FAT32 </li><li>NTFS: format using NTFS. Please note that in this case a UAC prompt will be displayed unless the process is run with full administrative privileges.
</li></ul>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/dynamic</td>
<td>(Only with /create)<br>
It has no parameters and it indicates that the volume will be created as a dynamic volume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/force</td>
<td>(Only with /create)<br>
It has no parameters and it indicates that overwrite will be forced without requiring user confirmation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/silent</td>
<td>(Only with /create)<br>
It has no parameters and it indicates that no message box or dialog will be displayed to the user. If there is any error, the operation will fail silently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>/noisocheck</em> or <em>/n</em></td>
<td>Do not verify that VeraCrypt Rescue Disks are correctly burned. <strong>WARNING</strong>: Never attempt to use this option to facilitate the reuse of a previously created VeraCrypt Rescue Disk. Note that every time you encrypt a system partition/drive,
you must create a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk even if you use the same password. A previously created VeraCrypt Rescue Disk cannot be reused as it was created for a different master key.</td>
<p>Note that the order in which options are specified does not matter.</p>
<h4>Examples</h4>
<p>Mount the volume <em>d:\myvolume</em> as the first free drive letter, using the password prompt (the main program window will not be displayed):</p>
<p>veracrypt /q /v d:\myvolume</p>
<p>Dismount a volume mounted as the drive letter <em>X</em> (the main program window will not be displayed):</p>
<p>veracrypt /q /d x</p>
<p>Mount a volume called <em>myvolume.tc</em> using the password <em>MyPassword</em>, as the drive letter
<em>X</em>. VeraCrypt will open an explorer window and beep; mounting will be automatic:</p>
<p>veracrypt /v myvolume.tc /l x /a /p MyPassword /e /b</p>
<p>Create a 10 MB file container using the password <em>test</em> and formatted using FAT:</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
To contact IDRIX directly, you can use <ahref="https://www.idrix.fr/Root/mos/Contact_Us/Itemid,3"target="_blank">
our contact form</a>.</div>
</div>
<div>
<p>
We are also present on social media:<br>
<atitle="VeraCrypt on Twitter"href="https://twitter.com/VeraCrypt_IDRIX"target="_blank"><imgsrc="twitter_veracrypt.PNG"alt="VeraCrypt on Twitter"width="168"height="28"></a>
<atitle="VeraCrypt on Facebook"href="https://www.facebook.com/veracrypt"target="_blank"><imgsrc="Home_facebook_veracrypt.png"alt="VeraCrypt on Facebook"width="61"height="28"></a>
<atitle="VeraCrypt on Reddit"href="https://www.reddit.com/r/VeraCrypt/"target="_blank"><imgsrc="Home_reddit.png"alt="VeraCrypt on Reddit"width="94"height="28"></a>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<li>Tutorial on installing and using official VeraCrypt binaries on Raspberry Pi (Raspbian) by Bohdan Danishevsky.
</li></ul>
</li></ul>
<h3>Miscellaneous:</h3>
<ul>
<li><ahref="http://sourceforge.net/projects/veracrypt/files/Contributions/vcsteg2.py/download"target="_blank">vcsteg2.py</a> : a Python script that tries to hide a VeraCrypt volume inside a video file (Steganography)
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Converting%20TrueCrypt%20volumes%20and%20partitions.html">Converting TrueCrypt volumes and partitions</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<h1>Converting TrueCrypt volumes and partitions</h1>
<p>Starting from version 1.0f, TrueCrypt volumes and <strong>non-system</strong> partitions can be converted to VeraCrypt format using any of the following actions:</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<p>To create a new VeraCrypt file-hosted volume or to encrypt a partition/device (requires administrator privileges), click on ‘Create Volume’ in the main program window. VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard should appear. As soon as the Wizard appears,
it starts collecting data that will be used in generating the master key, secondary key (XTS mode), and salt, for the new volume. The collected data, which should be as random as possible, include your mouse movements, key presses, and other values obtained
from the system (for more information, please see the section <ahref="Random%20Number%20Generator.html">
<em>Random Number Generator</em></a>). The Wizard provides help and information necessary to successfully create a new VeraCrypt volume. However, several items deserve further explanation:</p>
<h3>Hash Algorithm</h3>
<p>Allows you to select which hash algorithm VeraCrypt will use. The selected hash algorithm is used by the random number generator (as a pseudorandom mixing function), which generates the master key, secondary key (XTS mode), and salt (for more information,
please see the section <ahref="Random%20Number%20Generator.html">
<em>Random Number Generator</em></a>). It is also used in deriving the new volume header key and secondary header key (see the section
<ahref="Header%20Key%20Derivation.html">
<em>Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count</em></a>).<br>
<br>
For information about the implemented hash algorithms, see the chapter <ahref="Hash%20Algorithms.html">
<em>Hash Algorithms.</em></a><br>
<br>
Note that the output of a hash function is <em>never </em>used directly as an encryption key. For more information, please refer to the chapter
<p>This allows you to select the encryption algorithm with which your new volume will be encrypted. Note that the encryption algorithm cannot be changed after the volume is created. For more information, please see the chapter
<p>If unchecked, each sector of the new volume will be formatted. This means that the new volume will be
<em>entirely </em>filled with random data. Quick format is much faster but may be less secure because until the whole volume has been filled with files, it may be possible to tell how much data it contains (if the space was not filled with random data beforehand).
If you are not sure whether to enable or disable Quick Format, we recommend that you leave this option unchecked. Note that Quick Format can only be enabled when encrypting partitions/devices.</p>
<p>Important: When encrypting a partition/device within which you intend to create a hidden volume afterwards, leave this option unchecked.</p>
<h3id="dynamic">Dynamic</h3>
<p>Dynamic VeraCrypt container is a pre-allocated NTFS sparse file whose physical size (actual disk space used) grows as new data is added to it. Note that the physical size of the container (actual disk space that the container uses) will not decrease when
files are deleted on the VeraCrypt volume. The physical size of the container can only
<em>increase </em>up to the maximum value that is specified by the user during the volume creation process. After the maximum specified size is reached, the physical size of the container will remain constant.<br>
<br>
Note that sparse files can only be created in the NTFS file system. If you are creating a container in the FAT file system, the option
<em>Dynamic </em>will be disabled (“grayed out”).<br>
<br>
Note that the size of a dynamic (sparse-file-hosted) VeraCrypt volume reported by Windows and by VeraCrypt will always be equal to its maximum size (which you specify when creating the volume). To find out current physical size of the container (actual disk
space it uses), right-click the container file (in a Windows Explorer window, not in VeraCrypt), then select
<em>Properties </em>and see the Size on disk value.</p>
<p>WARNING: Performance of dynamic (sparse-file-hosted) VeraCrypt volumes is significantly worse than performance of regular volumes. Dynamic (sparse-file-hosted) VeraCrypt volumes are also less secure, because it is possible to tell which volume sectors are
unused. Furthermore, if data is written to a dynamic volume when there is not enough free space in its host file system, the encrypted file system may get corrupted.</p>
<h3>Cluster Size</h3>
<p>Cluster is an allocation unit. For example, one cluster is allocated on a FAT file system for a one- byte file. When the file grows beyond the cluster boundary, another cluster is allocated. Theoretically, this means that the bigger the cluster size, the
more disk space is wasted; however, the better the performance. If you do not know which value to use, use the default.</p>
<h3>VeraCrypt Volumes on CDs and DVDs</h3>
<p>If you want a VeraCrypt volume to be stored on a CD or a DVD, first create a file-hosted VeraCrypt container on a hard drive and then burn it onto a CD/DVD using any CD/DVD burning software (or, under Windows XP or later, using the CD burning tool provided
with the operating system). Remember that if you need to mount a VeraCrypt volume that is stored on a read-only medium (such as a CD/DVD) under Windows 2000, you must format the VeraCrypt volume as FAT. The reason is that Windows 2000 cannot mount NTFS file
system on read-only media (Windows XP and later versions of Windows can).</p>
<h3>Hardware/Software RAID, Windows Dynamic Volumes</h3>
<p>VeraCrypt supports hardware/software RAID as well as Windows dynamic volumes.</p>
<p>Windows Vista or later: Dynamic volumes are displayed in the ‘Select Device’ dialog window as \Device\HarddiskVolumeN.</p>
<p>Windows XP/2000/2003: If you intend to format a Windows dynamic volume as a VeraCrypt volume, keep in mind that after you create the Windows dynamic volume (using the Windows Disk Management tool), you must restart the operating system in order for the volume
to be available/displayed in the ‘Select Device’ dialog window of the VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard. Also note that, in the ‘Select Device’ dialog window, a Windows dynamic volume is not displayed as a single device (item). Instead,
all volumes that the Windows dynamic volume consists of are displayed and you can select any of them in order to format the entire Windows dynamic volume.</p>
<h3>Additional Notes on Volume Creation</h3>
<p>After you click the ‘Format’ button in the Volume Creation Wizard window (the last step), there will be a short delay while your system is being polled for additional random data. Afterwards, the master key, header key, secondary key (XTS mode),
and salt, for the new volume will be generated, and the master key and header key contents will be displayed.<br>
<br>
For extra security, the portions of the randomness pool, master key, and header key can be prevented from being displayed by unchecking the checkbox in the upper right corner of the corresponding field:<br>
Note that only the first 128 bits of the pool/keys are displayed (not the entire contents).<br>
<br>
You can create FAT (whether it will be FAT12, FAT16, or FAT32, is automatically determined from the number of clusters) or NTFS volumes (however, NTFS volumes can only be created by users with administrator privileges). Mounted VeraCrypt volumes can be reformatted
as FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, or NTFS anytime. They behave as standard disk devices so you can right-click the drive letter of the mounted VeraCrypt volume (for example in the ‘<em>Computer</em>’ or ‘<em>My Computer</em>’ list) and select
‘Format’.<br>
<br>
For more information about creating VeraCrypt volumes, see also the section <ahref="Hidden%20Volume.html">
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<p>When a VeraCrypt volume is mounted, the operating system and third-party applications may write to unencrypted volumes (typically, to the unencrypted system volume) unencrypted information about the data stored in the VeraCrypt volume (e.g. filenames and
locations of recently accessed files, databases created by file indexing tools, etc.), or the data itself in an unencrypted form (temporary files, etc.), or unencrypted information about the filesystem residing in the VeraCrypt volume. Note that Windows automatically
records large amounts of potentially sensitive data, such as the names and locations of files you open, applications you run, etc.</p>
<p>Also, starting from Windows 8, every time a VeraCrypt volume that is formatted using NTFS is mounted, an Event 98 is written for the system Events Log and it will contain the device name (\\device\VeraCryptVolumeXX) of the volume. This event log "feature"
was introduced in Windows 8 as part of newly introduced NTFS health checks as explained
here</a>. To avoid this leak, the VeraCrypt volume must be mounted <ahref="Removable%20Medium%20Volume.html">
as a removable medium</a>. Big thanks to Liran Elharar for discovering this leak and its workaround.<br>
<br>
In order to prevent data leaks, you must follow these steps (alternative steps may exist):</p>
<ul>
<li>If you do <em>not</em> need plausible deniability:
<ul>
<li>Encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to do so, see the chapter
<ahref="System%20Encryption.html"><em>System Encryption</em></a>) and ensure that only encrypted or read-only filesystems are mounted during each session in which you work with sensitive data.<br>
<br>
or, </li><li>If you cannot do the above, download or create a "live CD" version of your operating system (i.e. a "live" system entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD) that ensures that any data written to the system volume is written to a RAM disk. When you need
to work with sensitive data, boot such a live CD/DVD and ensure that only encrypted and/or read-only filesystems are mounted during the session.
</li></ul>
</li><li>If you need plausible deniability:
<ul>
<li>Create a hidden operating system. VeraCrypt will provide automatic data leak protection. For more information, see the section
<ahref="Hidden%20Operating%20System.html">
<em>Hidden Operating System</em></a>.<br>
<br>
or, </li><li>If you cannot do the above, download or create a "live CD" version of your operating system (i.e. a "live" system entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD) that ensures that any data written to the system volume is written to a RAM disk. When you need
to work with sensitive data, boot such a live CD/DVD. If you use hidden volumes, follow the security requirements and precautions listed in the subsection
<em>Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</em></a>. If you do not use hidden volumes, ensure that only non-system partition-hosted VeraCrypt volumes and/or read-only filesystems are mounted during the session.
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<ahref="Default%20Mount%20Parameters.html">Default Mount Parameters</a>
</p></div>
<divclass="wikidoc">
<h2>Default Mount Parameters</h2>
<p>Starting from version 1.0f-2, it is possible to specify the PRF algorithm and the TrueCrypt mode that will be selected by default in the password dialog.</p>
<p>As show below, select the entry "Default Mount Parameters" under the menu "Settings":</p>
<p><imgsrc="Home_VeraCrypt_menu_Default_Mount_Parameters.png"alt="Menu Default Mount Parameters"width="241"height="254"></p>
<p> </p>
<p>The following dialog will be displayed:</p>
<p><imgsrc="Home_VeraCrypt_Default_Mount_Parameters.png"alt="Default Mount Parameters Dialog"width="267"height="144"></p>
<p>Make your modifications and then click OK.</p>
<p>The chosen values are then written to VeraCrypt main configuration file (Configuration.xml) making them persistent.</p>
<p>All subsequent password request dialogs will use the default values chosen previously. For example, if in the Default Mount Parameters dialog you check TrueCrypt Mode and you select SHA-512 as a PRF, then subsequent password dialogs will look like:<br>
<imgsrc="Default Mount Parameters_VeraCrypt_password_using_default_parameters.png"alt="Mount Password Dialog using default values"width="499"height="205"></p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Note:</strong> The default mount parameters can be overridden by the <ahref="Command%20Line%20Usage.html">Command Line</a> switches
<strong>/tc</strong> and <strong>/hash</strong> which always take precedence.</p>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<p>When you (or the operating system) defragment the file system in which a file-hosted VeraCrypt container is stored, a copy of the VeraCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system).
This may have various security implications. For example, if you change the volume password/keyfile(s) afterwards, and an adversary finds the old copy or fragment (the old header) of the VeraCrypt volume, he might use it to mount the volume using an old compromised
password (and/or using compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re-encrypted). To prevent this and other possible security issues (such as those mentioned in the section
<ahref="Volume%20Clones.html"><em>Volume Clones</em></a>), do one of the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>Use a partition/device-hosted VeraCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. </li><li><em>Securely</em> erase free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system) after defragmenting. On Windows, this can be done using the Microsoft free utility
<code>SDelete</code> (<ahref="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897443.aspx"rel="nofollow">https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897443.aspx</a>). On Linux, the
<code>shred</code> utility from GNU coreutils package can be used for this purpose.
</li><li>Do not defragment file systems in which you store VeraCrypt volumes. </li></ul>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
<p>It might happen that a VeraCrypt installation package you download from our server was created or modified by an attacker. For example, the attacker could exploit a vulnerability in the server software we use and alter the installation packages stored on
the server, or he/she could alter any of the files en route to you.<br>
<br>
Therefore, you should always verify the integrity and authenticity of each VeraCrypt distribution package you download or otherwise obtain from any source. In other words, you should always make sure that the file was created by us and it was not altered by
an attacker. One way to do so is to verify so-called digital signature(s) of the file.</p>
<h3>Types of Digital Signatures We Use</h3>
<p>We currently use two types of digital signatures:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>PGP</strong> signatures (available for all binary and source code packages for all supported systems).
</li><li><strong>X.509</strong> signatures (available for binary packages for Windows).
</li></ul>
<h3>Advantages of X.509 Signatures</h3>
<p>X.509 signatures have the following advantages, in comparison to PGP signatures:</p>
<ul>
<li>It is much easier to verify that the key that signed the file is really ours (not attacker’s).
</li><li>You do not have to download or install any extra software to verify an X.509 signature (see below).
</li><li>You do not have to download and import our public key (it is embedded in the signed file).
</li><li>You do not have to download any separate signature file (the signature is embedded in the signed file).
</li></ul>
<h3>Advantages of PGP Signatures</h3>
<p>PGP signatures have the following advantages, in comparison to X.509 signatures:</p>
<ul>
<li>They do not depend on any certificate authority (which might be e.g. infiltrated or controlled by an adversary, or be untrustworthy for other reasons).
</li></ul>
<h3>How to Verify X.509 Signatures</h3>
<p>Please note that X.509 signatures are currently available only for the VeraCrypt self-extracting installation packages for Windows. An X.509 digital signature is embedded in each of those files along with the digital certificate of the VeraCrypt Foundation
issued by a public certification authority. To verify the integrity and authenticity of a self-extracting installation package for Windows, follow these steps:</p>
<ol>
<li>Download the VeraCrypt self-extracting installation package. </li><li>In the Windows Explorer, click the downloaded file (‘<em>VeraCrypt Setup.exe</em>’) with the right mouse button and select ‘<em>Properties</em>’ from the context menu.
</li><li>In the <em>Properties</em> dialog window, select the ‘<em>Digital Signatures</em>’ tab.
</li><li>On the ‘<em>Digital Signatures</em>’ tab, in the ‘<em>Signature list</em>’, double click the line saying "<em>IDRIX</em>" or
<em>"IDRIX SARL"</em>. </li><li>The ‘<em>Digital Signature Details</em>’ dialog window should appear now. If you see the following sentence at the top of the dialog window, then the integrity and authenticity of the package have been successfully verified:<br>
<br>
"<em>This digital signature is OK.</em>"<br>
<br>
If you do not see the above sentence, the file is very likely corrupted. Note: On some obsolete versions of Windows, some of the necessary certificates are missing, which causes the signature verification to fail.
</li></ol>
<h3id="VerifyPGPSignature">How to Verify PGP Signatures</h3>
<p>To verify a PGP signature, follow these steps:</p>
<ol>
<li>Install any public-key encryption software that supports PGP signatures. For Windows, you can download
<ahref="http://www.gpg4win.org/"target="_blank">Gpg4win</a>. For more information, you can visit
<ahref="https://www.gnupg.org/">https://www.gnupg.org/</a>. </li><li>Create a private key (for information on how to do so, please see the documentation for the public-key encryption software).
</li><li>Download our PGP public key from <strong>IDRIX</strong> website (<ahref="https://www.idrix.fr/VeraCrypt/VeraCrypt_PGP_public_key.asc"target="_blank">https://www.idrix.fr/VeraCrypt/VeraCrypt_PGP_public_key.asc</a>) or from a trusted public key repository
(ID=0x54DDD393), and import the downloaded key to your keyring (for information on how to do so, please see the documentation for the public-key encryption software). Please check that its fingerprint is
<strong>993B7D7E8E413809828F0F29EB559C7C54DDD393</strong>. </li><li>Sign the imported key with your private key to mark it as trusted (for information on how to do so, please see the documentation for the public-key encryption software).<br>
<br>
Note: If you skip this step and attempt to verify any of our PGP signatures, you will receive an error message stating that the signing key is invalid.
</li><li>Download the digital signature by downloading the <em>PGP Signature</em> of the file you want to verify (on the
<ahref="Downloads.html">Downloads page</a>).
</li><li>Verify the downloaded signature (for information on how to do so, please see the documentation for the public-key encryption software).
</li></ol>
<p>Under Linux, these steps can be achieved using the following commands:</p>
<ul>
<li>Check that the fingerprint of the public key is <strong>993B7D7E8E413809828F0F29EB559C7C54DDD393</strong>:
<strong>gpg --with-fingerprint VeraCrypt_PGP_public_key.asc</strong></li><li>If the fingerprint is the expected one, import the public key: <strong>gpg --import VeraCrypt_PGP_public_key.asc</strong>
</li><li>Verify the signature of the Linux setup archive (here for version 1.0e): <strong>
<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title>
<metaname="description"content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/>
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