Files
Evan JarrettandClaude Opus 5 39919cc832 appview: stop webhooks reaching private addresses
The URL check accepted http:// while telling the user "must be https", and
guarded no addresses at all. POST /api/webhooks with http://127.0.0.1:9/hook
returned 200 and created the webhook, so both scheduled deliveries and the
synchronous Test button would dial arbitrary destinations from the appview
host, on demand, for any authenticated user. Loopback, link-local (including
the cloud metadata endpoint at 169.254.169.254) and RFC1918 were all reachable.

Enforces https, and refuses non-public destinations.

The load-bearing half is the dial-time check, not the creation-time one. An
attacker controls their own DNS, so a hostname that resolves publicly when the
webhook is created can resolve to loopback when it is delivered, and a
creation-time check cannot see a redirect either. The guard is therefore a
net.Dialer Control hook on the delivery client, which inspects the resolved
address on every connection attempt. Transport.Proxy is explicitly nil:
honouring HTTP(S)_PROXY would route around the Control hook and hand the
bypass straight back. Redirects are re-validated per hop and capped at 3.

The creation-time check stays so the user gets an immediate, comprehensible
error instead of a silent delivery failure later.

IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unmapped before every check, so ::ffff:127.0.0.1 and
friends hit the IPv4 rules. Ranges with no net.IP helper are listed explicitly:
CGNAT, NAT64, ::/96, TEST-NET and reserved space.

Both outbound paths are covered, since the scheduled dispatcher and the Test
button both funnel through attemptDelivery. The dispatcher's other client is
deliberately left unguarded: it fetches quota stats from holds, which
legitimately live on private addresses, and those URLs are not user-supplied.

Note this removes the ability to point a webhook at a localhost receiver in
local development. There is deliberately no environment-variable escape hatch,
since a security toggle read from the environment is the same bypass wearing a
nicer coat.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDqoCE1j3njokkZ9b1C5n9
2026-09-02 21:37:19 -05:00

268 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

package webhooks
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"atcr.io/pkg/appview/db"
"atcr.io/pkg/appview/storage"
"atcr.io/pkg/atproto"
)
// fakeHold serves io.atcr.hold.getQuota with a configurable usage value so
// the test can drive the edge condition.
type fakeHold struct {
limit int64
usage atomic.Int64
}
func (f *fakeHold) handler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != atproto.HoldGetQuota {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"userDid": r.URL.Query().Get("userDid"),
"totalSize": f.usage.Load(),
"limit": f.limit,
})
})
}
// fakeReceiver captures webhook deliveries so the test can assert on count.
type fakeReceiver struct {
mu sync.Mutex
payloads [][]byte
done chan struct{}
}
func newFakeReceiver(expected int) *fakeReceiver {
r := &fakeReceiver{done: make(chan struct{}, expected+1)}
return r
}
func (r *fakeReceiver) handler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
buf := make([]byte, req.ContentLength)
_, _ = req.Body.Read(buf)
r.mu.Lock()
r.payloads = append(r.payloads, buf)
r.mu.Unlock()
select {
case r.done <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
}
func (r *fakeReceiver) count() int {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
return len(r.payloads)
}
// waitFor blocks up to d for the receiver to accumulate n deliveries.
func (r *fakeReceiver) waitFor(n int, d time.Duration) bool {
deadline := time.Now().Add(d)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if r.count() >= n {
return true
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
return false
}
// TestDispatchForQuotaEdgeTriggered exercises the full dispatcher path against
// a real SQLite DB and a fake hold. Covers:
// - fires once when usage crosses upward through the threshold
// - suppresses repeat fires while still above (last_fired_at sticky)
// - re-arms when usage drops below threshold and fires on the next crossing
// - non-quota webhooks (push-only) are not picked up by DispatchForQuota
// - captain / unlimited holds (Limit == nil) never fire
func TestDispatchForQuotaEdgeTriggered(t *testing.T) {
conn, err := db.InitDB(":memory:", db.LibsqlConfig{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("init db: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
const userDID = "did:plc:quotatest"
if err := db.UpsertUser(conn, &db.User{
DID: userDID, Handle: "qt.test", PDSEndpoint: "https://pds", LastSeen: time.Now(),
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("upsert user: %v", err)
}
hold := &fakeHold{limit: 1000}
hold.usage.Store(400) // 40% — below threshold
holdSrv := httptest.NewServer(hold.handler())
defer holdSrv.Close()
receiver := newFakeReceiver(3)
recvSrv := httptest.NewServer(receiver.handler())
defer recvSrv.Close()
// Quota webhook with threshold 75
quotaHook := &db.Webhook{
ID: "wh-quota",
UserDID: userDID,
URL: recvSrv.URL,
Triggers: PackTriggers(TriggerQuota, 75),
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
if err := db.InsertWebhook(conn, quotaHook); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("insert quota hook: %v", err)
}
// Push-only webhook on the same user — must be ignored by DispatchForQuota
pushHook := &db.Webhook{
ID: "wh-push",
UserDID: userDID,
URL: recvSrv.URL + "/push",
Triggers: PackTriggers(TriggerPush, 0),
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
if err := db.InsertWebhook(conn, pushHook); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("insert push hook: %v", err)
}
d := NewDispatcher(conn, atproto.AppviewMetadata{ClientShortName: "ATCR", BaseURL: "https://atcr.test"}, nil)
// The receiver is an httptest server on loopback, which the delivery guard
// would otherwise refuse. See ssrf_test.go for the guard's own coverage.
d.allowLoopbackDeliveryForTest()
event := storage.QuotaWebhookEvent{
UserDID: userDID,
UserHandle: "qt.test",
HoldDID: holdSrv.URL, // ResolveHoldURL passes URLs through
HoldEndpoint: holdSrv.URL,
}
// 1) Below threshold: no fire
d.DispatchForQuota(context.Background(), event)
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) // give any in-flight goroutine a chance
if got := receiver.count(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("below threshold: expected 0 deliveries, got %d", got)
}
// 2) Cross upward to 80% — should fire exactly once
hold.usage.Store(800)
d.DispatchForQuota(context.Background(), event)
if !receiver.waitFor(1, 2*time.Second) {
t.Fatalf("crossing upward: webhook did not fire within timeout, count=%d", receiver.count())
}
if got := receiver.count(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("crossing upward: expected 1 delivery, got %d", got)
}
// Verify payload contents
var payload QuotaWebhookPayload
if err := json.Unmarshal(receiver.payloads[0], &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal payload: %v", err)
}
if payload.Trigger != "quota" {
t.Errorf("payload trigger = %q, want %q", payload.Trigger, "quota")
}
if payload.QuotaData.UsagePercent != 80 || payload.QuotaData.ThresholdPercent != 75 {
t.Errorf("payload pcts = (%d, %d), want (80, 75)", payload.QuotaData.UsagePercent, payload.QuotaData.ThresholdPercent)
}
if payload.QuotaData.LimitBytes != 1000 || payload.QuotaData.UsageBytes != 800 {
t.Errorf("payload bytes = (%d / %d), want (800 / 1000)", payload.QuotaData.UsageBytes, payload.QuotaData.LimitBytes)
}
if payload.User.DID != userDID {
t.Errorf("payload user.did = %q, want %q", payload.User.DID, userDID)
}
// last_fired_at should be stamped
stored, err := db.GetWebhookByID(conn, quotaHook.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get webhook: %v", err)
}
if stored.LastFiredAt == nil {
t.Fatal("expected last_fired_at to be set after firing")
}
// 3) Still above, second push: must not re-fire
hold.usage.Store(900)
d.DispatchForQuota(context.Background(), event)
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
if got := receiver.count(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("still above: expected 1 delivery total, got %d", got)
}
// 4) Drop below threshold: re-arms (clears last_fired_at), no fire
hold.usage.Store(500)
d.DispatchForQuota(context.Background(), event)
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
if got := receiver.count(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("drop below: expected 1 delivery total, got %d", got)
}
stored, err = db.GetWebhookByID(conn, quotaHook.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get webhook after drop: %v", err)
}
if stored.LastFiredAt != nil {
t.Errorf("expected last_fired_at to be cleared after dropping below; got %v", *stored.LastFiredAt)
}
// 5) Cross upward again — fires again
hold.usage.Store(950)
d.DispatchForQuota(context.Background(), event)
if !receiver.waitFor(2, 2*time.Second) {
t.Fatalf("re-crossing upward: webhook did not re-fire, count=%d", receiver.count())
}
if got := receiver.count(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("re-crossing upward: expected 2 deliveries total, got %d", got)
}
}
func TestDispatchForQuotaUnlimitedHold(t *testing.T) {
conn, err := db.InitDB(":memory:", db.LibsqlConfig{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("init db: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
const userDID = "did:plc:cap"
if err := db.UpsertUser(conn, &db.User{DID: userDID, Handle: "cap", PDSEndpoint: "x", LastSeen: time.Now()}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Hold serving an unlimited response (no `limit` field)
holdSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"userDid":%q,"totalSize":9999999999}`, userDID)
}))
defer holdSrv.Close()
receiver := newFakeReceiver(1)
recvSrv := httptest.NewServer(receiver.handler())
defer recvSrv.Close()
if err := db.InsertWebhook(conn, &db.Webhook{
ID: "wh", UserDID: userDID, URL: recvSrv.URL,
Triggers: PackTriggers(TriggerQuota, 50), CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
d := NewDispatcher(conn, atproto.AppviewMetadata{}, nil)
d.allowLoopbackDeliveryForTest()
d.DispatchForQuota(context.Background(), storage.QuotaWebhookEvent{
UserDID: userDID, HoldDID: holdSrv.URL, HoldEndpoint: holdSrv.URL,
})
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
if got := receiver.count(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unlimited hold should never fire quota webhook, got %d deliveries", got)
}
}