Follow-up to f12d5e0. Extending the orphan sweep to io.atcr.hold.scan and
io.atcr.hold.image.config brought those collections under a delete path built
for layer records, and the two are not interchangeable. Layer rkeys are
generated per write, so a remembered rkey is a stable handle on one record.
Scan and image-config rkeys are atproto.ScanRecordKey(manifestDigest) — the bare
digest hex, with no DID — which is both reused across re-pushes and shared
between users who push identical images. "Delete rkey K" therefore stopped
meaning "delete the record I judged", and the sweep could destroy live data two
ways.
Both were confirmed by probe before being fixed, and each guard below has a
regression test that fails when that guard alone is reverted.
Shared records: two users pushing the same image collapse onto ONE record whose
body names only the last writer. When that user deleted their manifest the
record looked orphaned, and deleting it stripped the vulnerability scan and the
layer history/env/entrypoint from every co-owner's still-live image.
- knownDigests keeps a record while any successfully fetched user still holds
a manifest at that digest, not just the one the record names.
- knownDigests alone is not enough: it is built only from users we reached, so
a co-owner whose PDS was down this run is indistinguishable from one who
deleted their image. digestOwners closes that. It maps each digest to every
DID that pushed it here, derived from the hold's own layer records during
the walk analyzeRecords already performs, so it costs nothing extra and
needs no network. If any owner was unreachable, the record stays. This is
the sweep's existing principle — an unreachable PDS never causes a deletion —
extended from the record's named user to everyone the record serves.
Layer records are the right source because they are load-bearing for storage
accounting and billing, so they exist for anything a user is charged for.
Reused rkeys: a re-push upserts into the same digest-derived slot, so a record
marked orphaned by an earlier scan can be replaced by a LIVE one before the
delete runs. The admin delete button makes this wide — lastPreview is in-memory
for the life of the process, so an open tab keeps a stale scan actionable — and
doRun has the same race across its analyze-to-delete gap.
- Records now carry the CID they had when judged, and the delete re-reads the
slot to confirm it still holds that revision. Anything else (rewritten,
missing, unreadable, or a ref with no recorded CID) is skipped, not deleted.
- The CID check is record identity, not orphanhood, and identity alone is not
enough either. A re-push does not necessarily rewrite the SCAN record:
scan-on-push is tier-gated, and the broadcaster's discovery loop skips any
manifest that already has a scan record, so its CID survives a re-push
unchanged. manifestsWithLayerRecords covers that — a push writes layer
records to this hold, so their presence proves the manifest is back
regardless of what the scan concluded. Local, no PDS round trip. A manifest
whose layer records are themselves orphaned but not yet collected also lands
in the set, which only defers its aux record one cycle; one more round of a
leak beats deleting a live user's records.
- maxPreviewAgeForDelete (30m) refuses a stale preview outright. The
per-record checks are the real safety net; this stops the admin acting on a
picture that is hours old. Refusal surfaces through startBackground ->
lastError -> the polling progress fragment, so it is visible rather than a
silent no-op.
The four state maps auxRecordOrphaned consults are grouped into auxOrphanState.
Three are same-shaped maps that were trivial to transpose positionally, and
swapping knownDigests with fetchedUsers would have silently widened what the
sweep deletes.
Not addressed, all failure-to-collect rather than data loss: maxPreviewItems
caps the admin button's list while doRun uses the uncapped one, so a hold with
10000+ orphaned layer records surfaces no aux orphans in the preview;
DeleteManifestAuxRecord cannot distinguish "already gone" from "write failed";
and discoverUserDIDs never consults the aux collections, so a record whose owner
has no remaining layer records is kept indefinitely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ATCR - ATProto Container Registry
https://atcr.io
An OCI-compliant container registry that uses the AT Protocol for manifest storage and S3 for blob storage.
What is ATCR?
ATCR integrates container registries with the AT Protocol ecosystem. Container image manifests are stored as ATProto records in your Personal Data Server (PDS), while layers are stored in S3-compatible storage.
Image names use your ATProto identity:
atcr.io/alice.bsky.social/myapp:latest
atcr.io/did:plc:xyz123/myapp:latest
Architecture
Three components:
-
AppView - Registry API + web UI
- Serves OCI Distribution API (Docker push/pull)
- Resolves handles/DIDs to PDS endpoints
- Routes manifests to user's PDS, blobs to hold services
- Web interface for browsing/search
-
Hold Service - Storage service with embedded PDS (optional BYOS)
- Each hold has a full ATProto PDS for access control (captain + crew records)
- Identified by did:web (e.g.,
did:web:hold01.atcr.io) - Generates presigned URLs for S3/Storj/Minio/etc.
- Users can deploy their own storage and control access via crew membership
-
Credential Helper - Client authentication
- ATProto OAuth (DPoP handled transparently)
- Automatic authentication on first push/pull
Storage model:
- Manifests → ATProto records in user's PDS (small JSON, includes
holdDidreference) - Blobs → Hold services via XRPC multipart upload (large binaries, stored in S3/etc.)
- AppView uses service tokens to communicate with holds on behalf of users
Features
- ✅ OCI-compliant - Works with Docker, containerd, podman
- ✅ Decentralized - You own your manifest data via your PDS
- ✅ ATProto OAuth - Secure authentication (DPoP-compliant)
- ✅ BYOS - Deploy your own storage service
- ✅ Web UI - Browse, search, star repositories
- ✅ Multi-backend - S3, Storj, Minio, Azure, GCS, filesystem
Quick Start
Using the Registry
1. Install credential helper:
curl -fsSL https://atcr.io/static/install.sh | bash
2. Configure Docker (add to ~/.docker/config.json):
{
"credHelpers": {
"atcr.io": "atcr"
}
}
3. Push/pull images:
docker tag myapp:latest atcr.io/yourhandle/myapp:latest
docker push atcr.io/yourhandle/myapp:latest # Authenticates automatically
docker pull atcr.io/yourhandle/myapp:latest
See INSTALLATION.md for detailed installation instructions.
Running Your Own AppView
# Build
go build -o bin/atcr-appview ./cmd/appview
# Generate a config file with all defaults
./bin/atcr-appview config init config-appview.yaml
# Edit config-appview.yaml — set server.default_hold_did at minimum
# Run
./bin/atcr-appview serve --config config-appview.yaml
Using Docker:
docker build -f Dockerfile.appview -t atcr-appview:latest .
docker run -d -p 5000:5000 \
-v ./config-appview.yaml:/config.yaml:ro \
-v atcr-data:/var/lib/atcr \
atcr-appview:latest serve --config /config.yaml
See deploy/README.md for production deployment.
Running Your Own Hold (BYOS Storage)
See docs/hold.md for deploying your own storage backend.
Development
Building from Source
# Build all binaries
go build -o bin/atcr-appview ./cmd/appview
go build -o bin/atcr-hold ./cmd/hold
go build -o bin/docker-credential-atcr ./cmd/credential-helper
# Run tests
go test ./...
go test -race ./...
Project Structure
cmd/
├── appview/ # Registry server + web UI
├── hold/ # Storage service (BYOS)
├── credential-helper/ # Docker credential helper
├── oauth-helper/ # OAuth debug tool
├── healthcheck/ # HTTP health check (for Docker)
├── db-migrate/ # SQLite → libsql migration
├── usage-report/ # Hold storage usage report
├── record-query/ # Query ATProto relay by collection
└── s3-test/ # S3 connectivity test
pkg/
├── appview/
│ ├── db/ # SQLite database (migrations, queries, stores)
│ ├── handlers/ # HTTP handlers (home, repo, search, auth, settings)
│ ├── holdhealth/ # Hold service health checker
│ ├── jetstream/ # ATProto Jetstream consumer
│ ├── middleware/ # Auth & registry middleware
│ ├── ogcard/ # OpenGraph image generation
│ ├── readme/ # Repository README fetcher
│ ├── routes/ # HTTP route registration
│ ├── storage/ # Storage routing (blob proxy, manifest store)
│ ├── public/ # Static assets (JS, CSS, install scripts)
│ └── templates/ # HTML templates
├── atproto/ # ATProto client, records, manifest/tag stores
├── auth/
│ ├── oauth/ # OAuth client, refresher, storage
│ ├── token/ # JWT issuer, validator, claims
│ └── holdlocal/ # Local hold authorization
├── config/ # Config marshaling (commented YAML)
├── hold/
│ ├── admin/ # Admin web UI
│ ├── billing/ # Stripe billing integration
│ ├── db/ # Vendored carstore (go-libsql)
│ ├── gc/ # Garbage collection
│ ├── oci/ # OCI upload endpoints
│ ├── pds/ # Embedded PDS (DID, captain, crew, stats, scans)
│ └── quota/ # Storage quotas
├── logging/ # Structured logging + remote shipping
└── s3/ # S3 client utilities
License
MIT
Contributing
Contributions welcome! Please open an issue or PR.