Instead of considering designators as equivalent if one is the prefix of
another, only accept an exact match of the designator length as required
by the SCSI standard.
Fixes: 5e90abb64a ("scst_copy_mgr: Implement a workaround for non-compliant initiator systems")
Fixes: 3fc775c75a ("EXTENDED COPY support")
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9570 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
When Target port transitions personality from one to another (NVMe <-->
FCP), there could be some overlap of the two where one layer is going down
while the other layer is coming up. This overlap can cause temporary I/O
error. Detect those errors/transitions and recover from them. Triggers
session tear down and allow relogin to re-drive the connection under the
following conditions:
- NVMe command error
- On PRLO + N2N (rida format 2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817051315.2477-11-njavali@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit 7a8ff7d9854a1727435557184c8255bbbca60920 upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9563 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
For target port that register itself as both FCP + NVMe, initiator driver
will try to login one mode at a time. If the last mode did not succeed,
then driver will try the other mode.
When error is encountered, current code only flip to other mode one time
(NVMe->FCP) and remain on the last mode. Driver wrongly assumed target
port does not support PRLI NVMe, instead it was not ready to receive PRLI.
This patch will alternate back and forth on every PRLI failure until login
retry count has depleted or it is succeeded.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817051315.2477-10-njavali@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit f88444570072a6863f3e2bd67878560a51b187f2 upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9562 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
The following hung task call trace was seen:
[ 1230.183294] INFO: task qla2xxx_wq:523 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 1230.197749] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 1230.205585] qla2xxx_wq D 0 523 2 0x80004000
[ 1230.205636] Workqueue: qla2xxx_wq qlt_free_session_done [qla2xxx]
[ 1230.205639] Call Trace:
[ 1230.208100] __schedule+0x2c4/0x700
[ 1230.211607] schedule+0x38/0xa0
[ 1230.214769] schedule_timeout+0x246/0x2f0
[ 1230.222651] wait_for_completion+0x97/0x100
[ 1230.226921] qlt_free_session_done+0x6a0/0x6f0 [qla2xxx]
[ 1230.232254] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
...when device side port resets were done.
Abort threads were getting out without processing due to the "deleted"
flag check. The delete thread, meanwhile, could not proceed with a
logout (that would have cleared out pending requests) as the logout IOCB
work was not progressing. It appears like the hung qlt_free_session_done()
thread is causing the ha->wq works on hold. The qlt_free_session_done()
was hung waiting for nvme_fc_unregister_remoteport() + localport_delete cb
to be complete, which would only happen when all I/Os are released.
Fix this by allowing abort to progress until device delete is completely
done. This should make the qlt_free_session_done() proceed without hang and
thus clear up the deadlock.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817051315.2477-5-njavali@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit 310e69edfbd57995868a428eeddea09a7b5d2749 upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9557 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
Some FC adapters from Marvell offer the ability to encrypt data in flight
(EDIF). This feature requires an application to act as an authenticator.
During runtime, driver and authentication application need to stay in sync
in terms of: Session being down|up, arrival of new authentication
message (AUTH ELS) and SADB update completion.
These events are queued up as doorbell to the authentication
application. Application would read this doorbell on regular basis to stay
up to date. Each SCSI host would have a separate doorbell queue.
The doorbell interface can daisy chain a list of events for each read. Each
event contains an event code + hint to help application steer the next
course of action.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624052606.21613-9-njavali@marvell.com
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit 7a09e8d92c6d56121910ccb2e8bc0d1affff66ee upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9533 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
Some FC adapters from Marvell offer the ability to encrypt data in flight
(EDIF). This feature requires an application to act as an authenticator.
There is no FC switch scan service that can indicate whether a device is
secure or non-secure.
In order to detect whether the remote port supports encrypted operation,
driver must first do a PLOGI with the remote device. On completion of the
PLOGI, driver will query firmware to see if the device supports secure
login. To do that, driver + firmware must advertise the security bit via
PLOGI's service parameter. The remote device shall respond using the same
service parameter whether it supports it or not.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624052606.21613-8-njavali@marvell.com
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit 9efea843a906c6674ac6728f3f5db2cbfa3e1830 upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9532 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
Some FC adapters from Marvell offer the ability to encrypt data in flight
(EDIF). This feature requires an application to act as an authenticator.
On completion of the authentication process, the authentication application
will notify driver on whether it is successful or not.
In case of success, application will use the QL_VND_SC_AUTH_OK BSG call to
tell driver to proceed to the PRLI phase.
In case of failure, application will use the QL_VND_SC_AUTH_FAIL bsg call
to tell driver to tear down the connection and retry. In the case where an
existing session is active, the re-key process can fail. The session tear
down ensures data is not further compromised.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624052606.21613-7-njavali@marvell.com
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit 8a4bb2c1dd623b5a71609de5b04ef3b5086b0a3e upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9531 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
Some FC adapters from Marvell offer the ability to encrypt data in flight
(EDIF). This feature requires an application to act as an authenticator.
As part of the authentication process, the authentication application will
generate a SADB entry (Security Association/SA, key, SPI value, etc). This
SADB is then passed to driver to be programmed into hardware. There will be
a pair of SADB's (Tx and Rx) for each connection.
After some period, the application can choose to change the key. At that
time, a new set of SADB pair is given to driver. The old set of SADB will
be deleted.
Add a new bsg call (QL_VND_SC_SA_UPDATE) to allow application to allow
adding or deleting SADB entries. Driver will not keep the key in
memory. It will pass it to HW.
It is assumed that application will assign a unique SPI value to this SADB
(SA + key). Driver + hardware will assign a handle to track this unique
SPI/SADB.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624052606.21613-6-njavali@marvell.com
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit dd30706e73b70d67e88fdaca688db7a3374fd5de upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9530 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
Some FC adapters from Marvell offer the ability to encrypt data in flight
(EDIF). This feature requires an application to act as an authenticator.
Add the ability for authentication application to send and retrieve
messages as part of the authentication process via existing
FC_BSG_HST_ELS_NOLOGIN BSG interface.
To send a message, application is expected to format the data in the AUTH
ELS format. Refer to FC-SP2 for details.
If a message was received, application is required to reply with either a
LS_ACC or LS_RJT complete the exchange using the same interface. Otherwise,
remote device will treat it as a timeout.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624052606.21613-4-njavali@marvell.com
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Wisneski <Larry.Wisneski@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Duane Grigsby <duane.grigsby@marvell.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Hicksted Jr <rhicksted@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[ commit 84318a9f01ce13650ea23eb6362066bb95ccc9fe upstream ]
git-svn-id: http://svn.code.sf.net/p/scst/svn/trunk@9528 d57e44dd-8a1f-0410-8b47-8ef2f437770f
