fix: implement proper policy condition evaluation and trust policy validation

Fixed the critical issues identified in GitHub PR review that were causing
JWT authentication failures in S3 IAM integration tests.

### Problem Identified:
- evaluateStringCondition function was a stub that always returned shouldMatch
- Trust policy validation was doing basic checks instead of proper evaluation
- String conditions (StringEquals, StringNotEquals, StringLike) were ignored
- JWT authentication failing with errCode=1 (AccessDenied)

### Solution Implemented:

**1. Fixed evaluateStringCondition in policy engine:**
- Implemented proper string condition evaluation with context matching
- Added support for exact matching (StringEquals/StringNotEquals)
- Added wildcard support for StringLike conditions using filepath.Match
- Proper type conversion for condition values and context values

**2. Implemented comprehensive trust policy validation:**
- Added parseJWTTokenForTrustPolicy to extract claims from web identity tokens
- Created evaluateTrustPolicy method with proper Principal matching
- Added support for Federated principals (OIDC/SAML)
- Implemented trust policy condition evaluation
- Added proper context mapping (seaweed:FederatedProvider, etc.)

**3. Enhanced IAM manager with trust policy evaluation:**
- validateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity now uses proper policy evaluation
- Extracts JWT claims and maps them to evaluation context
- Supports StringEquals, StringNotEquals, StringLike conditions
- Proper Principal matching for Federated identity providers

### Technical Details:
- Added filepath import for wildcard matching
- Added base64, json imports for JWT parsing
- Trust policies now check Principal.Federated against token idp claim
- Context values properly mapped: idp → seaweed:FederatedProvider
- Condition evaluation follows AWS IAM policy semantics

### Addresses GitHub PR Review:
This directly fixes the issue mentioned in the PR review about
evaluateStringCondition being a stub that doesn't implement actual
logic for StringEquals, StringNotEquals, and StringLike conditions.

The trust policy validation now properly enforces policy conditions,
which should resolve the JWT authentication failures.
This commit is contained in:
chrislu
2025-08-24 21:21:55 -07:00
parent 0cbb29161d
commit 9cbd73aba0
3 changed files with 310 additions and 65 deletions
-41
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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"encoding/base64"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
)
func main() {
now := time.Now()
signingKeyB64 := "dGVzdC1zaWduaW5nLWtleS0zMi1jaGFyYWN0ZXJzLWxvbmc="
signingKey, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(signingKeyB64)
sessionId := fmt.Sprintf("test-session-admin-user-TestAdminRole-%d", now.Unix())
roleArn := "arn:seaweed:iam::role/TestAdminRole"
sessionName := "test-session-admin-user"
principalArn := fmt.Sprintf("arn:seaweed:sts::assumed-role/TestAdminRole/%s", sessionName)
sessionClaims := jwt.MapClaims{
"iss": "seaweedfs-sts",
"sub": sessionId,
"iat": now.Unix(),
"exp": now.Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
"nbf": now.Unix(),
"typ": "session",
"role": roleArn,
"snam": sessionName,
"principal": principalArn,
"assumed": principalArn,
"assumed_at": now.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
"ext_uid": "admin-user",
"idp": "test-oidc",
"max_dur": int64(time.Hour.Seconds()),
"sid": sessionId,
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, sessionClaims)
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(signingKey)
fmt.Println(tokenString)
}
+225 -21
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@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ package integration
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/policy"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/providers"
@@ -294,29 +298,44 @@ func (m *IAMManager) validateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, role
return fmt.Errorf("role has no trust policy")
}
// For simplified implementation, we'll do basic validation
// In a full implementation, this would:
// 1. Parse the web identity token
// 2. Check issuer against trust policy
// 3. Validate conditions in trust policy
// Check if trust policy allows web identity assumption
for _, statement := range roleDef.TrustPolicy.Statement {
if statement.Effect == "Allow" {
for _, action := range statement.Action {
if action == "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity" {
// For testing, just verify there's a Federated principal
if principal, ok := statement.Principal.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
if _, ok := principal["Federated"]; ok {
return nil // Allow
}
}
}
}
}
// Parse the web identity token to extract claims for context
tokenClaims, err := parseJWTTokenForTrustPolicy(webIdentityToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse web identity token: %w", err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy does not allow web identity assumption")
// Create evaluation context for trust policy validation
requestContext := make(map[string]interface{})
// Add standard context values that trust policies might check
if idp, ok := tokenClaims["idp"].(string); ok {
requestContext["seaweed:TokenIssuer"] = idp
requestContext["seaweed:FederatedProvider"] = idp
}
if iss, ok := tokenClaims["iss"].(string); ok {
requestContext["seaweed:Issuer"] = iss
}
if sub, ok := tokenClaims["sub"].(string); ok {
requestContext["seaweed:Subject"] = sub
}
if extUid, ok := tokenClaims["ext_uid"].(string); ok {
requestContext["seaweed:ExternalUserId"] = extUid
}
// Create evaluation context for trust policy
evalCtx := &policy.EvaluationContext{
Principal: "web-identity-user", // Placeholder principal for trust policy evaluation
Action: "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
Resource: roleDef.RoleArn,
RequestContext: requestContext,
}
// Evaluate the trust policy directly
if !m.evaluateTrustPolicy(roleDef.TrustPolicy, evalCtx) {
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy denies web identity assumption")
}
return nil
}
// validateTrustPolicyForCredentials validates trust policy for credential assumption
@@ -388,3 +407,188 @@ func (m *IAMManager) ExpireSessionForTesting(ctx context.Context, sessionToken s
return m.stsService.ExpireSessionForTesting(ctx, sessionToken)
}
// parseJWTTokenForTrustPolicy parses a JWT token to extract claims for trust policy evaluation
func parseJWTTokenForTrustPolicy(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
// Simple JWT parsing without verification (for trust policy context only)
// In production, this should use proper JWT parsing with signature verification
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format")
}
// Decode the payload (second part)
payload := parts[1]
// Add padding if needed
for len(payload)%4 != 0 {
payload += "="
}
decoded, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT payload: %w", err)
}
var claims map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(decoded, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal JWT claims: %w", err)
}
return claims, nil
}
// evaluateTrustPolicy evaluates a trust policy against the evaluation context
func (m *IAMManager) evaluateTrustPolicy(trustPolicy *policy.PolicyDocument, evalCtx *policy.EvaluationContext) bool {
if trustPolicy == nil {
return false
}
// Trust policies work differently from regular policies:
// - They check the Principal field to see who can assume the role
// - They check Action to see what actions are allowed
// - They may have Conditions that must be satisfied
for _, statement := range trustPolicy.Statement {
if statement.Effect == "Allow" {
// Check if the action matches
actionMatches := false
for _, action := range statement.Action {
if action == evalCtx.Action || action == "*" {
actionMatches = true
break
}
}
if !actionMatches {
continue
}
// Check if the principal matches
principalMatches := false
if principal, ok := statement.Principal.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
// Check for Federated principal (OIDC/SAML)
if federated, ok := principal["Federated"].(string); ok {
// For web identity, check if the token issuer matches the federated provider
if tokenIssuer, exists := evalCtx.RequestContext["seaweed:FederatedProvider"]; exists {
if issuerStr, ok := tokenIssuer.(string); ok && issuerStr == federated {
principalMatches = true
}
}
}
// Could add other principal types here (AWS, Service, etc.)
} else if principalStr, ok := statement.Principal.(string); ok {
// Handle string principal
if principalStr == "*" {
principalMatches = true
}
}
if !principalMatches {
continue
}
// Check conditions if present
if len(statement.Condition) > 0 {
conditionsMatch := m.evaluateTrustPolicyConditions(statement.Condition, evalCtx)
if !conditionsMatch {
continue
}
}
// All checks passed for this Allow statement
return true
}
}
return false
}
// evaluateTrustPolicyConditions evaluates conditions in a trust policy statement
func (m *IAMManager) evaluateTrustPolicyConditions(conditions map[string]map[string]interface{}, evalCtx *policy.EvaluationContext) bool {
for conditionType, conditionBlock := range conditions {
switch conditionType {
case "StringEquals":
if !m.evaluateStringConditionForTrust(conditionBlock, evalCtx, true, false) {
return false
}
case "StringNotEquals":
if !m.evaluateStringConditionForTrust(conditionBlock, evalCtx, false, false) {
return false
}
case "StringLike":
if !m.evaluateStringConditionForTrust(conditionBlock, evalCtx, true, true) {
return false
}
// Add other condition types as needed
default:
// Unknown condition type - fail safe
return false
}
}
return true
}
// evaluateStringConditionForTrust evaluates string conditions for trust policies
func (m *IAMManager) evaluateStringConditionForTrust(block map[string]interface{}, evalCtx *policy.EvaluationContext, shouldMatch bool, useWildcard bool) bool {
for conditionKey, conditionValue := range block {
contextValues, exists := evalCtx.RequestContext[conditionKey]
if !exists {
if shouldMatch {
return false
}
continue
}
// Convert context value to string slice
var contextStrings []string
switch v := contextValues.(type) {
case string:
contextStrings = []string{v}
case []string:
contextStrings = v
default:
contextStrings = []string{fmt.Sprintf("%v", v)}
}
// Convert condition value to string slice
var expectedStrings []string
switch v := conditionValue.(type) {
case string:
expectedStrings = []string{v}
case []string:
expectedStrings = v
default:
expectedStrings = []string{fmt.Sprintf("%v", v)}
}
// Evaluate the condition
conditionMet := false
for _, expected := range expectedStrings {
for _, contextValue := range contextStrings {
if useWildcard {
matched, err := filepath.Match(expected, contextValue)
if err == nil && matched {
conditionMet = true
break
}
} else {
if expected == contextValue {
conditionMet = true
break
}
}
}
if conditionMet {
break
}
}
if shouldMatch && !conditionMet {
return false
}
if !shouldMatch && conditionMet {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+85 -3
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
@@ -419,9 +420,90 @@ func (e *PolicyEngine) evaluateIPCondition(block map[string]interface{}, evalCtx
// evaluateStringCondition evaluates string-based conditions
func (e *PolicyEngine) evaluateStringCondition(block map[string]interface{}, evalCtx *EvaluationContext, shouldMatch bool, useWildcard bool) bool {
// For this simplified implementation, we'll just return true
// In a full implementation, this would evaluate string conditions against request context
return shouldMatch
// Iterate through all condition keys in the block
for conditionKey, conditionValue := range block {
// Get the context values for this condition key
contextValues, exists := evalCtx.RequestContext[conditionKey]
if !exists {
// If the context key doesn't exist, condition fails for positive match
if shouldMatch {
return false
}
continue
}
// Convert context value to string slice
var contextStrings []string
switch v := contextValues.(type) {
case string:
contextStrings = []string{v}
case []string:
contextStrings = v
case []interface{}:
for _, item := range v {
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
contextStrings = append(contextStrings, str)
}
}
default:
// Convert to string as fallback
contextStrings = []string{fmt.Sprintf("%v", v)}
}
// Convert condition value to string slice
var expectedStrings []string
switch v := conditionValue.(type) {
case string:
expectedStrings = []string{v}
case []string:
expectedStrings = v
case []interface{}:
for _, item := range v {
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
expectedStrings = append(expectedStrings, str)
} else {
expectedStrings = append(expectedStrings, fmt.Sprintf("%v", item))
}
}
default:
expectedStrings = []string{fmt.Sprintf("%v", v)}
}
// Evaluate the condition
conditionMet := false
for _, expected := range expectedStrings {
for _, contextValue := range contextStrings {
if useWildcard {
// Use wildcard matching for StringLike conditions
matched, err := filepath.Match(expected, contextValue)
if err == nil && matched {
conditionMet = true
break
}
} else {
// Exact string matching for StringEquals/StringNotEquals
if expected == contextValue {
conditionMet = true
break
}
}
}
if conditionMet {
break
}
}
// For shouldMatch=true (StringEquals, StringLike): condition must be met
// For shouldMatch=false (StringNotEquals): condition must NOT be met
if shouldMatch && !conditionMet {
return false
}
if !shouldMatch && conditionMet {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// ValidatePolicyDocument validates a policy document structure