s3: use oidc: prefix for trust-policy conditions in IAM example (#9653)

* s3: use oidc: prefix for trust-policy conditions in IAM example

Trust-policy conditions for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity see OIDC claims
under the oidc: prefix, so the docker example's bare "roles" key never
matched and denied every web-identity assume against those roles. Switch
the three roles to oidc:roles.

Also document the available trust-policy condition keys (oidc:iss/sub/aud,
oidc:<claim>, aws:FederatedProvider, aws:userid, sts:DurationSeconds) and
note that roleMapping selects the role for direct OIDC bearer auth while
STS uses the explicit RoleArn plus trust policy.

* s3: clarify aws:userid differs between trust policy and request auth

aws:userid is the raw sub claim during trust-policy evaluation, but a
stable sub+iss hash (ComputeParentUser) during S3 request authorization
after the role is assumed. Note both so the two contexts aren't conflated.
This commit is contained in:
Chris Lu
2026-05-23 20:02:48 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent e2203b2a0b
commit dc5621d2ae
2 changed files with 51 additions and 3 deletions
+48
View File
@@ -298,6 +298,54 @@ User Request → Load Balancer → Any S3 Gateway Instance
Allow/Deny Request
```
## Trust Policy Conditions
Step 5 above evaluates the role's trust policy against context keys derived from the
OIDC token's claims. The available keys are:
| Condition key | Source |
|---------------|--------|
| `oidc:iss` | `iss` claim (issuer URL) |
| `oidc:sub` | `sub` claim |
| `oidc:aud` | `aud` claim |
| `oidc:<claim>` | any other token claim, e.g. `oidc:roles`, `oidc:groups`, `oidc:email` |
| `aws:FederatedProvider` | the provider `name` (e.g. `keycloak-oidc`) when its configured issuer matches the token, otherwise the raw issuer URL |
| `aws:userid` | `sub` claim (same value as `oidc:sub` during trust-policy evaluation) |
| `sts:DurationSeconds` | requested session duration, when supplied |
During trust-policy evaluation `aws:userid` is the raw `sub` claim. Once the
role has been assumed, the keys seen by request authorization differ: there
`aws:userid` is a stable per-identity hash of `sub` and `iss` (see
`ComputeParentUser`), so do not assume the two contexts carry the same value.
Custom claims are always exposed under the `oidc:` prefix, so a trust policy must use
`oidc:roles` (not a bare `roles`) to match a `roles` claim:
```json
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"oidc:roles": "s3-admin"
}
}
```
A multi-valued claim (such as a `roles` array) matches when any of its values equals
the condition value. The same `oidc:` keys can be interpolated into policy resources,
e.g. `arn:aws:s3:::bucket/${oidc:sub}/*`.
### roleMapping vs. trust policy
A provider's `roleMapping` and a role's trust policy apply to two different entry
points and are not interchangeable:
- **Direct OIDC** — an S3 request carrying `Authorization: Bearer <OIDC-JWT>`. The
gateway applies `roleMapping` to choose the caller's role from the token claims; the
first matching rule (or `defaultRole`) wins.
- **STS `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`** — the caller names the role explicitly via
`RoleArn`, and that role's trust policy decides whether the assumption is allowed.
`roleMapping` does not select the role on this path; instead the token claims are
surfaced as the `oidc:` condition keys above for the trust policy to evaluate.
## Configuration Management
### Development Environment
+3 -3
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"roles": "s3-admin"
"oidc:roles": "s3-admin"
}
}
}
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"roles": "s3-read-only"
"oidc:roles": "s3-read-only"
}
}
}
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"roles": "s3-read-write"
"oidc:roles": "s3-read-write"
}
}
}