mirror of
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs.git
synced 2026-08-20 22:27:04 +00:00
* terraform: add cloud-agnostic core renderer module Renders per-node weed argv, systemd units, config files, disk-mount and secret-fetch scripts, and cloud-init from an address map. Creates zero cloud resources. Flags verified against the weed binary: volume uses -mserver for the master list, gRPC is -port.grpc (auto http+10000), minFreeSpacePercent is a string, filer store via -defaultStoreDir. * terraform: add mTLS and JWT security module Generates the CA, per-component certs with distinct CNs, and JWT signing keys via the tls/random providers. Emits a core_security object plus PEMs for secret-store delivery. * terraform: add AWS deployment module and examples Reserves stable ENIs first, renders config via the core, then creates instances, prevent_destroy EBS data disks mounted at /data, and the cluster security group. With enable_security, generates certs/JWT, stores them in SSM SecureString, grants an instance role, and fetches them at boot so secrets stay out of user_data. Keyed for_each on every stateful tier. * terraform: add local cluster test harnesses run_local_cluster.sh and run_local_secure.sh render a cluster with the core and run real weed processes, asserting master quorum, volume registration, filer/s3 round-trips, mutual-TLS formation, and JWT enforcement. Use an isolated high port range with a guard so they never touch a cluster already running on the machine. The weed binary defaults to $(go env GOPATH)/bin/weed. * terraform: add CI workflow and README fmt/validate/tofu-test plus smoke jobs that build weed and run both harnesses. * terraform: guard against empty filesystem UUID in mount script An empty UUID made grep -q match any fstab line, skipping the fstab entry and breaking the mount. Fail fast when blkid returns no UUID. * terraform: sanitize cluster name in WEED_CLUSTER env keys Hyphens or spaces in cluster_name produced invalid systemd/bash env var names; map non-alphanumerics to underscores. * terraform: omit empty jwt.signing block from security.toml With enable_security and no JWT key, the template emitted [jwt.signing] key="". Gate the block on a non-empty key and cover it with a test. * terraform: mark core security input as sensitive The security object carries JWT signing keys; keep them out of plan output and known values. * terraform: enforce jwt_length minimum of 32 * terraform: note region/AZ coupling in HA example * terraform: guard WORKDIR before recursive delete in test harnesses * terraform: fix README fence language and test count * terraform: handle embedded s3 with no filer nodes Indexing sort(keys(var.filers))[0] errored at plan time when embedded S3 was enabled but no filers were defined; fall back to an empty config source. * terraform: scope kms:Decrypt to a configurable key arn Replace the hardcoded Resource="*" with a kms_key_arn variable (default "*") so production can restrict decrypt to a specific CMK. * terraform: encrypt EBS data volumes at rest Set encrypted = true on the volume/filer data disks and the all-in-one example disk. * terraform: protect filer instances from API termination Filers hold the leveldb2 metadata store, so they are stateful and get the same disable_api_termination as masters and volumes. * terraform: stop instance before detaching in all-in-one example * terraform: drop stale references to the removed plan doc * terraform: correct stale mount-step comment in aws module * terraform: mark Terraform support as experimental in README
129 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
129 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
# SeaweedFS on Terraform
|
|
|
|
> **Experimental.** This Terraform support is an early scaffold under active
|
|
> development. Interfaces (variables, outputs, module layout) may change without
|
|
> notice, and not every tier is implemented yet. Not recommended for production
|
|
> without your own review and testing.
|
|
|
|
Self-contained Terraform/OpenTofu modules to deploy SeaweedFS on cloud VMs
|
|
running the `weed` binary directly under systemd. No Helm and no Kubernetes
|
|
required.
|
|
|
|
What works today is verified end-to-end against a real `weed` cluster (see
|
|
"Test it locally" below).
|
|
|
|
## Layout
|
|
|
|
```text
|
|
terraform/
|
|
modules/
|
|
core/ cloud-agnostic renderer (ZERO cloud resources): turns an
|
|
address map + config into per-node weed argv, systemd units,
|
|
config files, disk-mount + secret-fetch scripts, and cloud-init.
|
|
Both the cloud wrappers and the local harnesses consume `nodes`.
|
|
security/ cloud-agnostic CA + per-component mTLS certs (distinct CNs) +
|
|
JWT signing keys (tls/random providers). Emits a `core_security`
|
|
object ready for the core, plus PEMs for secret-store delivery.
|
|
aws/ thin AWS wrapper: reserves stable ENIs (fixed private IPs)
|
|
first, feeds them to core, creates instances + protected EBS
|
|
data disks + SG; with enable_security it generates certs/JWT,
|
|
stores them in SSM SecureString, grants an instance role, and
|
|
renders a boot fetch-secrets.sh. Keyed for_each throughout.
|
|
examples/
|
|
aws-ha-distributed/ 3 masters + 3 volumes (1/AZ) + 2 filers + 1 S3,
|
|
secure-by-default (mTLS via SSM-delivered certs)
|
|
aws-all-in-one/ single `weed server` instance via core directly
|
|
test/
|
|
local/ render a cluster with core and run it as real weed processes
|
|
on 127.0.0.1 (no cloud, no docker), then assert it works
|
|
local-secure/ generate certs/JWT with the security module, run a real
|
|
mTLS cluster, and assert it forms + enforces JWT auth
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Design in one paragraph
|
|
|
|
The chart is the structural reference, not a dependency. A cloud-agnostic
|
|
**core** renders everything portable; thin per-cloud wrappers provision infra.
|
|
Addressing is an **input** to the core (wrapper reserves static IPs first), so
|
|
the wrapper -> core dependency is one-way with no apply-time cycle. Stateful
|
|
tiers (master/volume/filer) are keyed `for_each` maps, never `count`, so a
|
|
middle node can be replaced without reindexing its peers or reattaching the
|
|
wrong disk. Flag names are verified against the real `weed` binary
|
|
(notably: volume uses `-mserver` for the master list; gRPC is `-port.grpc`,
|
|
auto = http+10000; `minFreeSpacePercent` is a string).
|
|
|
|
## Test it locally
|
|
|
|
Requires `tofu` (or `terraform`), `jq`, `curl`, and a `weed` binary. Renders a
|
|
3-master + volume + filer + S3 cluster from the core module and runs it as real
|
|
processes, asserting quorum, volume registration, and filer/S3 round-trips:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd terraform/test/local
|
|
WEED=/path/to/weed ./run_local_cluster.sh
|
|
# => 7 passed, 0 failed
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
The harness uses a high port range (29333/28080/28888/28333) so it does not
|
|
collide with a SeaweedFS cluster already running on the machine, and aborts if a
|
|
required port is taken. `KEEP=1 ./run_local_cluster.sh` leaves the cluster up.
|
|
|
|
### mTLS end-to-end
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd terraform/test/local-secure
|
|
WEED=/path/to/weed ./run_local_secure.sh
|
|
# => generates a CA + component certs + JWT, renders security.toml, runs a real
|
|
# mTLS cluster, asserts master/volume/filer form over mutual TLS and that the
|
|
# filer enforces JWT signing (unsigned writes get 401). 5 passed.
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Plan-level tests (no cloud)
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd terraform/modules/core && tofu test
|
|
# => 11 passed: peers list, -mserver vs -master, metrics gating,
|
|
# security.toml conditions, all-in-one inheritance, ...
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Validate the cloud wrappers
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd terraform/examples/aws-ha-distributed && tofu init && tofu validate
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
`apply` needs AWS credentials, a VPC, subnets, and an AMI with `weed` installed
|
|
(bake with Packer, or install at boot).
|
|
|
|
## Status
|
|
|
|
Implemented and verified:
|
|
- Tiers: master / volume / filer / s3 / all-in-one rendered by the core.
|
|
- Disk mount: cloud-init runs a `mount-disks.sh` that auto-discovers (or takes
|
|
explicit candidate devices), `blkid`-guards `mkfs`, mounts, and persists to
|
|
`/etc/fstab` by UUID. The AWS wrapper wires the protected EBS disk to `/data`.
|
|
- mTLS + JWT: the `security` module generates the CA + per-component certs
|
|
(distinct CNs) + JWT keys; the AWS wrapper stores them in SSM SecureString,
|
|
grants an instance role, and the core renders a boot fetch script so secrets
|
|
stay OUT of user_data. Proven end-to-end by `test/local-secure`.
|
|
|
|
Not yet implemented:
|
|
- sftp / admin / worker tiers (core does not render them yet).
|
|
- GCP/Azure wrappers, the data-plane provider, and the K8s-native module.
|
|
- CA in Vault PKI (currently TF-generated, so the CA key lives in state). KMS
|
|
decrypt in the IAM policy is scoped by
|
|
`ViaService` but uses `Resource="*"`; tighten to the SSM CMK in production.
|
|
|
|
## Gotchas
|
|
|
|
- This `weed` build starts an Iceberg REST catalog on `:8181` by default; set
|
|
`s3.iceberg_port = 0` to disable, or a port to relocate it.
|
|
- Disk auto-discovery assumes a single attached data disk per node. For multiple
|
|
data disks, pass explicit `devices` candidates in `disk_mounts`.
|
|
|
|
## Security note
|
|
|
|
`tofu output`/state can contain secrets. Generate secrets outside Terraform
|
|
(cloud secret manager / Vault) and fetch them at boot; never commit secret
|
|
material.
|