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* SECURITY.md: require working repro and trust-boundary impact Funnel reports through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, require a reproduction against a supported version, and spell out the trust model so internal-cluster exposure and example-config issues are out of scope. Unvalidated scanner/AI output is handled as hardening, not as an advisory. CVEs minted by third parties outside this process may be disputed. * SECURITY.md: drop email channel, GitHub private reporting only
79 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Supported versions
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Security fixes land in the latest release. Please reproduce against a recent
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release or `master` before reporting; issues that only reproduce on old,
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unsupported versions are not eligible for a fix or an advisory.
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Report privately through GitHub private vulnerability reporting (the "Report a
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vulnerability" button under the repository's Security tab). This keeps the
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report, the fix, and any CVE in one place. Do not open a public issue.
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### What a report must include
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We can only act on reports that show real impact. Please include:
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- Affected version (a release tag or `master` commit you reproduced on)
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- The exact deployment and configuration: which components are running
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(master, volume, filer, S3, admin), which ports are reachable by the
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attacker, and what authentication is enabled
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- The attacker's starting position: unauthenticated, a valid S3 user, an admin,
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or someone with access to the internal cluster network
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- The trust boundary that is crossed (e.g. an unauthenticated client reading
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another tenant's data, an S3 user escalating to admin)
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- A minimal, working reproduction or proof of concept
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- Expected vs. actual behavior
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A report without a working reproduction and a clear trust boundary is a
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hardening suggestion, not a vulnerability. We are glad to receive those, but
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they are handled on the normal issue tracker, not as security advisories.
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### Automated and AI-assisted reports
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Output from static analysis, dependency scanners, fuzzers, or LLMs is welcome
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only when you have manually validated it and can supply a working reproduction
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against a supported version, per the requirements above. Raw tool output,
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speculative findings, or generated reports without a demonstrated exploit will
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be closed as hardening suggestions.
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## Trust model
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SeaweedFS is built to run with its cluster components (master, volume servers,
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and the raw filer API) on a trusted network. Those internal APIs are not an
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authentication boundary unless you explicitly enable a control (for example
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volume JWT or filer authentication) and that control is bypassed. Exposing an
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internal port directly to untrusted clients is a deployment mistake, not a
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vulnerability in SeaweedFS.
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Reports are in scope when they cross a boundary SeaweedFS is meant to enforce,
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for example:
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- Unauthenticated access to data or operations that require authentication
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- One S3 identity reading, writing, or deleting another identity's data
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- Privilege escalation from a normal S3 user to administrative capability
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- Bypass of Object Lock / retention where it is configured
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- Remotely triggered data corruption or loss
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Reports are generally out of scope when they require:
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- Direct access to an internal cluster port that is meant to be private
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- Full master, filer, or volume server access (already a full compromise)
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- An insecure example configuration rather than a documented secure setup
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- Local-only impact on a host the attacker already controls
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## CVE assignment
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When a report is confirmed, we publish an advisory and request the CVE through
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GitHub. CVEs assigned by third parties without coordinating with us, or for
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issues that do not cross a boundary described above, may be disputed.
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## Response and disclosure
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- We aim to acknowledge a valid report within a few business days.
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- We will investigate, work on a fix, and coordinate a disclosure timeline
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with you.
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- Please allow time for a fix before any public disclosure.
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