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Fixed rebase conflicts
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@@ -41,11 +41,13 @@ On the other hand, if there is a deterministic bug in `PrepareProposal` or `Proc
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strictly speaking, this makes all processes that hit the bug byzantine. This is a problem in practice,
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as very often validators are running the Application from the same codebase, so potentially _all_ would
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likely hit the bug at the same time. This would result in most (or all) processes prevoting `nil`, with the
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serious consequences on Tendermint's liveness that this entails.
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serious consequences on Tendermint's liveness that this entails. Due to its criticality, Requirement 3 is a
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target for extensive testing and automated verification.
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* Requirement 4 [`ProcessProposal`, determinism-1]: For any correct process $p$, and any arbitrary block $v'$,
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* Requirement 4 [`ProcessProposal`, determinism-1]: `ProcessProposal` is a (deterministic) function of the current
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state and the block that is about to be applied. In other words, for any correct process $p$, and any arbitrary block $v'$,
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if $p$'s Tendermint calls `RequestProcessProposal` on $v'$ at height $h$,
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then $p$'s Application's acceptance or rejection exclusively depends on $v'$ and $s_{p,h-1}$.
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then $p$'s Application's acceptance or rejection **exclusively** depends on $v'$ and $s_{p,h-1}$.
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* Requirement 5 [`ProcessProposal`, determinism-2]: For any two correct processes $p$ and $q$, and any arbitrary block $v'$,
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if $p$'s (resp. $q$'s) Tendermint calls `RequestProcessProposal` on $v'$ at height $h$,
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@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ to hit the bug at the same point. There is currently no clear solution to help w
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the Application designers/implementors must proceed very carefully with the logic/implementation
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of `ProcessProposal`. As a general rule `ProcessProposal` _should_ always accept the block.
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According to the Tendermint algorithm, a correct process can only broadcast one precommit message in round $r$, height $h$.
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According to the Tendermint algorithm, a correct process can broadcast at most one precommit message in round $r$, height $h$.
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Since, as stated in the [Description](#description) section, `ResponseExtendVote` is only called when Tendermint
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is about to broadcast a non-`nil` precommit message, a correct process can only produce one vote extension in round $r$, height $h$.
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Let $e^r_p$ the vote extension that the Application of a correct process $p$ returns via `ResponseExtendVote` in round $r$, height $h$.
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@@ -79,10 +81,11 @@ However, if there is a (deterministic) bug in `ExtendVote` or `VerifyVoteExtensi
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we will face the same liveness issues as described for Requirement 3, as Precommit messages with invalid vote
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extensions will be discarded.
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* Requirement 7 [`VerifyVoteExtension`, determinism-1]: For any correct process $p$,
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and any arbitrary vote extension $e$, and any arbitrary block $w$,
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if $p$'s (resp. $q$'s) Tendermint calls `RequestVerifyVoteExtension` on $e$ and $w$ at height $h$,
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then $p$'s Application's acceptance or rejection exclusively depends on $e$, $w$ and $s_{p,h-1}$.
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* Requirement 7 [`VerifyVoteExtension`, determinism-1]: `VerifyVoteExtension` is a (deterministic) function of
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the current state, the vote extension received, and the prepared proposal that the extension refers to.
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In other words, for any correct process $p$, and any arbitrary vote extension $e$, and any arbitrary
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block $w$, if $p$'s (resp. $q$'s) Tendermint calls `RequestVerifyVoteExtension` on $e$ and $w$ at height $h$,
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then $p$'s Application's acceptance or rejection **exclusively** depends on $e$, $w$ and $s_{p,h-1}$.
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* Requirement 8 [`VerifyVoteExtension`, determinism-2]: For any two correct processes $p$ and $q$,
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and any arbitrary vote extension $e$, and any arbitrary block $w$,
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@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ From the App's perspective, they'll probably skip ProcessProposal
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| Name | Type | Description | Field Number |
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|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
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| modified_tx | bool | The Application sets it to false to denote it did not make changes to transactions | 1 |
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| modified_tx | bool | The Application sets it to true to denote it made changes to transactions | 1 |
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| tx | repeated [TransactionRecord](#transactionrecord) | Possibly modified list of transactions that have been picked as part of the proposed block. | 2 |
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| same_block | bool | If true, Application is in same-block execution mode | 3 |
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| data | bytes | The Merkle root hash of the application state. | 4 |
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@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ and _p_'s _validValue_ is `nil`:
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* in both modes, the Application can manipulate transactions
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* leave transactions untouched - `TxAction = UNMODIFIED`
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* add new transactions (not previously in the mempool) - `TxAction = ADDED`
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* removed transactions (invalid) from the proposal and from the mempool - `TxAction = REMOVED`
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* remove transactions (invalid) from the proposal and from the mempool - `TxAction = REMOVED`
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* remove transactions from the proposal but not from the mempool (effectively _delaying_ them) - the
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Application removes the transaction from the list
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* modify transactions (e.g. aggregate them) - `TxAction = ADDED` followed by `TxAction = REMOVED`
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