feat: add live GitHub OIDC end-to-end test for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity

Add IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live, the only web-identity test that exercises AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against a real external OIDC provider end-to-end: GitHub Actions' own issuer, with real discovery-document fetch, JWKS fetch, RS256 signature verification, claims mapping, and session credential issuance. Every other web-identity test in the suite uses a fake token that never reaches real signature verification. The test registers a throwaway OIDC provider and trust role scoped to this repo (via a distinct test audience and repo-scoped sub condition), fetches a real ID token from GitHub's runtime endpoint, assumes the role, and confirms the issued session credentials work with a follow-up GetCallerIdentity call. It cleans up the role and provider unconditionally and skips itself when run outside a GitHub Actions job with id-token: write permission (e.g. local runs or fork PRs, where GitHub downgrades OIDC permissions to read-only).

Add functional-iam-oidc.yml to run this test in CI on push to main and on same-repo pull_request runs, isolated from the full iam suite since it's the only test needing id-token: write.

Add a SKIP counter and skipF() alongside the existing runF/passF/failF, and report it in the final RAN/PASS/FAIL summary, so a test opting out via skipF() (as this one does when OIDC env vars aren't present) is visible instead of silently absent from the count.
This commit is contained in:
niksis02
2026-08-15 17:49:06 +04:00
parent 4756b4d236
commit eeff64c255
5 changed files with 345 additions and 6 deletions
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
name: IAM functional tests (GitHub OIDC live)
# This workflow exercises AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against a REAL external
# OIDC identity provider (GitHub Actions' own OIDC issuer) - the one publicly
# reachable, free IdP available from inside our own CI job, so no self-hosted
# IdP container is needed.
#
# Trigger stays plain `pull_request` (never pull_request_target or
# workflow_run) plus `push` to main. On a pull_request run, GitHub itself
# downgrades GITHUB_TOKEN/OIDC permissions to read-only whenever the PR
# comes from a fork - regardless of what this file requests - so
# ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN simply won't
# exist in that case and the test below skips itself. That's the actual
# security boundary here: a hostile fork-PR author cannot use their own PR
# to mint a token scoped to this repo's identity through this workflow. Only
# a same-repo (non-fork) pull_request run, or a push to main, gets real
# credentials and actually exercises the live OIDC flow.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main]
jobs:
build:
name: RunIAMGitHubOIDCTest
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: "stable"
id: go
- name: Get Dependencies
run: |
go mod download
- name: Build
run: |
make testbin
- name: Run GitHub OIDC live web-identity test
run: |
set -Eeuo pipefail
IAM_PID=""
cleanup() {
local status=$?
trap - EXIT
if [[ -n "$IAM_PID" ]] && kill -0 "$IAM_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
kill "$IAM_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if [[ -n "$IAM_PID" ]]; then
wait "$IAM_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
exit "$status"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p /tmp/iam-oidc
./versitygw --health /healthz -p :7078 -a user -s pass iam --dir /tmp/iam-oidc &
IAM_PID=$!
ready=""
for _ in {1..50}; do
if curl --fail --silent --max-time 1 http://127.0.0.1:7078/healthz >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ready=1
break
fi
if ! kill -0 "$IAM_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "IAM API server stopped before becoming ready" >&2
exit 1
fi
sleep 0.2
done
if [[ -z "$ready" ]]; then
echo "timed out waiting for IAM API server" >&2
exit 1
fi
./versitygw test -a user -s pass -e http://127.0.0.1:7078 IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live
+2 -2
View File
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ func websiteHostingAction(ctx *cli.Context) error {
ts.Wait()
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println("RAN:", integration.RunCount.Load(), "PASS:", integration.PassCount.Load(), "FAIL:", integration.FailCount.Load())
fmt.Println("RAN:", integration.RunCount.Load(), "PASS:", integration.PassCount.Load(), "FAIL:", integration.FailCount.Load(), "SKIP:", integration.SkipCount.Load())
if integration.FailCount.Load() > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("test failed with %v errors", integration.FailCount.Load())
}
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ func getAction(tf testFunc) func(ctx *cli.Context) error {
ts.Wait()
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println("RAN:", integration.RunCount.Load(), "PASS:", integration.PassCount.Load(), "FAIL:", integration.FailCount.Load())
fmt.Println("RAN:", integration.RunCount.Load(), "PASS:", integration.PassCount.Load(), "FAIL:", integration.FailCount.Load(), "SKIP:", integration.SkipCount.Load())
if integration.FailCount.Load() > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("test failed with %v errors", integration.FailCount.Load())
}
+2
View File
@@ -1473,6 +1473,7 @@ func TestIAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(ts *TestState) {
ts.Run(IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_oaud_condition_mismatch)
ts.Run(IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_issuer_trailing_slash_mismatch)
ts.Run(IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_issuer_scheme_mismatch)
ts.Run(IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live)
}
func TestIAMGetCallerIdentity(ts *TestState) {
@@ -2199,6 +2200,7 @@ func GetIntTests() IntTests {
"IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_oaud_condition_mismatch": IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_oaud_condition_mismatch,
"IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_issuer_trailing_slash_mismatch": IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_issuer_trailing_slash_mismatch,
"IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_issuer_scheme_mismatch": IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_issuer_scheme_mismatch,
"IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live": IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live,
"IAMGetCallerIdentity_root_success": IAMGetCallerIdentity_root_success,
"IAMGetCallerIdentity_user_success": IAMGetCallerIdentity_user_success,
"IAMGetCallerIdentity_unknown_access_key": IAMGetCallerIdentity_unknown_access_key,
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
// Copyright 2026 Versity Software
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
// (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
// with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
// software distributed under the License is distributed on an
// "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
// KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
// specific language governing permissions and limitations
// under the License.
package integration
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/iam"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts"
)
const (
// githubOIDCIssuerURL is GitHub Actions' own OIDC token issuer: a real,
// publicly reachable HTTPS endpoint with a CA-issued certificate.
githubOIDCIssuerURL = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
// githubOIDCTestAudience is deliberately distinct from GitHub's default
// audience (which is the caller's own server URL). If this org ever
// configures a real cloud-provider role trusting
// token.actions.githubusercontent.com for this repo (e.g. for
// publishing/deploys), a leaked test token must not be replayable
// against that unrelated trust relationship - binding the throwaway
// role's trust policy to this audience (instead of GitHub's default)
// is what prevents that.
githubOIDCTestAudience = "versitygw-integration-tests"
)
// IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live exercises
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against a REAL external OIDC identity provider —
// GitHub Actions' own OIDC issuer — end-to-end: discovery-document fetch,
// JWKS fetch, real RS256 signature verification, claims mapping, and
// session credential issuance. It's the only web-identity test that does
// this; every other one in this package uses a fake token that never
// reaches real signature verification.
func IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live(s *S3Conf) error {
testName := "IAMAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity_github_oidc_live"
reqURL := os.Getenv("ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL")
reqToken := os.Getenv("ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN")
if reqURL == "" || reqToken == "" {
skipF("%v: ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN not set "+
"(expected outside a GitHub Actions job with id-token: write permission)", testName)
return nil
}
return iamActionHandler(s, testName, func(client *iam.Client) error {
repo := os.Getenv("GITHUB_REPOSITORY")
if repo == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("GITHUB_REPOSITORY is not set, but ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/TOKEN are - unexpected environment")
}
roleName, roleArn, cleanup, err := createGitHubOIDCTrust(client, repo)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer cleanup()
token, err := fetchGitHubIDToken(reqURL, reqToken, githubOIDCTestAudience)
if err != nil {
return err
}
const sessionName = "github-oidc-live"
assumeOut, err := assumeRoleWithWebIdentity(s, roleArn, sessionName, token, 0)
if err != nil {
// checkIAMApiErr-style wrapping isn't used here since a live
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity SDK error carries no token material
// of its own to guard against - it's the request we build
// (never printed) and GitHub's response (never printed either,
// see fetchGitHubIDToken) that could leak the token.
return fmt.Errorf("AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity: %w", err)
}
if assumeOut.Credentials == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("expected Credentials in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity response")
}
accessKeyID := aws.ToString(assumeOut.Credentials.AccessKeyId)
secretAccessKey := aws.ToString(assumeOut.Credentials.SecretAccessKey)
sessionToken := aws.ToString(assumeOut.Credentials.SessionToken)
if accessKeyID == "" || secretAccessKey == "" || sessionToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("expected a full AccessKeyId/SecretAccessKey/SessionToken triple in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity response")
}
wantArn := fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:sts::000000000000:assumed-role/%s/%s", roleName, sessionName)
if aws.ToString(assumeOut.AssumedRoleUser.Arn) != wantArn {
return fmt.Errorf("expected AssumedRoleUser.Arn %q, instead got %q", wantArn, aws.ToString(assumeOut.AssumedRoleUser.Arn))
}
// A follow-up call authenticated with the session credentials
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity just issued proves the whole chain -
// discovery, JWKS, signature verification, claims mapping, and
// session creds - actually works, not just that a 200 came back.
callerOut, err := getCallerIdentityWithSessionCreds(*s, accessKeyID, secretAccessKey, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("GetCallerIdentity with assumed-role session credentials: %w", err)
}
if aws.ToString(callerOut.Arn) != wantArn {
return fmt.Errorf("GetCallerIdentity: expected Arn %q, instead got %q", wantArn, aws.ToString(callerOut.Arn))
}
return nil
})
}
// createGitHubOIDCTrust registers a throwaway OIDC provider for GitHub
// Actions' own issuer (ThumbprintList omitted, exercising
// CreateOpenIDConnectProvider's autofetch-and-CA-verify path against a real
// publicly reachable HTTPS endpoint instead of thumbprint pinning) and a
// throwaway role trusting it, returning the role's name, its ARN, and a
// cleanup func that removes both unconditionally.
//
// The trust policy's Condition requires both:
// - the effective audience to equal githubOIDCTestAudience (not GitHub's
// default audience - see that constant's doc comment), and
// - the sub claim to match "repo:<repo>:*".
//
// The sub match is a repo-wide wildcard rather than pinning an exact
// ref/event suffix: GitHub's sub claim differs by trigger and branch (e.g.
// "repo:o/r:pull_request" for a pull_request event vs.
// "repo:o/r:ref:refs/heads/main" for a push to main), and pinning one exact
// form would make this test fail depending on how it was triggered. That
// tradeoff only holds because this role is created and deleted within a
// single test run - the same repo-wide wildcard left in a real production
// trust policy would grant every workflow run in the repo, on any branch,
// the same trust, which is far too broad outside this throwaway context.
func createGitHubOIDCTrust(client *iam.Client, repo string) (roleName, roleArn string, cleanup func(), err error) {
out, err := createOIDCProvider(client, &iam.CreateOpenIDConnectProviderInput{
Url: aws.String(githubOIDCIssuerURL),
ClientIDList: []string{githubOIDCTestAudience},
})
if err != nil {
return "", "", nil, fmt.Errorf("create GitHub OIDC provider: %w", err)
}
providerArn := aws.ToString(out.OpenIDConnectProviderArn)
host := trimProviderScheme(githubOIDCIssuerURL)
roleName = "github-oidc-" + genRandString(12)
trust := fmt.Sprintf(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":{"Federated":%q},"Action":"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",`+
`"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"%s:aud":%q},"StringLike":{"%s:sub":%q}}}]}`,
providerArn, host, githubOIDCTestAudience, host, "repo:"+repo+":*")
if _, err := createIAMRole(client, &iam.CreateRoleInput{RoleName: &roleName, AssumeRolePolicyDocument: &trust}); err != nil {
deleteOIDCProvider(client, providerArn)
return "", "", nil, fmt.Errorf("create GitHub OIDC trust role: %w", err)
}
roleArn = "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/" + roleName
cleanup = func() {
deleteIAMRole(client, roleName)
deleteOIDCProvider(client, providerArn)
}
return roleName, roleArn, cleanup, nil
}
// githubIDTokenResponse is the JSON body GitHub's runtime ID-token endpoint
// returns: {"value": "<jwt>", "count": <n>}. Only value is needed here.
type githubIDTokenResponse struct {
Value string `json:"value"`
}
// fetchGitHubIDToken fetches a real, signed OIDC ID token for audience from
// GitHub Actions' runtime token endpoint (requestURL/requestToken are
// ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN, only present
// inside a GitHub Actions job with id-token: write permission).
//
// The returned token is a real, unmasked bearer credential - unlike a
// secrets.* value, GitHub does not scrub it from logs automatically since it
// never appears in the workflow YAML. Every error path here is deliberately
// built from fixed strings and status codes only, never from the response
// body or the request's Authorization header, so a failure here can never
// leak the token into CI output.
func fetchGitHubIDToken(requestURL, requestToken, audience string) (string, error) {
parsed, err := url.Parse(requestURL)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL: invalid URL")
}
q := parsed.Query()
q.Set("audience", audience)
parsed.RawQuery = q.Encode()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), shortTimeout)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, parsed.String(), nil)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("build GitHub OIDC token request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+requestToken)
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json; api-version=2.0")
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetch GitHub OIDC token: request failed")
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read GitHub OIDC token response: failed after status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", fmt.Errorf("GitHub OIDC token endpoint returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
var out githubIDTokenResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse GitHub OIDC token response: malformed JSON")
}
if out.Value == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("GitHub OIDC token endpoint returned an empty token value")
}
return out.Value, nil
}
// getCallerIdentityWithSessionCreds calls GetCallerIdentity authenticated
// with a full access/secret/session-token triple.
func getCallerIdentityWithSessionCreds(cfg S3Conf, access, secret, token string) (*sts.GetCallerIdentityOutput, error) {
cfg.awsID = access
cfg.awsSecret = secret
stsCfg := cfg.Config()
stsCfg.Credentials = credentials.NewStaticCredentialsProvider(access, secret, token)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), shortTimeout)
defer cancel()
return sts.NewFromConfig(stsCfg).GetCallerIdentity(ctx, &sts.GetCallerIdentityInput{})
}
+11 -4
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@@ -20,16 +20,18 @@ import (
)
var (
colorReset = "\033[0m"
colorRed = "\033[31m"
colorGreen = "\033[32m"
colorCyan = "\033[36m"
colorReset = "\033[0m"
colorRed = "\033[31m"
colorGreen = "\033[32m"
colorCyan = "\033[36m"
colorYellow = "\033[33m"
)
var (
RunCount atomic.Uint32
PassCount atomic.Uint32
FailCount atomic.Uint32
SkipCount atomic.Uint32
)
func runF(format string, a ...any) {
@@ -46,3 +48,8 @@ func passF(format string, a ...any) {
PassCount.Add(1)
fmt.Printf(colorGreen+"PASS "+colorReset+format+"\n", a...)
}
func skipF(format string, a ...any) {
SkipCount.Add(1)
fmt.Printf(colorYellow+"SKIP "+colorReset+format+"\n", a...)
}