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Chris LuandGitHub 8c7d714d5e Lance catalog, and a Rust plugin worker to maintain it (#10841)
* iceberg: skip tables the maintenance worker does not own

A Lance dataset registered through the Lance namespace's Iceberg REST adapter
arrives as an Iceberg table with a placeholder schema and table_type=lance, and
keeps its fragments under data/ - the same subdirectory the orphan cleaner
walks. Every fragment is unreferenced by the Iceberg metadata, so a maintenance
pass deletes the dataset. Views share the entry shape and were only skipped
because parsing their metadata happened to fail first.

Gate the scan and the execution path on the entry actually being an Iceberg
table. Maintenance is off by default, so this was latent rather than live.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3tables: let a table declare a format the catalog does not interpret

CreateTable accepted ICEBERG and nothing else. A Lance table has no metadata
file for the catalog to maintain - the entry records a name and the dataset
root, and the client owns everything under it - so accept LANCE, and carry the
declared format on the entry instead of hardcoding it back on the way out.

ListTables now reports format and metadataLocation, so listing a catalog that
holds both kinds takes one pass rather than a GetTable per row. AWS omits both
fields; adding them is additive.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3tables: move the in-memory filer into its own package

The Lance namespace tests need the same harness, and copying it would leave two
of them to keep in step. Extracted as it was, plus the two fidelity gaps that
only surface once a paginating caller uses it: ListEntries ignored
startFromFileName and limit, so a caller that paginates re-read the first page
until it hit its own cap and reported the same entry over and over, and
GetFilerConfiguration was missing, which CreateTableBucket needs to resolve the
buckets directory.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: serve the Lance Namespace REST spec

A second catalog surface beside the Iceberg one, over the same table buckets:
the namespace and table metadata operations, the $-delimited identifier codec,
the spec's numeric error model, the directory-catalog marker files, and
storage_options vending through the STS path the Iceberg catalog already uses.
Listens on -port.lance, 9101 by default, and inherits ARNs, policies and tags
from the storage layer, so a Lance table needs no second permission model.

Identifiers map bucket / namespace / table onto the three levels Lance clients
already use, which is why there is no warehouse selector to invent. The data
plane needs Lance format support that does not exist in Go and answers with the
spec's Unsupported code rather than a bare 404.

Two things it deliberately will not do: create a table bucket as a side effect
of creating a namespace inside one, since a bucket carries its own policy and
lifecycle, and resolve an Iceberg table's location for a Lance client, which
would hand it a table another engine owns.

The design note this follows is in design-lance-catalog.md, including the
.lance directory suffix it proposed and this does not implement.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* mini: give the Lance port the same treatment as the Iceberg one

The flag was registered but nothing else knew about it, so mini would start the
server without reserving its port, waiting for it, or saying where it is. Adds
it to the startup service list, the conflict resolver, the gRPC allocator's
reserved set, the readiness wait, the stop reporting and the banner.

The admin server still takes only the Iceberg port, because there is no Lance
page for it to link to.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: stop deregister and repoint from deleting the dataset

Deregistering preserves data by definition, and this did the opposite: the
catalog entry is the dataset directory, so DeleteTable took the files with it.
Registering over an existing name had the same shape, destroying the dataset
the name used to hold. Found by driving the running server rather than the
in-memory filer, where both looked like success because the table did stop
being listed.

Deregistering is now a state on the entry - the marker file hides it, and
declaring or registering the name again brings it back. Repointing a name at
another dataset is an UpdateTable against the version token, so neither dataset
loses files. Drop is left alone; it is the operation that does remove data.

The storage endpoint now falls back to the advertised -ip where the Iceberg
derivation gives up. An Iceberg client brings its own s3.endpoint and
advertising the wrong one hijacks it, but storage_options is the only place a
Lance client learns where the store is, and without it object_store quietly
talks to real AWS.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3tables: refuse to create a table over one of another format

Creating a table that already exists is idempotent, and that path returned the
existing table without looking at its format. A Lance declare over an Iceberg
table answered 200 and handed back a directory Iceberg owns, so the client
would write its dataset on top. The view check immediately above it already
guards the same class of collision.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3tables: let a table bucket hold a format other than Iceberg

The S3 door validated every object written into a table bucket against
Iceberg's file layout, so a Lance client could not write its dataset at all: it
got 403 on data/*.lance, on _versions/, and on the _transactions/ directory it
turned out to write as well. Table buckets were only neutral containers by
intention; in practice they were Iceberg-shaped and enforced as such.

The allowed set is now the union of what the supported formats write, because
the validator runs where the table's format is not in hand. Underscore-prefixed
directories are treated as belonging to the format, since enumerating them
means guessing at the next one - _transactions is exactly the one this missed -
and their contents are checked only for traversal. Iceberg writes none of them,
so it loses nothing. Marker files at the table root are admitted too, which the
namespace/table/dir/file shape had rejected as too shallow.

Describe also honours the request-body spellings of with_table_uri,
load_detailed_metadata and check_declared. The spec puts them in the query
string, but real clients send both.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: record what the implementation found

The table bucket being an Iceberg-shaped container, enforced at the S3 door,
was the premise this design never questioned and the one that had to change
before anything worked end to end.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* iceberg: prove the data loss the foreign-format guard prevents

The guard landed with a unit test for the predicate and nothing showing what it
saves. These seed what the Lance namespace's Iceberg REST adapter actually
leaves behind - an Iceberg table with a placeholder schema and table_type=lance
whose directory holds a Lance dataset - and assert both halves: orphan
collection does flag the dataset's fragments, because the Iceberg metadata
beside them references nothing, and the scan never reaches the table. An
ordinary Iceberg table in the same shape is still scanned, so the guard is not
just skipping everything.

Confirmed against a running gateway first: our Iceberg catalog accepts the
adapter's registration, and a real Lance client then writes a dataset into that
table's location.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3tablestest: make the in-memory filer safe to race against

Two gaps that only matter once a test drives concurrent writers, which is what
an exclusive create has to be tested with: the entry map had no lock, and
CreateEntry ignored O_EXCL entirely, so both writers of the same name would
have won and the test would have passed while proving nothing.

The BeforeUpdate hook runs before the lock is taken. Its whole purpose is to
land a competing write in a handler's read-to-write window, and that write
needs the lock the hook would otherwise be holding.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: make the namespace an external manifest store

Lance commits a version by writing _versions/{v}.manifest with
put-if-not-exists. The S3 layer in front of this same filer evaluates
If-None-Match by looking the entry up and then writing without a precondition,
so two writers can both pass the check and one commit is lost. The filer itself
has the primitive: CreateEntry with o_excl.

Adds the four version operations a Lance client actually calls - create, list,
describe and batch-delete - recording one entry per version under
_lance_versions/, and advertises managed_versioning so the client routes its
commits here. Reserving a version is the exclusive create, so exactly one of
several racing writers wins and the rest rebase.

Off by default, behind -lance.managedVersioning. Turning it on moves where a
table's version history lives, and a reader that does not come through this
namespace no longer sees all of it; that is the operator's call, not a default.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: record what managed versioning does and does not reach

The first commit through a namespace-backed store works and is recorded the way
the protocol specifies. Later commits do not, because lance 4.0.0 refuses
put_if_exists on that path in its own code, so the feature is capped upstream
rather than here.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* test: integration tests for the Lance namespace

Everything this surface got wrong so far - a deregister that deleted the
dataset, an S3 door that refused every Lance file, a version reservation that
could not actually be exclusive - passed against an in-memory filer first. So
these run against a live gateway, and where the claim is about data they check
storage rather than visibility.

Five Go tests on the shared harness: namespace and table lifecycle including
that deregister keeps the bytes and drop removes them, that a Lance client
cannot resolve or declare over an Iceberg table, that a Lance dataset's files
get past the table-bucket layout guard while junk still does not, and that
eight writers racing for one version produce exactly one winner.

One Docker-gated test drives the real Lance client, which is the only way to
check that the location and storage_options the namespace vends are between
them enough to write and read a dataset. It overrides the endpoint with the
container's view of the same gateway, because the shared harness binds a
wildcard address and so vends none.

The harness gains a Lance port and turns managed versioning on; the flag
touches nothing outside that surface.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3tables: a directory with no namespace metadata is a missing namespace

Three callers resolved a namespace by reading its metadata attribute and each
tested only for a missing entry, so a directory that carried no metadata came
back as an internal error saying "attribute not found". Creating a table under
a namespace that does not exist answered 500.

Collapses the three copies into one helper that reports both conditions as
absent, which is what they are: a directory without namespace metadata is not a
namespace.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* iceberg: stop reporting storage-layer refusals as server faults

writeManagerError recognised a missing table bucket and sent everything else to
500, so a missing namespace, a duplicate name and a commit conflict all reached
the client as InternalServerError with nothing to act on. Creating a table in a
namespace that does not exist is the case that turned up: 500 where the spec
wants 404 NoSuchNamespaceException.

Maps the storage error types onto the exception names this package already
uses, and keeps the existing bucket message, which explains how to select a
table bucket.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* iceberg: skip a foreign-format table by name, not by failing to parse it

A table the namespace created as LANCE carries no Iceberg metadata, so the
worker skipped it only because the parse failed, and logged that as damaged
metadata. The catalog records the format on the entry and this never read it.

Reading it turns an accident into a decision, and separates a mixed catalog
from a corrupt one in the logs. The property check beside it still covers the
other shape: a real Iceberg table wearing table_type=lance, which is what the
Lance namespace's Iceberg REST adapter writes.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: answer whether a Lance table needs maintenance

It does, and index optimization has no Iceberg equivalent: rows written after
an index was built are not covered by it, so a vector search quietly misses
them. None of the three jobs can run in the Go worker, and there is no useful
subset, because deciding what an old version still references means parsing
Lance manifests. Version cleanup at least has an answer that needs nothing from
us - Lance can enable it on the dataset itself.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: the Lance maintenance worker is a plugin worker, in Rust

Framing it as a sidecar was wrong. plugin.proto already defines a
language-agnostic gRPC contract for external maintenance workers, and
"weed worker -admin=..." is the Go reference implementation of it from outside
the admin process. seaweed-volume already compiles protos out of weed/pb with
tonic_build, so a Lance worker is that build plus plugin.proto and the lance
crate.

Scheduling, retries, dedupe, progress and the admin settings page all come from
the protocol: a worker that answers RequestConfigSchema with a descriptor gets
its configuration form rendered without a line of Go.

The data plane is the part that genuinely does need a process answering HTTP,
and this had the two conflated.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* seaweed-worker: Rust plugin worker workspace, with Lance as the first one

plugin.proto is language-agnostic and the Rust toolchain was already in the
tree, so a Lance maintenance worker needs no new integration surface: core is
the contract and nothing else, and a worker crate beside it supplies handlers
and a binary. A second worker is a new member here rather than a fork of the
protocol, which is why this is seaweed-worker and not seaweed-lance-worker.

Verified against a running admin: it connects, is accepted, and admin prefetches
descriptors for lance_compact, lance_optimize_indices and lance_cleanup_versions,
so their settings pages render from the Rust side without a line of Go. The
stream stays up across heartbeats.

The job bodies are stubs that report failure. Doing the work means adding the
lance crate and opening the dataset, and claiming success before that would be
worse than saying so.

Two things running it caught that reading the proto did not: the admin address
has to be converted to the gRPC port the way pb.ServerToGrpcAddress does, or the
dial fails as an h2 frame error; and the generated field names differ from the
Go ones in several places, so JobCompleted carries success rather than a state
enum.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: implement compaction

Detection lists tables from the namespace, opens each one, and proposes a job
for any with more fragments than the policy allows; opening a dataset reads its
manifest and not its data, so a sweep stays cheap. Execution re-resolves the
table rather than trusting what detection saw - it may have been repointed, and
the vended credentials expire - then compacts and reports the fragment counts
either side.

Verified against a live gateway: a twelve-fragment dataset became one fragment
with all twelve rows intact. The test drives the handler directly and skips
unless WEED_LANCE_NAMESPACE names a namespace, the way the Go integration tests
skip without Docker.

Running it turned up a gap the design had not: a gateway without STS vends no
credentials at all, so the worker could not open anything and detection quietly
proposed nothing. --access-key/--secret-key are the fallback, and whatever the
namespace vends still wins over them.

Two API assumptions did not survive contact either. Datasets open through
DatasetBuilder::with_storage_options, not ReadParams, and lance 10's
ObjectStoreParams has no storage_options field at all.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: implement index optimization and version cleanup

Index optimization is the job with no Iceberg equivalent: rows appended after
an index was built are invisible to a search of it until this runs. Detection
reads num_unindexed_rows from each index's statistics and proposes a table once
more rows sit outside its indices than the budget allows; a table with no
indices is skipped, which is different from one whose indices have fallen
behind.

Cleanup applies a retention window, refusing rather than silently dropping a
tagged version, and leaving unverified files alone because they may belong to a
commit still in flight.

Both verified against a live gateway: 512 uncovered rows became 0, and a
fourteen-version table lost its old ones. Each test now seeds what it needs,
including building an IVF_PQ index and appending rows outside it. The first
version of these depended on state a script had left, so the second run found
the work already done and asserted nothing - a test that passes by doing
nothing is worse than no test.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: answer an empty catalog with an empty list, not null

ListAllTables built its result from a nil slice, so a namespace holding no
tables answered {"tables":null} on a field the spec marks required. A generated
client may decode that differently from an empty list. Found running the
namespace on a dev box, where the catalog was empty.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: give Lance maintenance its own scheduler lane

Lane assignment is a hardcoded map, so the three lance_* job types fell through
to the default lane. That lane serialises its work under the cluster admin lock
because volume management shares global state, which would queue a table's
compaction behind volume balancing for no reason - Iceberg has its own
lock-free lane for exactly this.

Adds the lane, maps the three job types to it, and puts it in the sidebar
beside Iceberg and Lifecycle. The lane routes were already generic, so only the
nav was hand-written.

The lane-coverage test spelled out the three known lanes, so a fourth failed
it. It now checks against AllLanes(), which is the property it was reaching for
and does not need editing next time.

Found by connecting the Rust worker to a real admin: it registered fine and its
job types were known, but they were filed under "default" and had no page.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: log what detection saw

"Detection proposed nothing" and "the worker could not read the table" look
identical from the admin side, and the second is what a missing credential
produces. One line per table separates them.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: fix a leaked heartbeat and a silent reconnect loop

spawn_heartbeat returned a handle to an empty task rather than the ticker it
had just spawned, so aborting it aborted nothing and every reconnect left
another heartbeat running against a dead channel.

A stream that admin closes cleanly is not an error, but reconnecting in silence
hides why. Two workers sharing an id evict each other forever and the log shows
nothing but a login every five seconds - which is exactly how this presented on
a dev box, and it took a look at the admin's own log to see it. The message now
names the id to check.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: a namespace cannot be created without its parent

Storage keeps a namespace's parts flattened, so creating "a.b" with no "a"
was accepted and left an intermediate that only existed inside a name. Listing
derives child names by slicing those parts, so it reported "a", while describe
and exists on "a" both answered 404 - a client walking the tree got a 404 on
something the listing had just handed it.

The spec asks for NamespaceNotFound when the parent is missing, which is also
what keeps listing and describe telling the same story.

Namespaces created through the S3 Tables API still bypass this, so listing
keeps deriving intermediates rather than hiding whatever is already there.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: say why a non-Iceberg table shows no schema

The table pages read Iceberg metadata for schema and snapshots, and a Lance
table has none, so both panels rendered "No schema available" - which reads as
an empty table rather than a table this page cannot describe. The dataset
behind the one that prompted this holds 1024 rows.

The format is already on the entry and shown two rows above, so the empty
states now use it: the catalog records where a LANCE table lives, not what is
in it.

Reading the schema for real needs Lance format code, which is the same wall as
the data plane.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* seaweed-worker: run rustfmt over the workspace

Committed the crates unformatted, so `cargo fmt --all --check` failed on
files nothing had touched since.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* plugin: let a worker report what it saw about an object

Admin cannot read a Lance table: it knows where the dataset lives and
nothing else, so the details page had a location and two empty panels.
The worker already opens every dataset during detection to decide whether
it needs compacting, so it knows the schema, the row count and the
fragment count at that moment. It just had no way to say so.

Add a WorkerObservations body to the worker stream. Admin caches the last
observation per object and serves it back, timestamped, for display;
nothing schedules from it. The Lance compaction sweep reports what it
opened, and the S3 Tables details page fills its schema panel from the
cache when it has no metadata of its own, badged with when the worker
looked and which worker it was.

Nothing about this is Lance-specific past the reporting side, which is
the point: any format admin cannot parse can describe itself the same way.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: record the observation channel

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* plugin: ask a worker for sample rows of a table admin cannot read

Browse Data reads an Iceberg table's Parquet files directly, so it shows
real rows. For a Lance table it showed "Table has no Iceberg metadata"
and an empty grid, because there is no Go Lance reader and never will be
one worth maintaining.

The worker has the reader. Add RequestObjectPreview / ObjectPreviewResponse
to the stream, mirroring the config-schema round trip that already exists,
and give the Rust worker a PreviewProvider that scans the dataset and
formats the rows with Arrow's own formatter, so a vector column reads as a
vector. Admin picks the worker from the observation store: whichever one
last described this table is the one that can read it.

Unlike an observation the rows are not cached. They are the table's data
rather than a description of it, and a copy sitting in admin would be both
stale and nobody's business. The page fetches on load, bounded at 200 rows
and a 15 second round trip, and drops the snapshot and data-file panels
that only mean something for Iceberg.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: record the preview channel

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* test: disable the lance listener when two gateways share a host

* test: keep AllocatePorts away from the lance default port

* s3tables: let a table bucket declare the format it holds

A bucket is a catalog, and a catalog serves one protocol. Format was
recorded per table, so nothing could answer "where do I point a client at
this bucket" without opening a table first, and an empty bucket had no
answer at all.

CreateTableBucket takes an optional format, stored with the rest of the
bucket metadata and returned by Get and List. Empty means ICEBERG, which
is what AWS S3 Tables serves and therefore what an SDK that has never
heard of the field means. CreateTable refuses a table of another format,
and CreateView refuses outright in a bucket that is not Iceberg, since a
view is Iceberg metadata.

Buckets that already exist carry no declaration and keep accepting
anything, so nothing is migrated and nothing that worked stops working.
The Lance namespace declares LANCE for the buckets it creates, which is
what stops one of them being described to a client as an Iceberg catalog.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: take the Lance port the way it takes the Iceberg one

The UI cannot name the endpoint that serves a Lance bucket without it,
and every format-aware page below needs to.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: show which format a table bucket holds

The bucket list printed an Iceberg endpoint for every bucket, including
ones holding Lance datasets, where that endpoint serves nothing. It was
the most visible place the UI assumed one format.

The list gains a Format column and its endpoint column follows the
bucket's declaration. The banner names both endpoints rather than
asserting everything is Iceberg, and says so only for the servers that
are actually running. Create Bucket picks a format with two cards rather
than a dropdown, since what matters is not the name but which clients can
read the result, and the endpoint under them updates as you choose so the
operator leaves the modal knowing where to point one.

A bucket from before the declaration existed shows "unset" in an outline
badge, explained on hover. It is a fact about the bucket's age, not a
fault, so nothing nags about it.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: carry the bucket's format into the pages inside it

Namespaces and tables are reached through a bucket, so both now say which
catalog they belong to rather than making you go back up to find out. The
tables list gains a Format column and a Rows column filled from what a
worker last observed, since for a format admin cannot read that is the
only row count there is; a table nothing has looked at shows a dash, not
a zero.

Create Table stops offering a choice the bucket has already made: in a
declared bucket the format is fixed and says why, and only an undeclared
one still offers both. Before this the select had exactly one option,
hardcoded, which made a Lance table impossible to create from the UI at
all.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: let the table page speak the table's own format

Partitions and Snapshot History are Iceberg's shape. Rendering them empty
for a Lance table reads as a fault; a Lance table has neither, and says
so by not showing them. In their place is a Versions panel, which is what
that format calls its history, carrying the worker's timestamp so it is
clear the numbers are a cached look rather than something read live.

The breadcrumb carries the format badge, so the page names what it is
looking at before you read a panel and wonder why it is empty.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: show how to connect to either catalog, and group the two format workers

The client examples on the buckets page were Iceberg's alone, so the one
thing an operator wants after creating a Lance bucket - what to type to
reach it - was not written down anywhere in the UI. Both formats now get
a pair of snippets, and only for a server that is running.

In the Workers menu, Iceberg moves below Lifecycle so it sits next to
Lance: the two table-format workers together, the two cluster-wide ones
above them.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* shell: create a table bucket of either format

s3tables.bucket -create takes -format, so a Lance bucket can be made
without going through the UI. The integration harness passes it too: its
Lance tests were creating Iceberg buckets and getting away with it only
because nothing checked.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* design: record that a bucket declares its format

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: drop managed versioning; the store already orders commits

The namespace offered itself as an external manifest store, so that a
commit could reserve a version through a real put-if-not-exists. That was
designed around a gateway that no longer exists: If-None-Match: * is
reduced to a filer WriteCondition and evaluated at the object's owner
under its per-path lock, or under the object write lock on the fallback
path. Sixteen writers racing one fresh key get a single 200 and fifteen
412s, every time.

Lance needs nothing else. commit_handler_from_url hands every s3:// dataset
a ConditionalPutCommitHandler, which puts with PutMode::Create, which
object_store sends as If-None-Match: *. So the feature solved a problem
this store does not have, while moving a table's version history out of
the dataset and into the catalog - and lance could not use it past the
first commit anyway, since its own namespace-backed store answers
"put_if_not_exists is not supported" to the second.

The version operations answer Unsupported with the rest, managed_versioning
is false, and the flag is gone. In place of the reserve-once test there is
one that races eight writers at the manifest key through S3, which is the
path a commit actually takes.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: honour the version floor, the slot limits, and a shutdown

Five findings from review, all of them things the worker claimed to do and
did not.

The version floor was checked when a cleanup job was proposed and ignored
when it ran, so a table whose versions had aged past the retention window
in between could be taken below the count the operator asked to keep.
Execution now computes the floor itself and passes it as before_version;
CleanupPolicy ANDs its clauses, so a version has to be both too old and
below the floor to go. Both settings are clamped to the range the form
offers, since Duration::hours panics on a large enough value and a
negative min-versions wraps to a huge usize.

Admin's shutdown was answered by returning from the stream, which the
reconnect loop read as a healthy close and logged straight back in: the
worker could not be stopped. serve_once now says which of the two
happened.

The advertised concurrency limits bounded nothing - every request spawned
a task - and the heartbeat reported zero slots in use whatever was
running. Both now go through semaphores sized from the limits, with the
permits held for the life of the request and reported in the heartbeat.

A namespace call had no timeout, so a gateway that accepted the connection
and went quiet held a detection slot forever. And one table whose stats
could not be read failed the whole sweep, losing the proposals for every
table already scanned; it is now skipped and warned about, like a table
that cannot be opened.

The tests drove one shared catalog concurrently, which is why one of them
asserted "no proposals at all" and passed by luck. They now take a lock
and judge only their own tables.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* admin: fix the review findings on the format-aware pages

The endpoint hint in Create Bucket built its HTML by concatenating the
bucket name the operator is typing, so a name like <img onerror=...> ran
in the admin origin as they typed it. It is built from DOM nodes now.

A preview reply looked its channel up under the lock and then sent outside
it, which Shutdown can close in between: a Gosched in that gap panics with
"send on closed channel" every time. The send now happens under the lock.

Observations were looked up by path alone, so a table dropped and remade
in another format at the same path was described by the observation left
behind. Lookups now have to agree on the format.

Also: the Lance namespace caps a request body rather than reading whatever
arrives; the details action no longer says "Iceberg" over a Lance table;
mini stops advertising a catalog port when it is not running S3; a format
whose server this cluster does not run cannot be picked in the modal or
accepted by the API, since a bucket nothing can reach is not worth
creating; and the unused catalogPortFor helper is gone.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: let the control stream use mTLS

The channel was hardcoded to http://, so off loopback the stream carried
preview rows and execution commands in the clear - and a cluster with grpc
TLS turned on would refuse the worker outright.

--tls-ca, --tls-cert and --tls-key take the same certificates the Go
worker reads from the [grpc.worker] section of security.toml, and must be
given together: a CA on its own would quietly mean one-way TLS, which a
mutual setup rejects anyway. Without them the stream stays plaintext,
which is what the Go worker also does when nothing is configured.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: answer null properties rather than an empty map

The catalog does not keep a table's properties. Declare echoed the
request's back and describe answered {}, both of which claim they were
stored and are empty. Null says the catalog does not keep them, which is
what the spec distinguishes and what is true here.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance worker: test the slot accounting

The heartbeat reporting and the waiting are the two things the semaphores
are for, and neither is observable from outside without catching a sweep
mid-flight.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* test: fix the mixed-format catalog test, and name the binary it drives

The integration suite passed locally and failed in CI on
TestLanceRefusesIcebergTables. Both were right: CI builds the binary
first, my tree had one from the day before, so locally the test drove a
gateway with no format enforcement at all.

The test itself no longer holds as written. It made a bucket, put an
Iceberg table in it, and checked the Lance surface hid it - but a bucket
that declares LANCE now refuses the Iceberg table outright. The invariant
still matters from the other side, so it starts from an Iceberg bucket
instead: Lance must not describe or list a table whose format it does not
serve, and must refuse to declare one beside it.

The harness now prints which weed binary it is about to run and when that
was built. `make test` rebuilds first; a plain `go test` will happily
drive a weeks-old binary and report a pass for code it never ran, which is
exactly what happened here.

Also make the row-limit conversion in the preview request explicitly
bounded: CodeQL flagged the int-to-int32 conversion, and clamping by
reassignment beforehand is not a form it recognises.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* lance: prove concurrent commits are kept, and preselect the only format on offer

Two more from review.

The commit test asserted that exactly one writer wins the conditional PUT,
which is the mechanism, not the claim. The claim is that nothing is lost:
the losers see the conflict, rebase and commit again. So there is now a
test that has eight writers append to one dataset at once and counts the
rows afterwards - all eight batches survive. That is also the sequence
managed versioning could not finish, since its store refuses the second
commit outright.

And when Iceberg's endpoint is not running, the format picker offered two
options with neither selected, so Create Bucket submitted no format at
all, fell back to ICEBERG, and was refused by the guard added last round.
Lance is preselected when it is the only format this cluster serves.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* Clamp the remaining worker settings, and bootstrap buckets in a served format

Compaction and index optimization read their thresholds and cast straight
to usize and u64, so a negative arrives as an enormous number and turns
the threshold into "never": compaction and reindexing both go quiet with
nothing to say. The cleanup job was fixed last round; these are the same
bug. Clamped to the values that stay meaningful rather than to what the
form offers - zero uncovered rows is a real setting, meaning reindex as
soon as anything is not covered, so the floor there is zero and not the
form's thousand.

mini pre-creates the buckets named by -tableBucket, and did so without a
format, which now means Iceberg. Started with the Iceberg endpoint off
and the Lance one on, that left buckets nothing could reach and which
refused every Lance table. It takes the format from the endpoint that is
actually running, and creates nothing when neither is.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm

* s3: allow-unordered is a listing parameter, not an unimplemented subresource

The guard that stops a bucket GET with an unknown subresource from being
answered with a listing does not know about allow-unordered, so it answers
501 NotImplemented - to a parameter the listing handlers already read and
already validate against delimiter.

This is why test_bucket_list_unordered and test_bucket_listv2_unordered
fail in the Ceph s3-tests suite. They fail on master too; this is not a
Lance change and can be taken on its own.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm
2026-08-19 22:59:56 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 804111745a mount: discard a path-cache insert that raced a purge (#10842)
* mount: discard a path-cache insert that raced a purge

The Windows adapter's walk resolves a component with a Lookup RPC and inserts
the result holding no lock, so a purge can land in between - and what the walk
just resolved is then the very name the purge removed. Anything opening the
old path concurrently with a rename repopulates the cache with the vacated
name, which the next stat is served from for up to a second. The release path
already guards its equivalent insert; the walk had nothing.

The cache counts purges now. A resolve snapshots the generation before its
lookups and insert discards the entry when any purge ran in between, parking
the reference in the graveyard so the in-flight caller keeps a valid inode
either way.

Seen once in CI as TestRenameOverExisting failing with 'source survived the
rename': every SeaweedFS layer is synchronous with the rename, but a
background open of the source - an antivirus scan of the just-written file
fits - can requalify the stale name through this window. The assertion also
reports what stat returned now, and whether it persisted, so a recurrence
indicts a specific layer instead of reading as a mystery.

* mount: cover the path-cache discard by key, and let a discard rest

Review follow-ups. The generation was global, so any purge between a walk's
snapshot and its insert discarded the entry whatever its name - and an open
retries resolve-then-steal only four times before failing with EIO, so
sustained unrelated churn could fail opens of untouched paths. Purges are
remembered by key now and only one that covers the inserted name discards it;
past the remembered window the insert is discarded without a check, which only
costs a retry.

A discard that itself tripped the sweep also handed its own reference straight
to forget while the walker was still using the inode. The graveyard holds two
generations now, so an appended reference always survives the sweep of the
call that appended it - which the displaced-entry and purge paths needed too.

Also restores the original path-cache test suite this branch had overwritten
instead of extended, and rewords the semantics-test failure so it no longer
claims the source survived when stat returned a transient error.

* mount: take an open's reference directly instead of stealing it back

resolveAndSteal cached the final component only to steal it back, so an open
depended on that insert surviving whatever purges raced it - four attempts and
then EIO. The keyed purge window narrowed how often an insert is discarded,
but past the window the discard is blind again, so the cliff had only moved.

A cached entry is still stolen; anything else is now looked up directly, with
the caller owning the reference from the start. No retry loop, and no way for
churn - covered, unrelated or overflowing the window - to fail an open.

Also covers the whole-cache purge: purge of the root with prefix set clears
every entry, but the covers check tested for a '/'-prefixed key that a
normalised key never has, so it covered no in-flight insert at all.
2026-08-19 17:05:49 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 05013ad3da ci: fall through to another Ubuntu mirror when one is unreachable (#10828)
The e2e image pointed both archive and security at azure.archive.ubuntu.com and
nothing else, and the samba and pjdfstest images inherit that list. When Azure
is unreachable the build has nowhere to go: Acquire::Retries just retries a dead
host, every package fails, and apt exits 100 before a single test runs. Two
different workflows lost runs to it tonight.

Install through a helper that starts from the pristine sources.list each time
and walks a list of mirrors, so Azure stays the preferred one - the reason it
was pinned in the first place - without being the only one.

Verified both paths against a real build: the normal one installs from Azure,
and with the first entry pointed at an unroutable host the fallback logs the
skip and installs from archive.ubuntu.com.
2026-08-19 00:03:04 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 358fd314ea test(s3/versioning): read the whole version body instead of one Read (#10815)
A single Read on the response body can return the last bytes together
with io.EOF, so asserting NoError on it fails even though the body is
complete. Use io.ReadAll, like every other test in this package.
2026-08-18 18:34:01 -07:00
Lars LehtonenandGitHub ed75a61fb0 fix(test/s3/versioning): dropped test error (#10813) 2026-08-18 17:26:51 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 1ddec72707 Recover from a dead volume server on the mount read path (#10798)
* mount: re-resolve volume locations after a failed chunk read

NewChunkGroup passed nil as the ReaderCache's CacheInvalidator, so
retryFetchAfterCacheInvalidation was dead code on the FUSE read path. A
mount that cached a volume's locations while one server was down kept
retrying that server after it died, then returned EIO, even though the
master and filer both resolved the live replica. The S3 gateway already
passes its filerClient; do the same for the mount.

* test: FUSE integration tests for volume server failover

One mount appends while a second tails, and a volume server is killed,
started or restarted mid-stream against a 001-replicated cluster of three
volume servers. Automates the scenario matrix reported for Docker Swarm
mounts, including the large-file variant and a no-chaos control.

* test: report the filer's own view when append content mismatches

A mismatch between what the writer wrote and what the reader sees can come
from either side's cache. Read the file back through the filer's HTTP
handler as well, and let the mount verbosity be raised from the
environment, so a failing run says which layer lost the data.

* test: wait for the reader mount to converge before comparing

A mount caches metadata for about a second, so reading the file the instant
the writer's last close returned can legitimately come back short. Poll the
reader until it matches or the timeout expires; content that is wrong rather
than merely late never converges and still fails, now with the writer's
mount and the filer's own view alongside it.

* test: detect a failover cluster child that exited at startup

Signal(0) succeeds for a zombie and nothing reaped these children until
shutdown, so a process that died on startup looked alive until the readiness
timeout expired. Reap each child as it is started and consult the result.

* test: read a file the killed volume server actually holds

Placement decides which two of three servers back each volume, so killing
volume N and reading readfile-N could pass without the victim ever holding a
replica of it. Resolve each file's volumes through the filer and the master,
and pick one the victim backs, preferring a file the reader has not cached.

* ci: stop persisting checkout credentials in the failover workflow

The job does not use the token after cloning. Also tag the README's command
block as bash and match the timeout the workflow actually uses.

* test: discard the ignored errors errcheck flags in the failover harness

* test: resolve manifests when mapping a file to its volumes

A manifest chunk's own fid names the volume holding the manifest, not the
volumes holding the data, so a large enough file would point the failover
victim at the wrong server.

* test: pin the stale-location recovery path with a primed reader

Reading a file for the first time after a server dies proves nothing: the
lookup is fresh and returns the survivor. Kill one holder and wait for the
master to drop it, read a file on that volume so the reader caches the lone
survivor, restart the first server, then kill the survivor. The reader's only
cached location is now dead while the data is live elsewhere, which is the
case the invalidator exists for: EIO without it, recovery with it.
2026-08-17 17:30:33 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 1bcd55eba2 go 1.26 (#10797) 2026-08-17 15:39:20 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub a1d3fe236f iceberg: let table properties override the worker config (#10772)
* iceberg: carry snapshot retention in milliseconds

Config stored retention as hours, so any sub-hour value would have to be
truncated to 0 and then clamped back up to the 168 hour default. Keep the
plugin config key in hours and convert once at parse time.

* iceberg: let table properties override the worker config

Every other Iceberg implementation lets a table's own properties win over
engine defaults; the worker ignored them entirely. A writer honouring
write.target-file-size-bytes and a compactor rewriting to the plugin
config's size would rewrite each other's output forever.

Resolved once per job rather than per operation, so compaction committing
new metadata mid-job cannot change the settings underneath it.

* iceberg: clamp the orphan cutoff so it cannot overflow

collectOrphanCandidates converts the cutoff to a time.Duration. Past
roughly 2.5 million hours that multiplication wraps negative, putting the
cutoff in the future so every file walked looks like an orphan and gets
deleted, including data a concurrent writer has not yet committed.

Reachable today through orphan_older_than_hours.
2026-08-16 09:16:05 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 76a1983c86 test: re-lock and retry every chaos command, not just the balance (#10770)
The harness kills shells mid-command, and the master releases the dead
session's lock only when it notices the connection is gone. That cleanup
lands after the harness has already re-acquired the lock, so it can clear
the lock this run holds and the next command refuses with

  need to run "lock" first to continue

recoverInterruptedBalance answered that the way an operator would -- run
lock again and retry -- but the encode and decode recoveries called
shellCommand once and required success, so the same reap failed the run
outright. Move the retry into shellCommand: the reap can land during any
command that follows a kill, not only a balance.
2026-08-15 14:13:37 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 1c926e8fac test: systematic EC interruption verification — exhaustive model check + deterministic kill matrix (#10764)
* ec: bounded-exhaustive model check of the volume lifecycle

The randomized chaos harness samples the state space; this enumerates
it. The lifecycle is a state machine whose steps mirror the pipelines in
this package, and the checker explores every schedule within the bound:
a crash at every step boundary, an error return running the rollback
(itself crashable at every step), a volume-server restart applying the
startup reconciliation rules in every quiescent state, and the
prescribed restart-based recovery from every crashed state.

Checked in every reachable state: durability (a readable copy always
exists), at most one generation mounted, and — a property the sweep
discipline turns out to guarantee — at most one generation's files on
disk. From every quiescent state the recovery must converge to a clean
volume. Runs in well under a second.

* test: deterministic EC interruption matrix

Enumerate every phase of every interruptible EC operation and kill a
real weed shell exactly when the phase announces itself on the command
output, instead of at a random moment: four encode phases, four decode
phases, and the balance's move phase (set up with -rebalance=false so a
move is guaranteed). Each scenario prepares its precondition, kills at
the marker, runs the prescribed recovery, and verifies every stored byte
still reads back identical.

The interruption recoveries move out of the randomized ops into shared
chaosRun helpers both drivers use.

* test: make the randomized EC chaos walk opt-in

The systematic layers — the interruption matrix and the lifecycle model
check — carry the CI coverage deterministically; the randomized walk
stays for exploratory runs, behind EC_CHAOS_SEED.

* ci: bound the EC integration suite by the job budget, not go test's default

The suite with the interruption matrix runs close to the default 10m
binary timeout on slower runners.

* test: require every interruption-matrix marker to appear

A marker that never prints means a pipeline refactor renamed or dropped
the progress line; silently degenerating into a no-interruption run
would let CI pass without exercising the boundary the scenario names.
Also recheck the marker channel after the wait: a shell that prints and
exits at once makes both channels ready, and select picking the exit
case must not report a printed marker as missed.
2026-08-14 17:45:11 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 602746f51d test: EC lifecycle chaos harness, with four fixes it found (#10763)
* ec: let the encode's balance see a migrating volume's shards across disk-type buckets

Shard generation writes beside the source .dat, so a cross-tier encode
(source on hdd, -diskType=ssd) leaves the fresh shards in the source
disk-type bucket. The encode's internal balance ingested only the target
bucket, saw no shards, and planned no moves; the spread guard then
correctly aborted the encode (and before that guard existed, the shards
silently stayed clumped on the generation host in the wrong tier).

EcBalance now takes the encode batch as migratingVolumeIds and ingests
those volumes' shards from every bucket, while everything else keeps the
bucket filter so a plain ec.balance never drags deliberately tiered
shards onto another disk type. The in-memory model delete also becomes
bucket-agnostic: a node holds a given shard in exactly one bucket, and a
bucket-scoped delete missed cross-bucket moves in the dry-run model.

* volume: decode reads shard 0 from its resolved path, not the EC volume's base dir

On a multi-disk server a volume's shards can sit on several disks; the
store registers each shard with its own path and CollectEcShards resolves
them, but FindDatFileSize derived the .ec00 path from the EcVolume's base
directory. When shard 0 lived on a sibling disk, VolumeEcShardsToVolume
failed with 'open ...ec00: no such file or directory' and ec.decode
aborted.

* ec: decode re-copies shards the topology claims but the target does not hold

An interrupted earlier decode or balance can leave the master believing
the decode target holds a shard whose file never landed: the mount
registered but the partial copy was cleaned, or the file was swept. The
collect step took the topology's word for it, excluded the shard from
the copy set, and the decode failed with 'missing shard'. Probe the
target's live inventory (VolumeEcShardsInfo) and treat anything it
cannot serve as still-to-copy.

* ec: decode discovers shards across disk-type buckets

Shards sit wherever encode generation and balance left them: a
cross-tier encode leaves them in the source disk-type bucket, a partial
migration straddles buckets. ec.decode scoped its shard discovery to the
-diskType bucket and reported a decodable volume as having no shards at
all. Union across buckets, the way the encode's shard verification
already does.

* test: EC chaos lifecycle harness

Randomized, seeded sequences of the EC lifecycle against a live cluster
in the production-shaped layout: multiple data disks per server, a
separate -dir.idx directory so .ecx/.ecj sidecars are shared across
disks, and a tagged ssd tier. Operations cover encode (hdd and ssd
targets), balance, shard damage plus rebuild, decode, re-encode,
deletes, scrub, tier moves, crash-restarts, sidecar fault injections
(a data-dir .vif pushed into the shared idx dir; a stale-generation
shard planted beside a newer encode), and interruptions: a real weed
shell subprocess killed mid-encode, mid-decode, and mid-balance, with
the recovery re-run required to converge.

One invariant holds after every step: every stored byte reads back
identical and every deleted needle stays deleted. EC_CHAOS_SEED and
EC_CHAOS_STEPS make runs reproducible and scalable.

A known gap is tolerated and logged rather than fixed here: a shard
mounted on two disks of one node (orphan adoption after an interrupted
copy) is invisible to ec.balance's dedup and unaddressable by
ec.shard.unmount's shard@address form, so no cleanup path exists yet.

* test: fail payload-corruption checks on the test goroutine

t.Fatalf inside require.Eventually's condition runs on the poller's
goroutine, where Goexit kills only that goroutine and the corruption
message can be lost behind a generic timeout. Record the mismatch, end
the polling, and fail on the test goroutine. Also assert the full shard
count in the cross-bucket decode-discovery test.
2026-08-14 17:26:54 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 4500bdf88e iceberg: accept lowercase parquet file format when planning compaction (#10751)
* iceberg: accept lowercase parquet file format when planning compaction

* iceberg: expect absolute added-file paths in compaction integration test
2026-08-13 13:16:07 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 0799084e98 refactor: share volume and EC shard move logic between shell and workers (#10727)
* operation: add shared volume_move package for volume and EC shard moves

The shell commands (volume.move, volume.balance, ec.balance, tier moves)
and the maintenance workers (balance, ec_balance) each carried their own
copy of the move RPC sequences, and the copies had drifted: the worker
verified the target before deleting the source but dropped the disk
type and IO throttle; the shell passed those but deleted the source
unverified.

volume_move.Mover carries the merged sequences, keeping the stricter
behavior from each side:

- LiveMoveVolume: check-then-hard-freeze the source (VolumeStatus's
  IsReadOnly also covers low-disk and readonly-but-can-delete states,
  which still accept needle deletes), copy with disk type and IO
  throttle, tail, verify the target is not behind the source before the
  destructive source delete (a target that is ahead holds writes it
  accepted during the tail and the move commits to keep them), and
  restore the source's writability when a failure precedes the delete
  and this move did the freezing. Aborts clean up the incomplete target
  copy; a failed cleanup or an ambiguous source delete keeps the source
  readonly (ErrSourceKeptReadonly) so callers do not thaw a source next
  to a possibly-authoritative copy. With a readonly source, an existing
  or unknown-state target refuses the move outright: no client-side
  observation can prove such a copy is a stale remnant rather than the
  authoritative copy of an unfinished move.
- MoveEcShards: copy with the .ecx/.ecj/.vif/.ecsum sidecars, mount,
  verify the target registered every shard before unmount+delete on the
  source, and reject same-server moves (the EC delete is server-wide).

Server identity is the grpc endpoint (SameServer), so node:8080 and
node:8080.18080 compare equal while test servers sharing a degenerate
HTTP address stay distinct; addresses are validated non-fatally before
dialing and before being embedded in copy/tail requests, since both the
client dialer and the receiving server normalize them through a parser
that aborts the process on a malformed port. The Rust volume server's
codes.NotFound counts as a definitively absent probe answer alongside
the Go server's plain-error code Unknown.

All RPCs go through an injectable ClientFunc, so the sequences are unit
tested against a fake volume server client: RPC order, request fields,
and that verification failures keep the source intact.

* shell, worker: delegate volume and EC shard moves to operation/volume_move

LiveMoveVolume and the copy/tail/delete/mark-writable helpers become
thin wrappers over the shared mover, keeping their signatures; the EC
helpers keep their per-step output and delegate the RPCs. BalanceTask
and ECBalanceTask keep their parameter validation, progress reporting,
and guards (same-node cross-disk rejection, dedup keep-node
verification, shard ids range-checked before the uint8 narrowing) and
hand the RPC sequences to the mover. volume.tier.move skips its
thaw-on-failure when the mover deliberately kept the source readonly,
since reopening the replicas beside a possibly-authoritative target
copy would fork the volume.

The tail-failure tolerance moves inside the mover: a failed tail is
tolerated only when the volume was already readonly before the move
began, backstopped by a stability re-read across the idle window, so
volume.balance's -skipTailError-by-readonly heuristic and tier-move's
unconditional skip both become the same authoritative rule.

* volume_move: keep the source readonly when a failed copy leaves a target of unknown origin

A failed copy can leave a complete, mounted copy on the target (the
server finishes after the client loses the stream). The abort probed
the target only when its pre-copy state was known-absent; an unknown
prior state skipped both the probe and the cleanup and then reopened
the source - two writable replicas of one volume, diverging from the
next write on.

The abort now probes the target on every failed copy and restores the
source only when the target provably holds nothing. A copy whose
provenance cannot be proven (unknown prior state, a pre-existing
replica, or an unreachable target) is never deleted, and the source
stays readonly with ErrSourceKeptReadonly naming the recovery.

* test: teach the plugin worker harness the shared move sequence

The fake volume server lacked VolumeStatus, which the shared mover now
issues before freezing the source, and the batch execution test's
status-read accounting predates the pre-copy target probe and the
verification reads. Mirrors the harness the enterprise tree already
carries.
2026-08-12 12:29:40 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 2a513e71a4 test: drive ec.encode/balance/rebuild E2E with a byte-identical payload check (#10722)
The existing multi-disk EC integration test asserts on shard counts. Counting
cannot tell a healthy volume from one a repair reassembled out of the wrong
inputs — both have fourteen shards. This drives the real shell commands
(ec.encode, ec.balance, ec.rebuild) against a live three-node, four-disk
cluster and reads the stored bytes back after every step, so a rebuild that
produced fourteen plausible-but-wrong shards fails here.

An 8 KB random payload is stored, then encoded, balanced, damaged (two shard
files removed and the servers restarted so the master relearns the reduced
set from disk), and rebuilt. The rebuild output matches the shape of the
support case that motivated this — "rebuildOneEcVolume", "missing shard N.0",
"copied N.1 from ..." — and the payload is verified identical after each of
upload, encode, balance, shard loss, and rebuild.

Two ordering facts the test pins, both of which cost real debugging time:
ec.rebuild is driven by the master's topology, not disk truth, so shards must
be relearned (via restart) before a repair can target the right set; and the
shell lock is dropped when the restart disconnects the master, so it has to be
retaken before the rebuild.
2026-08-11 22:44:25 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 790e8d3fd6 clickhouse catalog test: cover latest ClickHouse and catalog-side CREATE TABLE (#10707)
* clickhouse catalog test: cover latest ClickHouse and catalog-side CREATE TABLE

* verify catalog registration structurally and fix README image wording
2026-08-10 20:04:33 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 214d3599d3 windows mount: cache file data, resolved paths and attributes (#10703)
* benchmark tool for mounted filesystems

* ci: on-demand mount benchmark, native WinFsp vs rclone plus a Linux reference

* windows mount: let the Windows cache manager cache file data

WinFsp only turns the cache manager on for a file when FileInfoTimeout
is infinite; at any finite value every application read and write is a
synchronous trip into the mount process at whatever size the application
issued. Metadata events already reach FspFileSystemNotify, which purges
a changed file's cached pages and attributes, so an infinite timeout
stays coherent. The dir listing, volume info and EA timeouts are pinned
to one second so they do not silently inherit the infinity.

* windows mount: cache resolved paths and attributes in the adapter

WinFsp addresses every operation by path and has no FORGET, so the
adapter walked the whole path through Lookup on each one, and in a
directory the filer has not listed yet every walk was a filer round
trip; nothing played the part of the kernel's dentry and attribute
caches. The path cache owns one lookup reference per entry the way the
kernel holds one until FORGET, serves attribute reads for files without
an open handle, and is purged by the mount's own mutations and by
metadata events, with the timeout as backstop.

* windows mount: keep a closed file's attributes cached

Open steals the path's cache entry for its handle and Release returned
the reference with a purge, so the stat that follows every copied file
walked to the filer again. Reading the handle's final attributes before
it goes away and moving the reference back into the cache serves that
stat locally, the way the kernel's attribute cache does after a close.

Only if the path still names that inode, though: WinFsp reports the
path the handle opened with, and after a delete-on-close or a rename
caching it would resurrect an entry that is gone.

* windows mount: persist entries at create, and let the flush stay at close

WinFsp posts the cleanup and close that carry the flush after
CloseHandle has returned, so deferring the filer entry to the flush let
everything that reads through the filer race an unflushed close: a
listing missed just-written files, and a directory rename moved a
directory on the filer before its newest child existed there, leaving
the straggler flush to recreate the child under the dead path.

Flush-at-cleanup is not the answer either: it makes every handle's
cleanup flush, and those flushes race the unlinks of delete-on-close,
re-inserting the entry the unlink just removed. Persisting the entry at
create takes the ordering question away.

* mount: flush written pages before a truncate shrinks past them

The shrink trims chunks, but written pages that have not become chunks
yet are invisible to it, so the next flush wrote them back and the file
grew again, resurrecting the truncated bytes. Windows hits this on
every write-then-shrink because its flush runs after CloseHandle, but
the gap is platform-neutral.

* mount: order a file's unlink against its in-flight flush

Unlink set the handle's deleted flag bare, so a flush already past its
own check of that flag wrote the entry back right after the delete
removed it, and a delete-on-close file outlived its last handle. The
flag is now set under the handle's flush lock and re-checked under it,
so a flush either completes before the delete or sees the flag and
skips. An eagerly created handle also starts clean: the dirty mark
existed to make the deferred filer create happen at flush, and eager
creates have nothing to flush.
2026-08-10 18:46:18 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 365d3e9e87 filer: TUS concatenation extension (#10702)
* filer: TUS creation accepts Upload-Concat partial uploads

* filer: TUS final uploads concatenate completed partials

* filer: TUS concatenation tests

* filer: consumed marker pins TUS chunk ownership on completion

* filer: TUS session delete decides chunk ownership after removing the session info

* filer: TUS completion persists the consumed marker before creating the entry

* filer: TUS completion re-verifies the session after persisting the consumed marker

* filer: serialize TUS session ownership transitions per filer

* filer: surface failed TUS consumed-marker rollbacks
2026-08-10 12:32:45 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 7c87d78ea2 s3: a key deleted after enabling versioning must leave the listing (#10684)
* s3: a null object wins over a rescan when the latest-version pointer is absent

The read path already resolves an absent pointer this way; the listing-path
counterpart scanned .versions/ first and could surface an old version or
delete marker over the current suspended-versioning null object.

* s3: dedup a key against its .versions sibling in suspended buckets too

A suspended bucket keeps its .versions directories, so a suspended-versioning
null object and its .versions sibling emitted the same key twice.

* s3: retract a null object from the listing when a delete marker shadows it

Deleting a key whose null version predates versioning leaves the base-path
entry in place and records the delete marker under <key>.versions. The
listing appended the base-path entry and relied on the .versions sibling to
replace it, but a delete-marker current version emitted nothing, so the
deleted key stayed visible to ListObjects while GET and HEAD returned 404.

* s3: keep a key's .versions sibling on the same page as the key

When the page quota ran out between a base-path entry and its .versions
directory, the page ended with the stale entry and the next page skipped the
directory as a marker echo, so the replacement or retraction never happened.

* s3: the null version is not latest when the .versions pointer names a newer one

ListObjectVersions stamped IsLatest on every base-path null object, so a key
deleted after enabling versioning reported IsLatest on both the delete marker
and the null version.

* s3: test listing after a pre-versioning null object is delete-marked

* s3: find a key's earlier page entry by scan, not by adjacency

A key such as k.bak sorts between k and k.versions, so the entry a .versions
sibling replaces or retracts is not always the last one on the page. Scan
back through the page for the key, and insert a late resolution in sorted
position instead of at the end.

* s3: settle trailing null objects by lookup when a page fills

The quota can run out while keys still sit between a null object and its
.versions sibling, and the sibling-adjacent page-boundary exception never
fires for those. Track the trailing null objects whose sibling has not been
ruled out and look each one up before declaring the page full; a retraction
reopens the quota.

* s3: do not resolve a .versions sibling its page has already moved past

A page resuming from a marker inside the base key's extension region has
already listed and settled the base null object on an earlier page, so
resolving the .versions directory again re-emitted the key.

* s3: test listing with keys between a null object and its .versions sibling

* s3: pick the newer of the null object and the scanned versions

Making the null object win outright whenever the pointer is absent misread
multi-filer pointer lag: version files replicate ahead of the pointer, and a
key overwritten or delete-marked after pre-versioning days would list its
stale null again. The suspended-versioning write that legitimately makes the
null current is also the newer entry, so mtime tells the two apart.

* s3: a delete-marked null object no longer keeps its prefix alive

The hidden-entries probe took any plain file as proof of a listable key, but
a null object shadowed by its .versions sibling's delete marker is not one.
Hold plain files pending until the sibling settles them either way.

* s3: settle an evicted pending null instead of dropping it

Nested keys like k, k!, k!! can hold more pending nulls than the cap. A
silently evicted one could close the page unsettled, and the resume skip
would then keep the stale entry for good.

* s3: test deleted-prefix hiding and the pending-null cap

* s3: cover the reported '!' intervening key with a live version

* s3: an unstamped same-second version outranks the null object

Second-resolution mtimes cannot order same-second writes, so the tie went to
the stale null when the pointer lagged. The suspended write that makes a null
current stamps the version it displaces before clearing the pointer, so the
stamp is the authoritative signal and a tie without it goes to the version.

* s3: a pointer-less versions listing still checks what replicated

ListObjectVersions took a missing pointer as proof the null object is latest,
but under pointer lag the sibling can already hold newer replicated versions
or markers. Apply the same nullObjectWins rule as the listing recovery.

* s3: a failed null-object settlement fails the listing

Every getEntry error read as a missing sibling, so a transient filer error at
a page boundary committed the unsettled null and the next page skipped its
sibling for good. Only a definitive not-found means the null is live; other
failures are retained on eviction and fail the request at page close.

* s3: retract a CommonPrefix whose only backers were delete-marked nulls

The directory probe settles this for the / delimiter, but any other delimiter
derives prefixes from base-path keys directly, and a prefix built solely from
null objects survived their delete markers. Count the unsettled null backers
behind the newest prefix and retract it when the last one settles as a marker;
a live resolution or any listable contributor confirms the prefix instead.

* s3: test custom-delimiter prefix retraction

* s3: an explicit signal marks the null object current, not the demotion stamp

The NoncurrentSinceNs stamp survives promotion: delete the version that
demoted another and the promoted one is current yet still stamped, so a
lagging replica would resurrect the stale null. A suspended-versioning write
now records Seaweed-X-Amz-Null-Version-Is-Latest on the .versions directory
when it clears the pointer, every pointer update removes it, and the
recovery paths trust the signal instead of the stamp.

* s3: a filer failover retry rebuilds the listing page from scratch

The failover wrapper reruns the callback on another filer after a transport
error, and the partially built page, spent quota, and advanced marker leaked
into the retry, which could then return a stale or duplicated page as
success.

* s3: only a prefix's own backers can debit it

A delete marker for a version-only key (no base object) derived the same
prefix as its neighbors and decremented backing it never contributed,
retracting a prefix that a live null object still backed. Track backers by
key so settlement is idempotent and only debits what was counted.

* s3: test a version-only marker against a null-backed prefix

* s3: a pointer recompute clears the null-current signal

The routed finalize for delete markers, COPY, and multipart rewrites the
.versions pointer through RECOMPUTE_LATEST, which left a suspended-era
null-current signal in place. Version files never carry the signal, so
mapping it in CopyExtended deletes it whenever the pointer recomputes.

* s3: the pointer outranks the null-current signal in the versions listing

The signal check guarded the pointer check, so a stale signal a recompute
had not cleared yet would have let the null claim IsLatest alongside the
pointed-at version.
2026-08-10 11:04:06 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub e428b05224 test: let the vacuum shell session outlive the vacuum (#10682) 2026-08-09 21:59:25 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 923d0bd20c iceberg: repair non-compliant manifests at commit (#10641)
* iceberg: stamp a default name mapping on new tables

* iceberg: repair non-compliant manifests at commit

* s3tables: verify ClickHouse writes read back through PyIceberg

* iceberg: carry the manifest-list content into repaired manifests

* iceberg: refresh the default name mapping on schema evolution

* iceberg: merge historical names into the refreshed name mapping

* iceberg: never fail a commit on repair fallout

* iceberg: harden manifest repair against writer dialects

* s3tables: keep PyIceberg reader stderr out of row data

* iceberg: keep name mappings unambiguous across field id reassignment

* iceberg: align existing manifest content metadata with the list entry
2026-08-08 21:24:37 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 2d9ea0285c s3: add the RenameObject endpoint (#10659)
* s3: add the RenameObject endpoint

PUT /{bucket}/{key}?renameObject with x-amz-rename-source moves an object
through the filer's AtomicRenameEntry, so no bytes are read or rewritten and
the ETag, tags and SSE keys travel with the entry.

Only unversioned buckets: a versioned rename would have to rebuild the
.versions chain, and AWS offers RenameObject on directory buckets, which
cannot be versioned. The source arrives in a header, so it is authorized
separately for read and delete; both keys are locked, in key order, across the
precondition checks and the move.

* s3: let a matched source ETag precondition settle its date precondition

RFC 7232 has an ETag precondition outrank the date precondition on its own
side, and AWS documents the same for CopyObject: a matching
x-amz-copy-source-if-match with a failing x-amz-copy-source-if-unmodified-since
copies rather than returning 412. The source check evaluated all four headers in
sequence, so the date header could still veto a decided ETag match.

validateConditionalHeadersForReads already applies this precedence; the source
path now matches it.

* s3: cover a rename source named as a directory without a trailing slash

Renaming a directory would move a whole subtree, so it has to stay a missing
key whether or not the caller wrote the trailing slash.

* s3: accept a bare object key as the RenameObject source

AWS spells x-amz-rename-source both ways. Its CLI, Java and Rust examples pass
the bare source key, and only a second CLI example and the boto3 conditional
example pass bucket/key; the API reference's own example is a bare key too. The
header was read as bucket/key only, so the form AWS leads with was rejected with
InvalidArgument and the endpoint was unusable as documented.

A value is now read as a literal key first — the only reading that can never
name the wrong object — and as bucket-qualified second, when it carries the
request's own bucket and the literal key does not exist. That costs one extra
lookup only for a source that starts with the bucket's own name.

Another bucket's name in the source is no longer a distinct error: RenameObject
moves within one bucket, so it is simply part of a key this bucket does not
hold, and it reports NoSuchKey.

* s3: only a proven absence picks the other reading of a rename source

A source that resolves to a directory is not a miss to fall through on: the
literal path is still what the caller named, so answering for it beats renaming
a different object under the bucket-qualified reading. With a directory at
bucket/source.txt and an object at source.txt, a rename naming the former moved
the latter.

A failed lookup is not a proof of absence either, so a blip can no longer
redirect a rename to the other reading.
2026-08-08 21:24:30 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 3a61debaa5 filer: rebuild peer metadata subscriptions after a master reconnect (#10648)
* filer: keep the existing peer subscription on a repeated add

A cluster node add for a peer that is already followed restarted the
subscription, dropping the metadata events between the two runs.

* master: tell a connecting client the current cluster membership

Cluster node updates are only broadcast to the clients connected at that
moment. A filer that lost its master stream while a peer came back never
learned about the peer, and stopped replicating its metadata for good.

* test: a filer joining the master learns about the filers already there

* test: a filer resubscribes to a peer that registered while it was disconnected

Runs the reported sequence against real processes: filer2 leaves, filer1
is paused and its master stream is broken, filer2 registers again, and
filer1 has to replicate from it after reconnecting.
2026-08-08 10:28:25 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 37f3dff677 volume: validate the file extension in CopyFile and ReceiveFile (#10644)
* volume: validate the file extension in CopyFile and ReceiveFile

CopyFile and ReceiveFile build an on-disk path from the client-supplied
Ext. Both are intentionally ungated for cluster-internal peers, so a
value like "/../../x" is joined onto the volume directory and, once
path-cleaned, resolves outside it -- an EC-shard receive can then write,
and CopyFile read, anywhere the process can reach.

Constrain Ext to a real suffix (a leading dot followed by alphanumerics)
before it is used to build any path, so it can no longer carry a
separator or a parent reference.

* test: use an alphanumeric missing-file extension in the copy variants

The not-found and stop-offset-zero cases used ".definitely-missing" as a
deliberately absent source. The extension is now validated, and the hyphen
makes it invalid, so switch to ".missing" -- still a nonexistent file, but a
real extension shape.

* volume: validate the collection in CopyFile and ReceiveFile

The client-supplied Collection is folded into the on-disk path as
"<collection>_<vid>" by VolumeFileName and EcShardBaseFileName, both joined
with path.Join / util.Join. A Collection carrying a separator, e.g.
"../../x", therefore path-cleans to a target outside the volume directory,
the same escape the extension check just closed. Reject a collection that is
a bare parent reference or holds a separator; ordinary names ('.', '-' and
all) still pass.
2026-08-08 09:25:57 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 213eb4c23a s3tables: add ClickHouse iceberg catalog integration test (#10637)
* s3tables: add ClickHouse iceberg catalog integration test

* ci: run the ClickHouse iceberg catalog test

* s3tables: bound setup HTTP calls in the ClickHouse test

* s3tables: pin the ClickHouse writer image dependencies
2026-08-07 22:39:50 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 4527947afc mount: absorb the WinFsp metadata cache window in the concurrent-reader test (#10636)
WriteFile's own existence probe runs while the file does not exist, and
WinFsp may serve that answer from its metadata cache for up to the
mount's FileInfoTimeout. A reader racing into that window failed its
open with not-found, which is the cache being a cache, not a defect in
concurrent reading. Establish visibility once before racing the readers,
so the test exercises what it is named for.
2026-08-07 19:45:30 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub a5e8254ffd s3: give a versioned metadata-only copy its own chunks (#10594)
* s3: give a versioned metadata-only copy its own chunks

A self-copy that only rewrites metadata clones the source entry, chunk fids
and all, and writes the clone back. With no versioning that is exactly right:
the clone replaces the entry it came from, so one entry owns the needles the
whole time. Under versioning the clone lands in a new .versions/ file and the
source stays live, and nothing refcounts a plain shared chunk list -- deleting
either version (a NoncurrentVersionExpiration rule, say) frees needles the
other still points at, and the next vacuum makes that permanent. rclone hits
this on every upload, since it stamps mtime with exactly this copy.

Take the metadata-only path only where the write replaces the entry it read:
the bare key of a bucket without versioning. Versioned, suspended, and
versionId-pinned copies fall through to the regular copy path, which gives the
destination its own chunks.

* s3: reencrypt a versioned SSE-KMS key rotation instead of reusing the chunks

A same-object copy that changes the KMS key id hands the source chunks straight
back, on the assumption that the copy overwrites the entry they came from. A
versioned bucket writes a new version beside the source instead, so the two end
up sharing needles that nothing refcounts, and deleting either one frees the
other's data. Reuse the chunks only when the destination really is the source
entry; otherwise fall through to the reencrypt path, which also gives the new
version the key it asked for rather than leaving it on the old one.

* s3: make one predicate decide whether a copy replaces its source

The metadata-only branch and the key-rotation strategy both answer the same
question -- does this copy write back to the entry it read -- so let them share
one predicate instead of pairing a same-destination check with it separately at
each site.

* test(s3): fail the copy regression tests when the vacuum does not run

The helper swallowed a failed or non-200 request to the master, so a vacuum
that never ran turned both chunk-ownership assertions into no-ops: the
tombstoned needles were still readable and the surviving version looked fine
either way. Require the endpoint, the request, and a 200.

* ci(s3): run every versioning test in the regression gate

The gate named the tests it wanted, so a new regression test sat there
uncovered until someone remembered this file -- it fooled me into thinking two
tests added in this PR never ran anywhere, when the comprehensive job had them
all along. Invert it: run everything, and name a test only to keep it out. The
delete job beside this one already works that way, and the suite costs about
two minutes.

Only the pagination stress tests are excluded; they build 1500+ versions, skip
themselves without ENABLE_STRESS_TESTS, and have their own make target.

Go's regexp has no negation, so the pattern is still assembled from a listing,
the way the volume-server integration workflow does it. Note the trailing $$:
make eats a lone trailing $ and takes the anchor with it.
2026-08-05 20:29:28 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub c2b47967bd s3: retire the suspended null marker only once the PUT has committed (#10589)
The suspended PUT dropped the null delete marker before writing, so a failed
write left the .versions pointer naming a marker that was gone. The read path
heals a dangling pointer by promoting the newest survivor, so a key the caller
had deleted came back serving an older version, and the heal persisted that
pointer. Move the retire into afterCreate via the shared finalize, which also
brings the ownership check the copy and multipart paths already have.
2026-08-05 14:31:50 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub f09bc14165 s3: report the effective ownership when a bucket has none stored (#10591)
* s3: report the effective ownership when a bucket has none stored

GetBucketOwnershipControls read Seaweed-X-Amz-Ownership straight out of the
bucket entry, so a bucket that never had one written reported an empty
ObjectOwnership. The object write path defaults the same missing attribute to
BucketOwnerEnforced, so the API contradicted the behavior it describes.

Resolve the stored value through one helper both readers share, and let
PutBucketOwnershipControls persist unconditionally so setting the default
value still gives DeleteBucketOwnershipControls something to remove.

* test: cover the bucket ownership controls round trip

Pins the behaviors the ownership default fix depends on: a bucket that never
had ownership controls written reports BucketOwnerEnforced, and putting that
same value on such a bucket still persists it, so the delete that follows has
something to remove. The put-then-delete case gets its own bucket -- run after
an ObjectWriter put, it would pass against an implementation that skips only
the initial write.

The acl workflow already runs this package against a live weed mini, so it
needs no wiring.
2026-08-05 13:15:28 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 5269d93fa8 s3: let a suspended-versioning multipart completion replace the null delete marker (#10585)
* s3: let a suspended-versioning multipart completion replace the null delete marker

In a versioning-suspended bucket a DELETE writes a null delete marker into the
key's .versions directory. CompleteMultipartUpload then writes the new null
version at the regular path but left that marker in place, so the completion
returned 200 and the object listed while HEAD and GET kept resolving the marker
and answered NoSuchKey. PutObject already handles this; do the same on the
multipart path.

* s3: order the suspended-versioning null cleanup behind the multipart write

Removing the null delete marker before writing left a failed completion having
already published the key's newest real version: the marker was gone, the
pointer still named it, so reads rescanned .versions and promoted the older
version. Do both fixups only once the write commits, pointer first so reads
never see a pointer aimed at a marker that is no longer there, and fail the
completion when the pointer cannot be cleared instead of returning 200 for an
object HEAD and GET still miss - a non-ErrNone finalize keeps the upload
directory, so the caller's retry replays it.

Also cover a pre-suspension real version in the regression test.

* s3: skip the suspended null cleanup when a concurrent write won the key

The completion's .versions fixups are unconditional rewrites of shared state and
the routed path runs off the object write lock, so a DELETE landing between the
multipart write and the cleanup had its own null delete marker erased - leaving
a successfully deleted key readable as an older retained version. Re-read the
object first and leave the cleanup alone unless it is still the one we wrote.

This narrows the window rather than closing it; a compare-and-set pointer flip
is the real answer and wants its own change.

* s3: re-read the completed object from the filer that took the write

The guard compared the object against our upload id through the routed read,
which skips an owner it recently found unreachable and falls back local-first.
A write that just landed on the owner could then read as superseded on another
filer, skipping the cleanup and leaving the key unreadable - the bug this set
out to fix. Read back from the filer the write went to instead.

* s3: trim the suspended-completion comments to the non-obvious why

* s3: lift the suspended null-write finalize into a named helper

The pointer-then-marker ordering is policy shared by every suspended null write,
not something the multipart path should be stating on its own; putSuspendedVersioningObject
and the copy path each restate it today. Give it a home next to the versioned
finalize helpers, and reuse the canonical key normalizer and the existing test
helpers rather than open-coding both.

* s3: retire the null delete marker on a suspended-versioning copy

The suspended CopyObject branch cleared the .versions latest pointer but left the
null delete marker a preceding DELETE wrote. While the regular-path object owns
the null slot that marker is shadowed, so it reads and lists correctly - but it
resurfaces as a phantom delete for a key nobody deleted once that null version
goes away. Route the branch through the shared finalize.

* s3: keep the suspended null cleanup from erasing a concurrent delete

Retiring the marker on the copy path reopened the race the multipart path had
already closed: a DELETE landing between the write and the cleanup lost its own
marker, so a rescan promoted an older version under a deleted key. Move the
ownership check into the shared finalize, keyed on the attribute that identifies
the caller's write, so both paths get it.
2026-08-05 11:49:36 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 7063b3e14c s3 lifecycle: bound the daily-replay pass so a quiet cluster stops wedging the job (#10578)
* s3 lifecycle: bound the daily-replay subscription at the pass boundary

A pass opens one meta-log subscription and 16 shard drains, then waits
on all of them. Nothing told the subscription where the pass ends, so
the only exit was the fan-out spotting an event past runNow — i.e. some
unrelated write landing under /buckets after the pass started. On a
cluster that goes quiet the reader parks in Recv, every shard drain
starves on an empty channel, and Run never returns. The job sits at
stage "starting" with the executor slot held and no log line, so
expiry stops cluster-wide until someone restarts the worker.

The pass covers (globalStartTsNs, runNow], so say that: UntilNs on the
subscribe request makes the filer end the stream once it has shipped
that range. The reader then closes the event channel on the way out,
which is what unblocks the fan-out and the drains when the stream
finishes on its own rather than by cancellation.

Same fix retires the other silent hang: a reader that failed early
(subscribe error, stream error) also left every drain waiting forever.

* s3 lifecycle: keep a halted shard from starving the shared fan-out

A drain that halts mid-stream (BLOCKED / RETRY_LATER / an RPC error on
dispatch) returns while the fan-out is still routing that shard's
events. After 256 of them the per-shard buffer is full and the fan-out
blocks on the send, so no other shard sees another event. Run's
WaitGroup never drains, and the teardown that would cancel the reader
sits behind that wait — the pass wedges exactly like an idle
subscription did, with one S3 hiccup as the trigger.

Keep discarding the channel after runShard returns. The events are
past this shard's saved cursor and get re-scanned next pass anyway.

* s3 lifecycle: assert the starved shard actually made progress

The fan-out test only checked that Run returned, which a version that
quietly dropped the second shard's events would also satisfy. Assert
the dispatch landed and the cursor moved.

recordingClient gains a per-object outcome map: the two shards dispatch
from separate goroutines, so pinning BLOCKED by call index was a race
waiting to pick the wrong shard.

* s3 lifecycle: fail the pass when the shared subscription dies

Closing the event channel on reader exit is what unblocks the shard
drains, but it also means a subscribe that never opened, or a stream
that broke mid-pass, now ends every drain cleanly. Run logged that at
V(2) and returned the shard result — so a filer failure produced a
green lifecycle job that had processed nothing.

Surface it as the pass error. Cursors still hold what was processed and
tomorrow resumes there; what changes is that the job stops claiming
success.

Cancellation has to stay a non-error — the shell driver's -runtime cap
is a truncated pass, not a failed one — and a canceled gRPC stream
arrives as a status code, not a wrapped context.Canceled, so isCanceled
checks both forms the way the rest of the tree does.

* s3 lifecycle: decide reader cancellation by intent, not status code

A stream we cancel and a stream the filer cancels both arrive as
codes.Canceled, so classifying the reader's exit by its error let a
truncated pass report success whenever the failure happened to carry a
cancellation status.

Intent is knowable exactly, so read that instead: the pass stops on
purpose only when the caller's context ended (the shell driver's
-runtime cap) or the fan-out hit the pass boundary itself. Everything
else is a broken subscription and fails the pass.

TestRun_ServerSideCancelFailsThePass and TestRun_CappedPassIsNotAFailure
are the same codes.Canceled from the reader with opposite verdicts —
the pair only passes because the decision no longer looks at the error.

* s3 lifecycle: time out a subscription that stops delivering

UntilNs ends a healthy stream and gRPC keepalive catches a dead
connection, but neither reaches a filer that keeps answering pings while
its handler has stopped producing. The pass would wait on that forever,
since s3_lifecycle is the one job type with no execution timeout.

Bound the wait for each response at 20 minutes, and opt into the filer's
idle heartbeats so a caught-up stream proves liveness instead of looking
stalled. The default sits above the filer's 15-minute metadata-gap
recovery budget, so a subscriber legitimately parked on a gap is never
mistaken for a stalled one.

Recv is only interruptible by killing the RPC, so it moves to its own
goroutine behind a per-response deadline. The timer covers only the wait
on the filer — dispatch to Events happens outside it, so a slow consumer
can't trip the watchdog.

Approach and the 20-minute figure are from #10577 by way of comparing
the two fixes; the wiring differs because the reader here ends the pass
by closing its event channel rather than cancelling the fan-out.

* s3 lifecycle: trim the comments added by this branch

Keep the non-obvious why, drop the prose restating what the code says.

* s3 lifecycle: snapshot reader intent where the reader stops

Sampling ctx.Err() during teardown reads it after the drains and cursor
saves have run. A reader that failed while the deadline was still live,
on a pass whose teardown then outlives that deadline, was classified as
an intentional stop and reported success.

Sampling earlier in Run is not the fix either: before the shard wait, a
legitimately capped pass has not reached its deadline yet and would be
misclassified the other way. Intent belongs where the reader actually
stops, so the reader goroutine records it next to the error it returns.

Reported by greptile on #10578.

* s3 lifecycle: cover the worker-dispatched pass with nothing due

The e2e suite drives the shell command in 14 of 15 files; the one test
on the real admin->worker path backdates an object, so its own delete
pushes a meta-log event past the pass boundary and ends the pass. The
branch where a pass has nothing to dispatch was never exercised through
the worker.

Cover it, asserting the pass returns on its own: no admin cancellation,
and the executor slot free for the next one.

This is not a regression test for the wedge. A pass used to end when any
write landed past its boundary, and on a shared test cluster something
usually does — the whole suite passes on the unfixed build, verified.
The deterministic guards stay the dailyrun unit tests; this one would
catch a pass that hangs unconditionally.
2026-08-05 08:41:37 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 7d6c83b126 s3: stop treating a directory marker as a versioned object (#10573)
* s3: delete a directory marker instead of versioning it

The key "dir/" is stored as the filer directory itself, so a delete marker
cannot stand in for it without hiding the children underneath, and its history
has to sit inside the directory it describes, where listings keep meeting it.
Delete it the way an unversioned bucket already does: remove the directory
when nothing is left under it, demote it to a plain directory when children
remain, and drop a history an older build recorded for it.

* s3: stop resolving directory markers through a version history

Nothing records one for them any more, so the lookups that read it are dead
weight - and the one in the listing was a filer round trip per directory
marker returned, which for a bucket that keeps a marker per directory is the
whole listing cost. A listing reads what a directory stands for straight off
the entry it already has; a unit test pins that N markers cost one ListEntries
rather than N+1. The guard that keeps a history left inside a directory by an
older build from surfacing as a key named after it stays.

* s3: do not let deleting "dir/" destroy the object at "dir"

Writing under an existing object turns that object's entry into a directory
while it keeps its data, so the keys "m2" and "m2/" end up sharing one entry.
Stripping the entry to delete "m2/" therefore wiped the object at "m2" - a
different key, and in a versioned bucket one no delete marker records. Leave a
directory holding uploaded data alone; "m2/" does not name it.

* s3: make the directory-marker delete fail closed and take the write lock

The guard that spares a promoted file only fired when the entry read
succeeded, so a transient filer error fell through to the delete and could
destroy the object at "dir" anyway. Fail the request instead, take the object
write lock so the entry cannot change between the check and the delete, and
report a stale history that cannot be removed rather than leaving it to keep
naming the key in ListObjectVersions.

* s3: check If-Match inside the directory-marker delete lock

The lock belongs to the caller: taking it inside the delete nested it under the
batch handler's own lock, and since every lock from a gateway shares one owner
the inner release would have freed it while the outer caller still assumed it
held it. Both callers now own the lock, the single-object path re-checks
If-Match inside it the way the other delete paths do, and a batch delete of a
trailing-slash key in an unversioned bucket goes through the same marker path
instead of the raw delete. A history lookup that fails now fails the delete.
2026-08-05 00:24:54 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub d448e9db7b iceberg: withhold the S3 endpoint from credential-vending clients (#10570)
* iceberg: withhold the S3 endpoint from credential-vending clients

A client that sends X-Iceberg-Access-Delegation: vended-credentials builds
its storage credential out of the LoadTable config and drops the one it was
configured with. We vend no credentials, so the endpoint we advertised left
DuckDB signing nothing: every metadata and data file came back 403, and its
attempt to refresh the empty credential 404ed on stage-created tables.

Answer those clients with no config at all so they keep their own
credentials. Clients that do not ask for delegation still get the endpoint.

* iceberg: mark load responses as varying on the delegation header

The FileIO config in a table or view load response now depends on whether
the client asked for vended credentials, so a cache between us and the
client must key on that header rather than on the URL alone.

* test: cover the DuckDB vended-credentials access pattern

Runs weed mini with -s3.externalUrl, which is what makes the catalog
advertise an endpoint at all, and checks both halves: a plain LoadTable
still gets the endpoint, while one asking for vended credentials never gets
an endpoint without the credentials to sign with. The DuckDB round trip
creates a table from a query and reads it back, which is the flow that
failed with 403 on every data file.
2026-08-04 18:14:34 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 474a0713b0 s3: honor the version history of a directory marker (#10571)
* s3: stop listing a directory marker whose latest version is a delete marker

A directory marker is stored as the filer directory itself, so deleting the
key "dir/" writes its delete marker into dir/.versions while the directory
keeps its mime and stays a key object. Every listing kept reporting the key.
Consult that history before treating the entry as a key, and demote it in
memory when it is delete-marked so live children still hold the prefix.

Also skip the container's own .versions entry while listing inside it: the
suffix match read it as the history of a nested object named "", which
surfaces as a phantom dir/dir key as soon as a live directory version exists.

* s3: a directory marker with version history is not also the latest null version

The directory entry behind the key "dir/" is that key's null version, but
list-object-versions reported it with IsLatest hardcoded true. After a delete
the key came back twice, once as the delete marker and once as a null version,
both claiming to be latest. Read the pointer under the directory instead.

* s3: resolve directory markers through their version history on GET and HEAD

GET and HEAD short-circuit any trailing-slash key straight to the filer
directory, so a directory marker kept answering 200 after its delete marker
was written. Resolve the key from dir/.versions first when the bucket is
versioned: a delete-marked current version answers 404 with
x-amz-delete-marker, a named delete-marker version answers 405, and a key
with no history keeps today's directory-probe behavior untouched.

* s3: re-creating a directory marker retires its delete marker

PutObject on a trailing-slash key never looked at the bucket's versioning
state, so re-creating a marker after a delete left the latest-version pointer
on the delete marker and the key stayed invisible to every versioned read.
Point the key back at the directory entry, which is its null version, and drop
the null version .versions may still hold — the same two steps a suspended
write already takes, now shared.

* s3: fail a directory-marker request whose version history cannot be read

Every lookup of dir/.versions treated any error as "no history", so a filer
hiccup served the directory entry for a key whose current version may be a
delete marker, reported a null version as latest over one, and let a PUT
report success without retiring the delete marker it was meant to retire.
Only a confirmed absence takes the no-history path now.

* s3: cancel the directory-marker probe stream instead of abandoning it

The probe answers off the first entry and returns, leaving the ListEntries
stream open for the life of the parent context. Give it a context of its own.
2026-08-04 18:14:00 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub d01ed36118 test: cover delete-on-close on the windows mount (#10561)
* test: cover delete-on-close on the windows mount

Windows software creates temporaries with FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE and
never deletes them explicitly. The conformance suite showed a file
outliving its last handle — an aborted test left its file behind and
every later test hit a name collision — but nothing in this suite asks
for the flag, because os offers no way to.

Skips where the flag is unavailable rather than passing quietly.

* test: fail delete-on-close on a real error instead of skipping

Skipping on any error meant a refused flag looked the same as a platform
that cannot ask for it, so the test could pass by never running. It now
skips only on that one sentinel and reports everything else.

Also stops printing a nil error when the file is still there after its
last handle closed, and checks the closes it was discarding.
2026-08-04 17:42:30 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub b1fecf3b44 mount: mark windows files archived and ignore a zero timestamp (#10559)
* mount: mark windows files archived and ignore a zero timestamp

Windows synthesises NORMAL when a file reports no attributes at all, which
is not the same as ARCHIVE and is what create_fileattr_test checks.

Utimens also wrote a zero timestamp through. Windows sends zero for a field
it is not setting, and storing it put 1970 in the atime overlay, which then
overrode the entry's real time — so a file created a moment ago reported an
access time of 1970 whenever the caller asked through an open handle.
Reading the path instead went down a different route and looked right,
which is why a probe of a fresh file showed nothing wrong.

* mount: match the file type by its mask, and only treat the epoch as unset

S_IFDIR is part of the multi-bit type field rather than a flag, so masking
against it alone also matched a symlink, which shares the bit. A regular
file is now identified by the type mask.

Rejecting every timestamp at or below zero also rejected a date genuinely
before 1970. Only the epoch itself is what Windows sends for a field it is
not setting, so that is all that is refused.

create_fileattr goes back on the known-failures list: the archive fix
works and the test simply moves on to ask for READONLY too, which needs
Chflags. Taking it off was premature.

* mount: drop the time overlays when an inode is released

atimeMap and dirMtimeMap are keyed by inode and were only ever trimmed by
a random eviction at capacity. Inodes are derived from the path, so a
delete and recreate hands the same number to a different file, which then
reported the previous file's access time — a file created a moment ago
answering with a time from long before it existed.

Cleared when Forget actually releases the inode, not on every decrement:
a partial forget still has users. Forget now reports that so callers
holding state keyed by the inode know when to drop it.

* ci: keep getfileinfo listed while its access time is unexplained

Two causes have been fixed and neither closed it, so the honest state is
listed-with-a-reason rather than removed in hope.

* mount: drop timestamp overlays while the inode table is locked

Forget released the inode under the table's lock but cleaned up the
atime and dir-mtime overlays after returning from it. Inode numbers are
derived from the path, so a lookup arriving in that window is handed the
same number back and can store a time that the cleanup then deletes.

Run the cleanup at the release point instead, as a callback under the
lock. The directory-cache purge stays deferred until after the unlock,
where it has to be.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EgY2QA3iiPtiu6ww3P2EBn
2026-08-04 16:42:33 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub edaee0e426 ci: run each conformance test on its own (#10564)
* ci: run each conformance test on its own

Run as one batch with --no-abort, a test that fails part way leaves its
files behind and the next one fails creating them, so the report showed a
cascade of failures that were really one. The whole rdwr and flush group
passes when run alone, and was only ever collateral.

Each test now gets its own directory and its own invocation, which costs
a process start per test and makes the list mean what it says.

* ci: clear a case directory before reusing it

-Force creates the directory but leaves anything already in it, so a
leftover from an interrupted run would defeat the isolation this exists
to provide.

* ci: list the one real failure isolation exposed

With each test on its own, 31 of 32 pass. The exception is rdwr_mmap_test,
which compares mapped bytes against what was written and finds them
different — a genuine data mismatch that only appeared once the test could
run to completion instead of tripping over a previous one's leftovers.
2026-08-04 13:24:38 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 5a5cd15054 mount: report . and .. from windows directories (#10556)
* mount: report . and .. from windows directories

WinFsp strips the dot entries for the root itself and expects every other
directory to report them, the way a real NTFS enumeration does: its
dirctl test asserts a subdirectory's first two entries are "." and ".."
and that a hundred files enumerate as 102 entries. Dropping them
unconditionally is what fails querydir_test.

The Go test that guarded the old behaviour went with it: os.File.Readdir
filters dot entries itself, so it could never have observed either way.

* mount: give the windows dot entries their directory type

The readdir fills an attribute block only for real children, so "." and
".." arrived with a zeroed one and were reported with mode 0. Windows
refuses to enumerate a directory whose first entry is not marked as a
directory, which is the assertion querydir_test fails on with
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND.

They now carry the type the readdir already knew. The explorer walk also
names any unexpected entry rather than only counting, so a dot entry
leaking through reads differently from a missing file.
2026-08-04 10:44:43 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 89ce6e175d ci: run WinFsp's conformance suite against the windows mount (#10555)
* ci: run WinFsp's conformance suite against the windows mount

The FUSE mount is held to pjdfstest with an empty known-failures list;
the Windows mount had 24 hand-written tests. winfsp-tests is what WinFsp
uses to check a filesystem behaves like NTFS, and --fuse-external points
it at ours instead of the bundled memfs, so it is the same bar in the
same shape: anything failing that is not listed is a regression.

It reaches oplocks, security descriptors, POSIX unlink-and-rename and
directory-buffer resumption — the places a Windows filesystem actually
breaks, and none of which the current suite touches.

known_failures.txt starts with the four groups that cannot pass by
construction. The first run will show what else needs listing.

* ci: make the conformance runner fail loudly instead of running empty

The first run reported "0 excluded entries" and then died with
STATUS_DLL_NOT_FOUND, so it never tested anything while looking like a
normal failing run.

winfsp-tests links against winfsp-x64.dll, which the installer puts
somewhere the loader does not search, so the WinFsp bin directory goes on
PATH. A missing or empty known-failures list is now an error rather than
a silent run with nothing excluded, which would read as a clean sweep
with no known failures. ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} needs the braces, and a
mount point without a trailing separator makes Join-Path build a path
relative to the drive's current directory rather than its root.

* ci: read winfsp-tests failures from its report, and list the real ones

The first run exited zero with 30 of 50 tests reporting KO, and the job
went green: --no-abort keeps the suite going past a failure and the exit
code stops reflecting them, so trusting it meant the check could not fail.
The report is now parsed for KO lines and each one named in the error.

known_failures.txt is populated from that run rather than guessed. The
groups are real gaps, not suite quirks: cached and overlapped IO fails as
a block, delete-while-open has no pending state, Windows file attributes
and creation time are not round-tripped, and directory enumeration does
not resume from a marker.

* ci: stop excluding the extended attribute tests

Forwarding landed, so the group runs instead of being taken on trust —
which is the only coverage it has had.
2026-08-03 22:26:22 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub e377149d39 mount: support mounting on Windows through WinFsp (#10536)
* mount: add the WinFsp filesystem adapter

WinFsp speaks a path-based FUSE dialect; weed/mount implements the
inode-based raw protocol the Linux kernel uses. This translates between
them so Windows runs the same filesystem code as everywhere else rather
than a second implementation: paths resolve to inodes one Lookup at a
time, and the raw operations run unchanged underneath.

Errno translation is spelled out rather than passed through. Go numbers
Windows errnos as offsets from APPLICATION_ERROR, so the raw value would
mean something unrelated by the time WinFsp read it.

Hard links return ENOSYS since WinFsp has none, and byte-range locks stay
with its kernel driver rather than the mount's lock table.

Not reachable from the mount command yet.

* mount: build the winfsp errno table with explicit precedence

Platforms alias errnos differently: freebsd has no ENODATA and linux makes
ENOATTR the same value as it. A map literal with colliding constant keys
does not compile, so build the table and let the first entry win, keeping
the general codes their own meaning.

* mount: wire the winfsp adapter into the mount command

RunMount was one function doing filer setup, mount-point preparation and
serving. The setup is the same everywhere, so it moves to mount_common.go
and each platform keeps only what differs.

Windows differs mostly in the mount point: WinFsp wants a drive letter or
a path that does not exist yet, so none of the unix preparation applies,
and a bad one is worth rejecting up front because WinFsp reports failure
as a bare false. Adds -windows.caseInsensitive for software that expects
Windows naming rules.

* ci: mount on windows and exercise it

Builds weed.exe, installs WinFsp, starts a cluster, mounts S: and runs a
test suite against it: round trips at several sizes, offset writes,
rename, delete, nested directories, concurrent writers, and a directory
wide enough to stand in for the case that prompted this.

Nothing else here can run the Windows mount, so without this the adapter
is only known to compile.

* ci: build the windows mount without cgo

The runner has MinGW, so cgo is on by default and cgofuse compiles its
cgo variant, which needs WinFsp's headers. The nocgo variant loads the
DLL at run time and is what the released weed.exe uses.

* mount: make the winfsp path splitting portable and test it

resolve and resolveParent had the splitting inline in a windows-tagged
file, so the cases that matter most there — both separators, empty and
dot components, the root having no parent to create in — could not be
tested on any runner that builds this.

* test: check the windows mount persists across a remount

Reading a file back through the same live mount proves nothing about
durability; the answer can come from the mount's own caches. Write the
fixtures, confirm the filer serves them with the mount out of the path,
then re-read after a teardown and remount.

* test: cover the windows mount operations that had none

Truncate, append, chtimes and the hard-link refusal were implemented but
never exercised, and the errno table was only unit-tested for mapping,
never end to end. Adds names that have to survive the UTF-16 boundary,
rename over an existing target and across directories, and concurrent
handles on one file rather than one file each.

* ci: dial the filer over ipv4 and run the persistence phases

localhost resolves to ::1 first on windows and the cluster binds ipv4
only, so the mount's grpc dial was refused while the http readiness
probe passed by falling back to ipv4.

* ci: pin the cluster to loopback and probe ports by connecting

weed mini advertises the runner's LAN address and binds filer grpc there,
so the mount's dial to 127.0.0.1:18888 was refused while http answered.

The readiness probe also passed with nothing on 18888: Test-NetConnection
reported success for a port that then refused a connection, so it now
opens a socket instead.

* ci: report listening ports before mounting

The readiness probe connects to the filer grpc port and the mount is then
refused on it, which cannot both be true; print the actual state.

* ci: run the cluster, mount and tests in one step

The runner tears down a step's process tree when its shell exits, so the
cluster started in an earlier step was already gone: the readiness probe
passed against a live filer, the step ended, and the mount then found
nothing listening. A diagnostic step reported no weed.exe at all.

Everything that needs those processes alive now shares a step.

* mount: key windows file io on the handle, not the path

Read and Write walked the path on every call to fill in a NodeId the raw
filesystem never reads: both look the file up by handle. Under eight
writers creating files in one directory the walk transiently missed and
the write failed with ENOENT before reaching the filesystem at all.

Same for flush, fsync and the release calls. O_EXCL now fails on an
existing name instead of taking it over, and Symlink is refused: the
entry is easy to create but WinFsp only follows it once the reparse
point is wired up, so it read back as an empty file.

* mount: translate cgofuse open flags for windows

cgofuse reports MSVC's numbering and the raw filesystem tests Go's, so
only the access mode and O_TRUNC lined up: O_EXCL arrived as O_APPEND and
O_CREAT as nothing at all.

Also report which handle a failed write was using, to tell a handle that
was never issued from one released while still in use.

* mount: report which step of a windows create failed

A concurrent create fails with ENOENT and the path walk, the parent
lookup and the create itself are indistinguishable from the caller.

* ci: send weed logs to stderr on windows

glog writes to its own files by default, so the mount's own error output
never reached the redirected log. Its flags are global and have to come
before the subcommand.

* mount: resolve known paths from the inode table on windows

Every create walked the parent chain with a filer lookup per component.
With eight writers creating files in one directory that is hundreds of
concurrent lookups of the same parent, and lookupEntry reports an
authoritative ENOENT when the directory is cached, the entry is not in
the cache and the inode table has no record — a window a concurrent
refresh can open for a directory that plainly exists.

A path the mount already tracks now resolves straight out of that table.

* test: sync the windows persistence fixtures before closing

The mount is killed rather than unmounted, so anything still queued for
flush is legitimately lost and the test was measuring crash durability
while calling it persistence. A 9MB file lost four chunks that way.

* mount: keep the lookup refresh on the target path

Resolving a tracked path straight from the inode table skipped Lookup,
which is also what refreshes the entry: a truncate then read back the
pre-truncate size. Only the parent chain takes the shortcut now, which
is where the concurrent creates were racing anyway.

* mount: log every windows resolve failure

Open suppressed ENOENT and Getattr logged nothing, which hid the two
callbacks that can report a missing file during a create.

* mount: drop dot entries from windows directory listings

readdir reports "." and ".." for the kernel, but Windows enumerates a
directory without them and displays whatever it is handed, so a folder of
200 files listed 202. Go's ReadDir filters them, which is why only the
PowerShell walk caught it.

* mount: flush queued writes when windows mount is interrupted

The signal handler exits the process the moment its hooks return, so the
WaitForAsyncFlush after Serve never ran on ctrl-c and queued writes were
dropped.

* mount: let windows mount over an empty directory

WinFsp turns a directory mount point into a reparse point, which NTFS
allows on an empty directory and refuses on a populated one. The check
rejected every existing directory, so the ordinary habit of creating the
mount point first failed with a message saying it should not exist.

CI now mounts over a pre-created directory and writes through it.

* ci: run the windows mount check on any pull request

It is the only thing that exercises the Windows mount, so restricting it
to pull requests based on master skipped it for stacked ones. Replaces
the branch name that was pushed to trigger it.

* mount: do not log a missing windows entry as an error

Windows probes for entries that do not exist as a matter of course, so
ENOENT from getattr and open is an answer rather than a fault and would
have filled the log.

* mount: take the fast path for parent chains in every windows resolve

Narrowing it to resolveParent left Getattr and Open re-walking the parent
with a filer lookup per component, and those are what Windows calls
before a create: eight writers in one directory still raced a meta cache
refresh there. Only the final component needs the Lookup refresh.

The pass that suggested otherwise came from a run five times slower than
the failing ones, where the race had no room to appear.

* mount: drop the windows path resolution shortcut

Resolving from the inode table skipped the Lookup that refreshes an
entry, and a truncate then read back its old size. Applying it only to
the parent chain kept truncate correct but left concurrent creates
failing, and applying it to the final component too inverted that. The
two cannot both be satisfied this way, so this returns to looking up
every component and leaves the concurrent create failure open.

* mount: fall back to the open handle when a deferred entry is evicted

A create that defers the filer write leaves the entry only in the local
cache. Creating many files at once pushes the directory past the hot
threshold and evicts it, taking that placeholder with it, so a lookup
went to the filer, found nothing, and reported a file that plainly
exists as missing.

The handle still holding the unflushed entry is authoritative for it.
Caught by concurrent creates over a Windows mount, which resolves a path
on every call rather than relying on a kernel dentry cache.

* mount: let cgofuse resolve to the version the module graph requires

rclone already depends on cgofuse at a newer commit than the v1.6.0 pin,
so readonly builds refused the go.mod until it matched what MVS picks.
The interface and flag values the adapter uses are unchanged there.

* mount: wait for a pending async flush before looking up on the filer

Open, unlink and rename already wait, but a plain lookup went straight
to the filer and read pre-close metadata: truncate a file, close it, and
a path probe during the flush window reported the old size. The kernel
attr cache hides this on linux; a front end that resolves paths on every
operation hit it directly.

* mount: reject a umask wider than the file mode it becomes

ParseUint allowed 64 bits and the result is narrowed to os.FileMode,
which is 32, so an out-of-range umask truncated silently instead of
being reported as unparseable.

* mount: address review findings on the windows mount

WaitForAsyncFlush closed its channel unconditionally and shutdown reaches
it from both the interrupt hook and the path that resumes after serving,
so a ctrl-c could panic on a second close.

The deferred-entry fallback read an open handle's entry without its lock,
which is what the other two readers of that field take so FromPbEntry
does not walk the chunk slice mid-append. The async-flush wait also sat
ahead of the meta cache, making every stat of a recently closed file
queue behind uploads; it belongs just before the filer is consulted.

Windows entries were persisted as uid 0: the raw filesystem stores
InHeader's owner and the adapter left it zero. They now carry the
identity the mount was started with.

The errno table used Linux numbering while cgofuse decodes MSVC's, so
ENAMETOOLONG arrived as EDEADLK and five others were likewise wrong; a
windows test pins each value to cgofuse's own constant.

Also: break the filer handshake loop on success rather than always
running ten rounds, accept a drive letter written S:\\, report a missing
WinFsp instead of panicking, keep commas out of the volume label, and
drop -windows.caseInsensitive, which told WinFsp the mount folds case
while lookups stayed exact.

* mount: return windows lookup references so the inode table stays bounded

Every operation that hands back an EntryOut grants a reference the Linux
kernel returns with FORGET. WinFsp has no FORGET, so the adapter took one
per path component per call, plus one per child of every readdirplus, and
never gave any back: inodeToPath grew for the life of the mount. Walking
the 200k-file directory this exists for stranded 200k references.

The adapter now plays the part the kernel plays. Each resolution releases
what it took, and an open handle keeps the reference for its inode until
Release, counted because the raw filesystem reuses one handle for repeated
opens. Holding it is not optional: completeAsyncFlush skips the metadata
flush when the saved path no longer maps to the inode, so releasing early
would lose a close's metadata.

Also stops persisting the display owner. -o uid=-1 makes WinFsp report the
calling user whatever we say, but the value handed to the raw filesystem is
written to the filer, and 4294967295 is what every other client would read.
-windows.uid and -windows.gid set what is recorded.

* mount: fix windows behaviours the reference implementations guard against

WinFsp has no ro option — it discards the flag and leaves the volume
writable — so -readOnly accepted writes and deletes. The refusal now
happens in the operations themselves.

Windows sends times around its own 1601 epoch, which arrive as a large
negative second count; casting them through stored a year-1601 timestamp
that every other client then read. Those are now left alone. rclone
carries the same guard.

Chown returned ENOSYS, and WinFsp passes a chown failure straight out of
SetSecurity, so Explorer's Security tab and icacls failed for edits that
were not about ownership. It now accepts and discards.

Only create and mkdir presented a caller; the rest sent uid 0, which
hasAccess treats as root, so deletes and renames skipped the permission
check that creates got. Every operation presents the same identity now.

A drive letter written S:\ reached WinFsp unnormalised, which recognises
a drive only as exactly two characters and then failed as a directory
path. A test also pins the open flag translation, since swapping O_EXCL
and O_TRUNC would turn 'fail if it exists' into 'truncate it'.

* mount: answer windows getattr and truncate from the open handle

WinFsp keeps the path a handle was opened with and never updates it when
the file is renamed, so resolving the path again fails on a handle that is
still perfectly valid — the ordinary write-temp-then-rename save pattern.
The handle already knows its inode, which also removes a full path walk
from two operations WinFsp calls constantly.

Readlink on the root now refuses. WinFsp probes there to decide whether
the volume has symlinks and enables them unless it fails, and with them on
it resolves a path a component at a time, each one reaching us as its own
walk — all for a feature Symlink already refuses.

* mount: require the windows mount directory not to exist

WinFsp creates the directory itself with FILE_CREATE and removes it when
the filesystem goes away, so an existing one — empty or not — fails with
"mount point in use". Allowing an empty directory was wrong, and the CI
check that appeared to prove otherwise was the vacuous one: listing a
plain directory succeeds whether or not anything is mounted on it, so the
step passed while the mount had failed and the writes went to local disk.

That check now waits for the reparse point, which is what caught this.

* mount: apply review comments on the windows mount

-windows.uid and -windows.gid reached the adapter but not the filesystem
parameters, which is what carries the owner written to the filer, so the
flags changed nothing.

Readdir re-resolved the path while Getattr and Truncate answer from the
handle; a directory renamed during an enumeration then failed on the
stale path WinFsp still holds.

Utimens now honours UTIME_OMIT instead of writing whatever came with it.

* mount: tag the unix-only lock tests away from windows

The production lock files were tagged when the package was made to build
on windows, but the tests that exercise them were not, so anything that
compiles tests for windows still failed on syscall.F_WRLCK.

* ci: vet the mount tests for each target too

Only compiling the non-test build let an untagged test keep a per-OS
syscall constant without anything noticing.
2026-08-03 21:20:26 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub c191b2fe01 iceberg: let clients select their table bucket as the catalog warehouse (#10549)
* iceberg: accept bare bucket names and ARNs as the catalog warehouse

Only s3://<bucket>/ was recognized. A warehouse spelled as a bare table
bucket name or as the s3tables bucket ARN -- the two forms users reach for
first, the latter being what AWS S3 Tables itself takes -- was silently
dropped, so every call landed on the default "warehouse" bucket and failed
with "table bucket warehouse not found".

* iceberg: report a missing table bucket as 404, not 500

Pointing a client at a table bucket that does not exist -- which every
client with no warehouse set does, since the default bucket "warehouse"
rarely exists -- returned InternalServerError with a message naming a
bucket the client never asked for. Answer 404 and say how to select one.

* admin: show the warehouse in the PyIceberg example

The example connected without one, so it always resolved to the default
table bucket and every client that copied it failed on the first call.

* test: pin bearer auth against a table bucket that exists

The subtest called the catalog with no warehouse and accepted 500 as proof
that auth had passed, since the default bucket does not exist. A missing
table bucket now answers 404, which the test read as an auth failure. Give
it a real table bucket so only 200 passes.

* test: assert the missing-bucket guidance reaches the client

The status and error type were checked but not the message, which is the
part of the mapping that tells a user how to select a table bucket.

* test: encode the warehouse query value

The ARN case pasted raw colons and slashes into the query string. Go's
parser tolerates them, so the test passed without modelling how a client
actually sends the request.
2026-08-03 13:25:37 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 82c67b5896 test: cover listings spanning a run of retracted keys (#10517)
* test: cover listings spanning a run of retracted keys

A listing drops entries whose current version is a delete marker. When a run
of consecutive entries drops out, the page being filled can come back empty,
and an empty page is easily mistaken for the end of the listing — everything
after the run then never appears and the caller is told those objects do not
exist.

Backup repositories produce exactly this shape: a batch of keys under one
prefix is retracted while writing continues under the next.

Covers a retracted run before live keys and between live keys, walked with
page sizes smaller than the run so at least one page is filled entirely from
entries that get dropped, plus the version view of the same namespace where
every version and every delete marker must still be reported.

* test: sweep every page size in both walks and paginate the version listing
2026-07-31 19:49:36 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub d8d29c4ede s3: carry storage class in the cached listing metadata (#10516)
A listing on a versioned bucket is served from metadata cached on the
.versions directory entry so the whole listing is a single scan. The cache
carried size, mtime, ETag, owner and the delete-marker flag but not the
storage class, so newListEntry found none and fell back to STANDARD.

The result was that HEAD and the listings disagreed about the same object:
HEAD reported the class the object was stored with, while ListObjectsV2 and
ListObjectVersions reported STANDARD for every object. Clients that filter or
tier on storage class act on the listing.

Caches the class alongside the other listing fields, clears it with them, and
copies it in the routed RECOMPUTE_LATEST path so both finalize paths agree.
2026-07-31 19:48:17 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 910fa1ff37 test: compare ListObjects and ListObjectVersions over the same namespace (#10515)
* test: compare ListObjects and ListObjectVersions over the same namespace

The two listings walk the same tree through separate code paths, so a client
navigating by versioned listings can see a different namespace than one
navigating by plain listings, and concludes keys are missing that are plainly
there. Testing each path on its own never catches that; only comparing them
does, and nothing compared them.

Asserts both report identical current keys and identical common prefixes
across a backup-shaped tree: nested prefixes, a prefix naming an object
exactly, a key that is simultaneously an object and the parent of other keys,
a partial key fragment, and a prefix matching nothing.

The version view is reduced to what a plain listing reports — latest versions
that are not delete markers — so the comparison is like for like.

* test: guard against truncated pages and cover the delete-marker path
2026-07-31 19:46:31 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub fce4da5c9c test: pin verb parity on lock-arbitration keys through acquire and release (#10514)
* test: pin verb parity on lock-arbitration keys through acquire and release

Backup clients arbitrate repository ownership by writing and retracting small
keys under a fixed prefix and re-probing them, each probe using a different
verb. They trust those verbs to agree; a key reported present by one and
absent by another makes the client either spin or declare the repository
corrupt, and neither shows up as an error on the storage side because each
individual answer is locally correct.

The keys are written and immediately deleted by version id, which is the cycle
that empties a version container, so parity is asserted on both sides of the
delete and across repeated re-acquire cycles where residue accumulates.

Reports which verbs disagreed rather than just failing.

* test: run the reacquire cycle on every lock key, and drain probe bodies
2026-07-31 19:46:01 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 33a974b4c5 test: pin that an unusable version id is refused, never resolved (#10513)
* test: pin that an unusable version id is refused, never resolved

A version id containing a path separator, or "." / "..", can never name a
stored version. Resolving one to the null or latest version instead would let
a caller destroy a live version by asking for one that does not exist, on a
bucket configured for immutability.

The guard exists today and holds on every verb; it had no test. Pins two
properties: such a request is refused with a client error rather than a 5xx
(a 5xx invites endless retries of something that can never succeed), and the
version that does exist survives every refused request.

* test: require exactly 400 for an unusable version id
2026-07-31 19:45:16 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 2961448a36 test: cover delete idempotency on versioned object-locked buckets (#10512)
* test: cover delete idempotency on versioned object-locked buckets

Backup clients probe and retract lock keys continuously, so they routinely
delete keys and versions that are already gone, and they batch those deletes
alongside keys that do exist. S3 makes all of that succeed; returning an error
turns ordinary lock arbitration into a job failure.

The behaviour is correct today but had no coverage, and it runs through the
object-lock retention check, which is the most likely place for a missing
object to start being reported as an error.

Covers: deleting a key that never existed, deleting a well-formed version id
that names nothing (twice, and without disturbing the version that does
exist), and a batch whose middle key is missing — every requested key must
come back under its own name rather than silently taking another row's slot.

* test: verify the deletes actually took effect, not just that they returned
2026-07-31 19:44:30 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 63d5140485 s3: allow copying an object onto itself in a versioned bucket (#10497)
* s3: allow copying an object onto itself in a versioned bucket

The copy writes a new version instead of overwriting in place, which is how an
earlier version is restored. Buckets with versioning off or suspended keep
rejecting a self-copy that changes nothing.

* s3: cover the suspended-versioning self-copy rejection

Suspended versioning overwrites the null version in place, so a self-copy that
changes nothing stays rejected. Pin that alongside the never-versioned case.
2026-07-30 13:00:41 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub e7a678fa72 s3: keep the list marker exclusive for versioned objects (#10496)
* s3: keep the list marker exclusive for versioned objects

A versioned object lives in a "<key>.versions" directory, so the entry name
never matched the marker and start-after/marker returned the marker key itself.

* s3: match the list marker against the raw entry name too

A backend that echoes the marker it was given returns the ".versions" directory
name, which no longer matched once the comparison used the object name alone.
Cover both, and unit test each half.
2026-07-30 12:57:31 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub a4692005e9 ci: harden the fusermount3 repair (#10485)
* ci: move the fusermount3 repair into a composite action

Three copies of the same block were already drifting apart, and the
target comes from PATH: only ever add setuid root to a root-owned,
non-symlink binary under the system bin paths, and say why otherwise.

* test: say that the process exited in the wait errors

"process exit status 1 before ... accepted connections" is missing its
verb. Also mark the SIGTERM return discarded - it fails with
os.ErrProcessDone exactly when the select below already handles it.

* ci: prefer the distro fusermount3 over escalating a shadow copy

The shadowing /usr/local/bin/fusermount3 is not root-owned either, so
setting its setuid bit would have handed root to a binary the runner
user owns - the repair now symlinks the distro one earlier in PATH and
touches nothing, keeping the in-place chmod for a root-owned binary with
no distro alternative. A setuid bit only grants root when root owns the
file, so accept an existing one only then.

* ci: run the FUSE workflows when the shared action changes

Their paths filters listed each workflow file but not the composite
action all three now call.
2026-07-29 14:02:33 -07:00
Chris LuandGitHub 167c114dae ci: fix FUSE mounts against the new runner image (#10484)
* ci: restore the setuid bit on a shadowed fusermount3

Newer ubuntu-22.04 runner images carry a source-built fusermount3 in
/usr/local/bin that shadows the distro one in PATH and is not setuid
root. go-fuse looks the helper up through PATH, so every unprivileged
mount fails with "mount failed: Operation not permitted".

* test: fail a fuse test as soon as its mount process dies

A mount that cannot mount at all exits within a second, but the harness
still waited out the 30s readiness timeout and then reported "mount
point not ready within timeout", leaving the real cause buried in the
log tail. Watch the child processes and report their exit instead.

* mount: report a failed mount without a goroutine dump

A mount failure is an environment problem - no /dev/fuse, fusermount not
setuid, stale mount point - and the all-goroutine stack dump Fatalf adds
buries the one line that says so.
2026-07-29 13:32:35 -07:00